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lntro du ctio n
The Fifth Periodic Report on the social and economic
situation and development of the regions in the
Community updates the information contained in
preceding reports and provides further analysis on
matters relating to regional problems and policy.
Part A of the report covers the main regional trends
and differences over the last decade or so in regard
to output, productivity, employment and unemploy-
ment. Also included are the results of a major re-.
examination of demographic trends in the regions
which focuses on the prospective changes in popula-
tion and labour force for the vear 2000.
Part B examines some of the factors underlying the
disparities between regions. The analysis builds on
that undertaken in previous reports, for example, in
regard to infrastructure where a new statistical data-
base on national and regional endowments is exam-
ined. A chapter is also devoted to the role of research
and technological development in the regions,
broadening the analysis presented in the preceding
report. Entirely ne,,v elements include a consideration
of the trends in foreign direct investment flows (and
the relative attractiveness of regions to new inves-
tors) and differences in the accessibility of regions
(including how this can be expected to change as a
result of improvements in transport).
Part C of the repon describes the situation in the
Community's problem regions which were eligible for
assistance under Community regional policies for the
period 1989-93. The report also provides a hrst oppor-
Introduction
tunity to consider the next g'eneration of regional
policies effective from 1994 where there is both
continuity with the past as well as important innova-
tions. This part of the report also examines Member
States' own rcgional policies and the changes which
have taken place over the last decade or so.
Part D of the reportcovers other Community policies
in the field of economic and monetary integration and
external policy (enlargement). The latter covers re-
gional aspects of the last enlargement (the situation
and prospects of the new German Liinder), the next
enlargement (the regions of Austria, Sweden,
Finland and Norway) as well as examining the re-
gional situation of the countries in the East under-
going extensive economic reform (Poland, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary).
The report reflects a combination of own research
and snrdies carried out by external experts which are
referenced in the text.
Legal basis
The periodic reports are prepared in accordance with
Article 8 of Council Regulation (EEC) N'4254/88
(as amended) on the reform of the European Regional
Development Fund
The report was adopted by the Commission after
consulting the Advisory Committee on the Develop-
ment and Conversion of Regions which expressed a
favourable opinion on its contents.
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Regional trends
the recession
The economic situation confronting the regions of
the Community in L993/94 could scarcely be more
different from that which prevailed when the Com-
mission produced the previous periodic Report at the
end of 1990. Then, economic growth wru averaging
3-4Vo per annum, jobs were being created at a record
rate and unemployment was falling steadily even in
the face of an expanding labiiiu,force. Now, the
Communigr's economy is at the end of a relatively
d*p recession 
- 
output seems to have fallen slightly
in 1993 for the first time since lgTS 
- 
and unemploy-
ment has risen to LIVo, stghtly above the level a
decade earfier when it was at its highest in the
Community's history.
Whatever the explanation of the Communiq/'s econ-
omic difficulties, and although sigrn of improvement
are visible, they have not provided the ideal circum-
stances for a reduction in intenegional disparities, as
pointed out in previous Periodic Reports.
More detailed analysis of the trends at regionar level
reveal a mixed picture. In terms of their capacity to
generate income (defined in terms of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) and expressed per head of popula-
tion), there is evidence of a general nanowing of
disparities across the regions as a whole. Up to l99l
- 
the latest year for which a complete data set exists 
-
statistical measures which take into consideration the
sinration of all regions point to a slow but steady
reduction in disparities in output per head in general.
Even so, the gap between the richest and poorest
regions remains considerable. For example, in 1991,
the top l0 regions had an average income per head
some 3rlz times greater than the bottom 10. With the
new German L[nder included the difference is
4rl2 times.
The figures also suggest that border regions in the
Member states tend to be poorer than the rest of the
qountry. This is not a uniform tendency, and espe-
cially in Belgium the difference in their income per
head is small.
With regard to unemployment rates, disparities
which nanowed at the end of 1980s widened again
in 1992 and 1993. Unemployment in 1993 in the
l0 worst-affected regions averaged 2S.3Vo, some
7 times higher than the l0 least-affected regions
where the rate averaged 3.6Vo. The regions with the
highest rates of unemploymeirt 
- 
in Spain, Southern
Italy, Ireland and Northern Ireland 
- 
are often those
where working-age population and labour force are
growing the fastest.
While it was expected in the last periodic Report that
labour supply growth would slow down, this now
seems by no means certain. In part this is because of
the possible persistence of the higher levels of immi-
gration into some parts of the Community which
have been a feature of recent years. More importan-
tly, it is because there are as yet no signs that the
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upward trend in female activity rates is slowing down
especially in those parts of the Community where
they are relatively low. In general, demogmphic fac-
tors cannot be counted on to solve the Community's
unemployment problems, especially at regional
level, although falling numbers of yowrg people in
certain areas should help to reduce levels of youth
unemployment
The unemployment problems also reflect the failure
to create jobs at the rate required to offset the long-
term decline in agricultural employment-a Process
which has yet to run its full course in most regions -
and the job losses caused by the restruchrring of
industry.
An examination of selected sertors within industry
shows widely different experiences. [n textiles and
clothing, which is strongly representedinthe weaker
regions of the Community, both output and employ-
ment are under threal In automobiles and aero-
nautics, rationalisation and the reorganisationof pro-
duction threaten employment although the longer
term trend in ouput is upward- Both activities have
been hard-hit by the global recession and the job
losses have contributed to rising unemployment in
some of the Community's central regions, dthough
rates seldom approach those in the Community's
worst-affected regions in the South and lreland.
Also considered in the report is the deferrce sector,
an amalgam of industrial and service activities
brought together by their shared dependence on pub
tic defence budgets which are under threat in vir-
tually all Member States. The outcome for the re-
gions in which production is located is uncertain.
Community producers are not entirely dependent on
domestic markets but the restructuring of outprt to-
wards non-military uses seems to offerthebestlong-
term policy. At the same time, the rwr-down or
closure of military installations - often located in
remote and rural areas 
- 
will also affect the regions
to varying degrees depending on the extent of local
linkages while the effect on unemployment of a
reduction in military personnel will tend to be more
widely spread.
Factors behind
the disparities
The disparities between the regions reflect their dif-
ferent underlying circumstances: a combination of
historical pafterns of development and the capacity
to adapt to the rapidly changing world of the late
twentieth century.
Uneven patrerns of development' historically, have
resulted in widely different endowments in infra-
structures (transport, energy, telecommunications
and the environmen$ and in human capital (the
knowledge and skills accumulated in the worKorce)
which are basic conditions for effbient prodlction.
Disparities in incomes per head are strongly associ-
ated both with poor levels of infrastnrctgre pmvision
and lower levels of qt'alification of the laborn force.
Compared to the rest of the Community, the regions
of Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portrgal tend to have
fewer roads, fewer motonvays (and higher road-
accident rates), fewer and more oddated rail lines,
fewer telephone lines, poorer acoess to the major
energy networks and are less likely to be collnccted
to waste and water supply systems- The differcnces
remain stark even after standardisation for popula-
tion and land size.
New Commission figures throw these disparities into
sharp relief. For example, the provision of motor-
ways in treland and Greece is less than 1O% of the
Community average. In Portugal there is an average
of only 27 telephone lines per 100 inhabitants - less
than haH the densrty in most Northern Member
States. In Pornrgal and Greecen only 10% of the
population is connected tq a waste water treafrnent
facitity (a particular difficulty given the importance
of tourism in these areas) whereas the figure is over
80Vo in most Northern Member States. Therc are
often wide differences in the levels of qrnlifrcation
of the worKorce, although the situation is changing
rapidly. The weight of the pastremains imporantand
whereas in the Community as a whole, for example,
less than one in five adults had not completed an
education beyond primary level, in Greece the figure
is one in two adults and, in Portugal, three in every
four adults. This is one factor in the explanation of
".''=ffi.*..'.-
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relatively low rates of female participation in these
areas.
The knowledge and skills accumulated in the work-
force are critical for the competitiveness and adapta-
bility of regional economic stnrctures, a feature
which is closely linked to researchandtechnological
development activity (RTD). Adjusted for the size of
their worKorce, Greece and Porflrgal have only 20-
25%of employment in RTD compared with the more
advanced Membef States. This is only one aspect of
the handicap suffered by the weaker Member States
and regions. Others include a comparative absence
of private sector involvement, and the absence of a
financial environment attuned to the risks of innova-
tory activities. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests
that a major investment prograrnme in research fa-
cilities in the Community's weaker regions is not the
most direct or cost-effective solution since new tech-
nology can be acquired externally. What is more
critical is the capacity to absorb and exploit new
technology which is often lacking and which there-
fore implies a need to establish appropriate systems
for technological transfer. A key diffrorlty in the
weaker regions, however, is a lack of recepiveness to
RTD: a failure of businesses both to recognise the
importance of RTD and to esablish a business ethos
based on the continuous introdtrction of new products
and processes. This suggests a role for the transfer of
appropriately qualified personnel from stronger to
weaker regions, demonstration projects and other
measures which will help penuade firms of the relev-
ance of RTD to their buiness prospcts. This is espe-
c ially relevant to small and medium- sized enterprises
which are oflen a key source of innovations.
Many oTttre handicaps affecting the weaker regions
can be alleviated through new invesEnenl There is
encouraging evidence that the weakest Member
States 
- 
with the support of the Community's Struc-
tural Funds 
- 
are investing more heavily in infra-
structure than the rest of the Community. In the four
poorest Member States, real investment in transport
more than doubled between 1989 and 1993 (much
more on roads than on rail) while in Spain and
Portugal annual investment in telecommunications
trebled 
- 
albeit from a very low base 
- 
in the five
years up to 1991. Since the latter investments em-
body the latest technology, it has enabled the weaker
regions to achieve relatively high rates of access to
the digital services which are essential for modern
data transmission systems.
Investment in transport, energy and telecommunica-
tions is vital to overcoming na0.ual, geographical
disadvantages often suffered by the Community's
peripheral regions and islands. Geographical periph-
erality, however, is not the same as economic periph-
erality, a fact which should become even clearer with
the enlargement of the Community to include distant
but often relatively prosperous Nordic regions. C\rr-
reqtly planned investment in passengertransport net-
works is an important step towards reducing the
economic effects of geographical peripherality. Ana-
lysis of the effects of these improvements suggests
that the main benefits are likely to accrue to many
regions in Greece, Ireland and Southern and Western
parts of the Iberian Peninsula, reducing the time it
takes to travel to Europe's main economic centres. It
is therefore of critical importance that these projects
are carried oul
Improvements in telecommunication networks will
also increase the accessibility of peripheral areas
although they are not the substitute for transport that
is sometimes thoughr On the contrary, contacts es-
tablished by telephone 
- 
and along the information
hi ghway s of the future 
- 
are likely to lead to increased
demand for passenger and freight traffic- Transport
and telecommunications networks are, therefore, es-
sentially complementary.
In relation to energy infrastructures, improvements
in terms of the inter-connection and inter-operability
of energy networks, and regional urccess to these
networks, will help to improve regional development
prospects
The evidence shows that new investors are acutely
aware of infrastnrchrre and human resource endow-
ments when taking their decisions about where to
locate, placing both features at the top of their list of
requirements. Modern firms tend to seek a combina-
tion of favourable features ratherthanbeing attracted
by any single factor 
- 
which differ from activity to
activity 
- 
when deciding where to invest.
One important factor which has favoured
Cmmunity regions as a whole as a location for new
investment has bcen the creation of the Single
Market Ttris tns led to a massive (grms) inflow of
foreign direct inveshent (FDI) into the Community
from third counEies estimaled at nearly 120 bil-
lion ECU between 1986 and 1991. Whencombined
with the flows between Member ,states 
- 
some
150 billion ECU benreen 1986 and 1991 
- 
FDI rep
resents a significant source of po-tential invesment
for thc Community's weaker regions and, except in
the case of Grece, has outstripped the hansfers from
thc Strrcural Funds. All of the weaker lUember
Stat€s are net benefbiaries of those FDI flows as are
Belgiumlluembourg and the UK In the wcaker
Member Stases, the flows from their Community
parbers are the most important whereas t&e UK is a
major recipient of FDI from third countries.
The Community's
problem regions
and regional policies
It was against a background of wide rcgional dis-
paritbs, and the paential impact of the competitive
fcoes rurleashed by the Single Market, that ttre
Community introdrrced the refonn of the Structural
Fmds in 1988. Thrce t'"es of problem regton werc
defined in terms of the Objectivcs of policy action:
Objective I (regions where development was lagging
behid), Objective 2 (regions in industrial decline),
and Objctive 5b (nral problem areas). Defined in
this way, in 1989, 140 million people in the
Community lived in problem regions 
- 
half of them
living in the weakest (Objective 1) regions 
- 
and in
1990, 16 million people of the former GDR were
added (under special provisions).
The performance of these regtons over time has been
mixed. On the positive side, many Objective 1 re-
gions have been converging towards the more pros-
perous parts of the Community, although there are
wide variations from region to region. The perfor-
mance of lreland, Spain and Portugal has been most
crrouraging. Here, annual economic growth bas
averaged 3l+7o to tslt% above the rate for the
Community as a whole since the mid-1980s. The
sihration in &€ece as well as in Southern ttaly and
Northern Ireland on the other tun4 is coruiderably
less encour4ging and the economic performance of
these rqgions seerns to be deteriorating relative to tlre
rest of the Community.
.Cabhing up remains a long-term ciallenge and the
gaps remain wide even with a growth differential on
the scale achieved over recent years by Spain, lreland
and Poraryal. In 1993, GDP per head was some
22-U% below the Comnunity average in Spain and
Ireland and40% below in Por[rgal.
Many of the Objoctive I regions which have shown
improvement in crms of GDP have achieved this
dmarily thrcugh increases in productivity. The ef-
fect on employment and unemfl oyment has been less
significant Bcanse their labour force has grown,
unemfloyrnent in Objective I regions as awhole has
inseascdsignificandy since the mid-1980s. In 1993,
one in six of thc labour force was out of worls, 50%
above the Community average.
" Edptoymbnt in the Objective I rcgions is still dis-
proportionarcly ooncentrated in traditional activities.
Iilhereas these regions amqrnt for around 16% of
totd employment in the Commrmig, they rccount
fc nearly 50% of employment in agriculture. In
some regions the slrarc of agricultural employment
is still as high as fi% compared to a Community
average of under 7%.\\e corollary is ttrat service
employment is often 10 pe,rcentage points or more
below the Communit5r average. Experience suggests
that agricultural employment will decrease while
many of the new jobs will be in services. The new
opporunities may therefore tend to be of particular
benefitto womenmany of whom are likely to benew
entrants to the laboru market. As a result, the effect
on unemployment might well be small.
The labour market situation is particularly important
inObjective 2regions sincein these arleas areduction
of unemploymentis the principal aim of Community
policies. Here, developments appear to have been
favourable with unemployment falling by nearly
12
3 percentage points between 1986 and 1993 while in
the rest of the Community it remained virtually un-
changed. This appears to reflect high rates of job
creation in Objective 2 areas, up by 13% benveen
1986 and 1993, nearly double the rate of irrcrease in
the Community as a whole.
Employment increased in Objective 5b areas at the
same rate as in the Community as a whole. The result
was a fall in unemployment mtes of I percentage
point between 1986 and 1993, which may rcflect
some decline in the labour force in rural areas, per-
haps due partly to outward migration of population
of working age.
while falling short of a full evaluation of assisted
regions, the trends in income per head, employment
and unemployment are important points of refercnce
for the Community's new stnrtural policies bcgin-
ning this year (L994). This new phase of regional
policies will need to address a nunber of specific
problems, snch as the poor economic performance of
Greece, Corsica and Sardegna as well as the general
problem of persistently high unemployment in the
Spanish Objr:ctive I regions, Soutbern lhly, Ireland
and Northern Ireland The lafter areas represent the
most acute aspct of the Community's gcneral failure
to create jobs, as compared with the US and Japan,
discussed in the Commission's White paper Growth,
C ompe titiv ena s s and Employme nt.
The Community's assisted rcgions enter the new
programming period with considerably incteased re-
sources compared to the previous phase, 1989-1993.
These resqlrces will be concentrated on the fqr
poorest Member States which will receiv e7l%of the
available funds (including the Cohesion Fund) com-
pared to 63.5% (under all three regional objectives)
in the previous period.
Total population coverage under the Structural
Funds has increased from 43% to just under 52% of
the Community total, although half of the increase is
due to the inclusion of the new Liinder. The increase
in coverage is also a response to the regional effects
of the general economic deterioration described
above, as well as to a number of specific factors, srrch
as the reform of the Common Agricultural policy and
increased international competition following the
conclusion of the Uruguay Rotmd of the GATT.
The additional resources are accompanied by a
strcngthening of procedures designed to improve the
efficiency of regional development programmes
coupled with a simplification of the decision-making
proccss. By the end of the decade the C_ommunity's
regional policies are likely to finance arornd S% of
investment in Objective I regions which could rise
to behrroen 7 and 13% n tbe four poorest Member
States, bc,lreficiaries of the new Cohesion Fund.
Used to finance new inftastrrctures (srrch as the
trans-European networlc referrcd to above) and ad-
ditional prodrrctive investment, these t€sourses can
be cxpcted to rccelerate the process of nansfonna-
tion ard modernisation of thc Community's weakest
rcgions which the prograrnmes implemented sirrce
1989 nndcr the previous planning period have cfir-
tributcd to.
The new generation of regional development pro-
grammes will also be complementcd by Community
Initiatives which are designedtorcinforce the actions
contained in the programmes as well as to infoduce
fresh innovatory measures. The new phase will main-
tain a degree of continuity with the past with a
combination of geographical initiatives
(eg INTERREG for action in borderarEzls, including
energy networks, REGIS for areas of extreme re-
moteness, LEADER fornrral development) and sec-
torally-inspired initiatives (to promote diversifica-
tion in areas dependent on older industries such as
coal (RECHAR), steel (RESIDER), texriles
(RETEX) as well as defence (KOITIVER)). New de-
parures include URBAN (actions in cities in crisis),
PESCA (diversification in fisheries areas), ADAPT
(to promote actions in anticipation of changing sys-
tems of prodnction) and an initiative for small and
medium-sized enterprise development.
The full effects of the Community's new generation
of policies, especially where they concern new infra-
structue and improvements in labour force skills,
will only emerge over the longer term. However,
Community policies in these areas are unlikely to be
enough. Other conditions need to be satisfied before
some regions are able to reduce the gap with the resl
w*
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Member States' own policies to promote develop
ment in their regions have an impo^lant role to play.
Here, the changes have been far-reaching over the
past decade vrith many Northern Member States
withdrawing from large-scale automatic support for
new business investmentin favorrof selective assist-
ance to smaller enterprises. Urban problems and nral
development problems also appear to be attracting
greater support.
These changes to national regional policies largely
concern incentives to business and are not, therefore,
directly comparable with Community regional
policies which also focus on infrastrucnre especially
in Objective 1 regions. Nevertheless, the reductions
in expenditure which have tended to accompany the
adoption of a more selective approach in Northern
parts of the Community will have to be compatible
with the need to conform with the additionality con-
ditions under the revised Structural Funds.
Deepening and widening
in the 1990s
Over the rest of the decade, the Community will take
further steps towards integration. Stage 2 of the pro-
cess leading to economic and monetary union (EMI-I)
has already been reached while the final stage, a
single currency, will help regional development in-
sofar as it reduces transaction costs and eliminates
exchange rate risk. At the same time, Member States
will lose certain fiscal and monetary policy options
as well as the ability to adjust the exchange rate. In a
single currency system, Member States will have to
adopt policies which avoid macro@onomic imbal-
ances but this will also create the conditions for faster
growth and help the weaker Member States, in par-
ticular, in their efforts to promote real convergence.
On economic grounds, the delayed entry of the
weaker Member States into a single culrency area
would therefore be undesirable.
EMU places additional importance on structural
policies as a means of maintaining regional compe-
titiveness. The need to accommodate stnrchrral
policies to the stricter fiscaland monetary disciplines
i of EMU is being recognised in the implementation
of the revised Structural Funds regulations by aposi-
tive response to request for higher rates of
Community intervention within the limits laid down.
There has also been an extension of eligible areas of
expendinue to include education and health- This
will ease ihe pressure on national budgets bu it
remains of paramount importance that any reduction-
s in public expenditure necessary to meet the macro-
'economic convergence criteria agreed in the
Maastricht Treaty be accompanied by a restrucnuing
of expendinre to maintain investment and improve
the competitiveness of the weaker regions. In this
way, nominal and real convergence can be mutually
compatible obj ectives.
The movement towards EMU, and the increased
importance accorded to Community structural
policies, are manifestations of closer integration and
greater sharing of decision-making agreed by the
Community's governments when they signed the
Maastricht Treaty in December 1991. These devel-
opments, towards a deepening of the Community,
have been accompanied by a process of widening, or
enlargement which has taken place at irregular inter-
vals since 1973.
The regions of the ex-GDR have now been part of
the Community for nearly 4 years. This has been a
period of profound restmcturing for the EastGennan
society and is regions. Output and employmenthave
fallen markedly (by one-half and AS%o,respectively)
and regional unemployment rates have reached 13-
157o. At the same time, a massive. progftrmme to
reshape and modernise the economy has begun with
investment rising to 507o of GDP compared to an
average of 20Vo Ul the Community as a whole. This
has contributed to substantial improvement in pro-
ductivity although the new Llnder remain heavily
dependent on public transfers from West Germany,
equivalent to 4.57o of West German GDP in 1993.
In addition, as new Objective I regions, the new
L?inder will receive I 3 .6 billion ECU (at 1994 prices,
excluding Community Initiatives) from the Strucnr-
ral Funds over the period 1994-99. The challenge is
'14
to help produce competitive businesses and regional
economies capable of generating the output and new
employment which will allow standards to converge
towards those of the rest of the Community.
At the beginning of 1994 accession agreements were
concluded with the governments of fourcountries of
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA):
Sweden, Nonvay, Finland and Austria. These coun-
tries are already well integrated into the Single Mar-
ket under the EEA agreement.
Unlike previous enlargements of the Community the
EFTA countries will not in general contibute to a
widening of regional disparities between Member
States. Their average level of GDP per head is almost
the same as that in the Community while unemploy-
ment rates have historically been much lower, though
they have increased significantly during the present
recession. They will, accordingly, impose relatively
little additional burden on the budget for the Structu-
ral Funds which will rise by 5.9 billion ECU
(1995 prices) or 4.5Vo as compared with an increase
in the Community's population of 7.4To (and a rise
in land area of SOVo). Finland, however, represents
something of an exception. Here, there has been a
large falt in output and regional unemployment rates
have reached 20c/o, largely as a result of a severe
reduction in exports to the ex-Soviet Union, with
which Finland had extensive trading linla. It will be
the only new Member State of the four to be a net
recipient from the Community's budget.
The regions of the four countries share many of the
problem3 of other parts of the Community. There are
differences in the underlying causes, however, iurd
the recolnition of this was instrumental in the agree-
ment to the creation of a new Objective 6 under the
Structural Funds to accommodate the particular dif-
ficulties in the sparsely populated, climatically ex-
treme regions of Northern Scandinavia. Total popu-
lation coverage under Objective 6 witl be 1.9 million
(half of one percent of the total of the enlarged
Community or between 5 and lTVo of national popu-
lation in the three countries conc erned), with a budget
of l.l billion ECU for the period 1995-99. The only
region meeting the criteria for Objective 1 is in
Austria (Burgenland on the Eastern border with
Hungary with 3.5Vo of national population). The
other regions of the fow countries will also be con-
sidered by the Commission for assistance under Ob-
jectives 2 and 5b on a comparable hsis to the exer-
cise undertaken for the present Community in
1993194.
Enlargement to include the four EFTA countries will
create an entirely new and extensive set of border
regions with a new set of neighbours in ihe countries
of Central and Eastern Europe.
The Visegradcountries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic and Slovakia) have undergorie dramatic
economic transformation since 1989. Poland and
Hungary have formally applied for membership of
the Community. Severe recession, caused partly by
the break-up of old trading relations, and economic
restnrcturing have resulted in massive falls in output
and high unemployment in most parts (the Czech
Republic is the main exception). The regional impact
has been extremely uneven. In general, economic
conditions tend to deteriorate 
- 
in terms of unem-
ploymen! number of private firms, investment flows
and quality and density of infrastructure 
- 
with dis-
tance from Western Europe, especially its capital
cities. An East-West and urban-rural divide has been
strengthened. Certain of the urban areas have also
attracted most of the inward foreign investment.
More general fears that the new opporurnities created
in Centrai and Eastern European countries would
divert investnent away trom the Community, and
espeially is weaker Member States, appear so far
to be unfounded Moreover, any diversion of invest-
ment is likely to be more than offsetby the increased
trading and commercial opportunities for
Community businesses generated by a successful
reform in the East. Trade, however, is a two-way
process and Central and Eastern European countries
are already offering strong competition to
Community producers in certain sensitive sectors
such as steel, textiles and agricultural products
though on a comparatively small scale so far. Over-
all, however, adjustments entailed by this competi-
tion are unlikely to rival those already demanded
both by international trade with Japanese and Asian
producers and by the advent of the Single Market
15
itsen and, from a long-term perspective, are equally
inescapable if furtlrer economic progress is to be
achieved.
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section A Main regional trends
Population and labour force to the end of the century
Trends in output in the regions
Employment and unemployment trends and differences in the regions
Employment
Unemployment
fhe situation and prospects of selected sectors
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labourChapter 1 Population and force
to the end of the century
Recent evidence points to the likelihood of a more
rapid increase in the community's population than
expected in the Fourth periodic Reportr. Immigration
is a significant part of the explanation although, in
addition, people are living longer while the extrernely
low birth rates which now prevail may be starting
gradually to rise again. I-abour force in many regions
can bc expected to increase as a result of inward
migration and if the trend towards higher female
panicipaticn continues.
The last ten years
There were a number r.f important demographic
changes in the Cornmunity over the last ten yeais :
r the fotal population (inclucing the former East
German Liinder) increased by 0.3Vo ayear from
337 million ro 347 million people;
o the proportion of young people ageil0- 14 in total
population fell by 2percentage poinrs, from ZTVo
to lSVo,while the proportion of olderpeople aged
65 and over increased by Z percentage points
from 13Vo to lSVo;
I the total Community labourforce rose significa_ntly
from 143 million to 157 million people, almosr lZo
a year, as a result of increasing participation
among women and inward migration;
r the proportion of the labour force aged lS_24
declined from 20vo to 16% as a result of falring
birth-rates some two decades earlier and increas-
ing numbers remaining in education;
r the proportion of total labour force aged 50_64
declined from 2l%qto lgVo because of earlier
retircment among men.
The extent to which such trends will persist into the
next century in different countries and regions is
important for economic prospects and potential Ia-
bour market pressures.
Previous forecasts
Previous studies undertaken in the 1980s suggested
that the population of the Community would tend to
stagnate during the 1990s. Such an outcome now
seems to lie at the low end of expectations and the
most recent evidence points to the possibility of
population growth in the 1990s at a rate approaching
that of ttre 1980s. There are three main reasons why
population growth may continue.
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First, and most importantly, there has been much
higher inward migration than wai foreseen. Over the
period 1985 to L992, there was a net inflow of well
over 5 million people (around 4 million more than
anticipated in the Fourth Periodic Report), Secondly,
contrary to prior assumptions,life expectancy is con-
tinuing to increase. Thirdly, previous expectations
for the birth rate in the 1990s seern to have been too
cautious and the decline in fertility rates in the South
of the Community now seems to be coming to an end,
while in some Northern countries (eg in Denmark
and the Netherlands) women aged 30 and over are
having more children than was foreseen.
The underestimate of population seems likely to
apply especially to the four largest Member States
and to Germany, in particular, which has experienced
much higher immigration than was expected.
For the labour force also, growth could be somewhat
faster than previously projected, largely because of
the potential increase in the participation of women
and immigration.
Projections of
Community population 'ri .r'1
to the year 2000
In viewof thehighdegree of uncertainty surrounding
future population developments, the approach
adopted-was to construct scenarios which represent
informed hypotheses on future changes in the key
demographic variables : fertility, mortality and mi-
gration. These scenarios set the expected upper and
lower limits for population change over the coming
years.
By the year 2000, they foresee a Community popu-
lation of between 351 and 363 million people as
'against 3a4 million in 1990 and, therefore, average
growth of betwee n0 .ZVo and} .5Vo a year 
- 
corirpared
to 0.3Vo a year in the 1980s (Tables 1 and 2).
A low scenario
The key feature of the low scenario are :
o the persistence of relatively low fertility rates;
o sharply declining, but still positive, net inward
migration to the Community from well over
I million in 1990 to 250,000 per year from lgg4
onwards.
Under these conditions there would be slow growth
of total population over the 199Cs, largely concen-
trated in the first half of the decade. This would be
accompanied by changes in the demographic struc-
ture with a sharp fall in the number of people under
25 and significant rise in the number of people in their
30s, 40s, early 50s and early 70s ('baby-boom'
generations of earlier decades). Working-age popu-
lation, aged 15-&, would rise at a rate in line with
total population.
The effects of this would be different across the
Community, with the highest growth rates in the
Netherlands (0.5Vo a year) and Luxembourg (0.4Vo a
year). In most other countries, there would be little
change and a decline'rin Germany and Italy. In
Ireland, the iast half of the decade would also see
declining population becaue of a continuing fall in
fertility rates to a level below the so-called replace-
ment rate of 2.05 children for every woman, and
continuing high outward migration.
At the regional level, the differences are more pro-
nounced partly because of interregional migration.
Between 1995 and 2000 theseare likely to contribute
to a decline of population in a number of regions in
central and Northern France, Northern Italy,
Portugal, Northern Spain and parts of the UK, with
the largest fall, of almost IVo a year, in Eastern
Germany and some parts of Greece (Map 1).
The highest growth rvould be in Flevolaud in the
Netherlands 
- 
a region which was only recently
reclaimed from the sea 
- 
of around3%o ayear. Other
regions showing large gains tend to be along national
borders or coasts where migration from elsewhere is
expected, though there are also many in some of the
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poorer parts of the community 
- 
in southern and
Eastern spain and southern Italy 
- 
as welr as in some
of the richer parts 
-in the west and south of France,
Southern Germany and the Benelux countries.
In terms of overall population change, there therefore
seems to be no simple divide between North and
South.
on the other hrld, the projected increase in the
population in the age group is-o+ (around 4 million)
in the 1990s, would be concentrated in the south of
the community and keland (as welr as in Flevoland).
This would continue to be the case in the second half
of the decade. By contrast, in this period, a fall is
projected in Germany, especially on the Western
border and in the former GDR. other regions experi-
encing a fall in working-age population wourd be
concentrated in some of the most prosperous, ur-
banised parts of the community 
- 
ttri souttr-East of
England, Ile de France, Brussels and North and
Central Italy.
A high scenario
Recent trends in population in the community indi-
cate a potential for faster growth. what would happen
if the current evidence on fertility isaindicative,of a
recovery? What if inward migration remains highi
The effects of such trends are explored in the high
scenario which assumes :
o a gradual rise in fertility rates
o high levels of inward migration into the
Community of 750,000 a year, less than the
I million experienced in 1990 (but 500,000 more
per year than in the low scenario).
Under this scenario, Community population would
increase by 19 million over the 1990s, giving a total
of 363 million in the year 2000. The prwiously
anticipated slowdown in population growth would
not occur and there would be an expansion at a
somewhat faster rate than the l9g0s.
Most Member states would experience some
growth. At the regional level, however, there wourd
continue to be decline in some arezrs (in the former
GDR, Greece and Norttrern Italy _ Map 2).
wttil" a recovery in fertility rates in the 1990s would
not affect working-age population until 15-20 years
later, higher inward migration could increase the
numbers in the present decade. Neverttreless, the
difference between the two scenarios for working-
age population is not so great as those for total
population. Overall, working-age population would
increase by 7.5 million, or 0.3Vo a ye,.r, to reach
239 miltion in the year 2000, some 3 mil[on more
' -,lq yd:l the low scenario. Growth would b" p*_
ticularly high in Germany due to migration, though
some regions here would still faceadecline, as would
regions in the North of ltaly, Greere and south-East
England.
It is worth noting that the actual data for the early
1990s have been closer to the high scenario because
of high levels of migration. This might not persist
throughout the decade which will depend on u nu^_
ber of economic and social factors both inside and
outside the community as well as on Member States
policies on entry.
Labour force
developments
As for population, 'high' and ,low' scenarios have
been generated for the labourforce. These are based
on past trends in participation rates by sex and age.
For the low labour force scenario, in addition to a low
population projection, recent trends in activity rates(up in the case of women and down in the case of
men) are projected to continue during the present
decade gradually to come to an end at the beginning
of the next century. Although working-age popula-
tion represents the main source of the labour force,
the acural size of the latrer depends on participation
of those above working-age who continue to work.
Present low rates of participation among older people
are expected to persist and a limited degree of con_
r%@:Jw:*@rffi
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Map 3 Grovuth of labour lorce, 1995 - 2000
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vergence between Member States and regions is
assumed
In the high scenario, average participation rates for
women are assumed to rise continuously (to ap-
proach male rates by the year 2020) and for men to
increase slightly overall. Activity rates for womenin
parts of the Community where they are low are also
assumed to converge to some extent towards rates in
areas where they are high (see M,lp 5 for details of
regional differences in activity rates for women in
1990). Further assumptions, of secondary import-
ance, are that the potential economic pressure im-
posed by an ageing population is offset by increasing
participation among older people, effectively revers-
ing past trends, and, thatyoung peoplecombine work
and training to a greater extent than at present and so
add slightly to the labour force. These assumptions
are applied to the high population scenario described
above.
By the year 2000, under the alternative assumptions,
a Community labour force of betrveen 160 million
and 173 million is projected as against 157 million in
1990, implying growth of between 0.2Vo and I% a
y%r, the upper figure hing much the same as the rate
of increase over the 1980s.
A low scenario
Although female participation rates, measured here
in relation to population of 15 and over, are projected
to show a nodest increase (from 42.4Vo to 44.L%),
male participation rates are projected to decline
(from 68Vo to 66.4Vo). This would imply growth in
the fenrale labour force of some 0.5Vo a year over the
decade, and 0.4Vo a year over the second hall as
compared with growth of the total labour force of
0.27o a year over the decade and virtually no change
over the second half. As a result, the share of women
in the labour force would rise from 40Vo in 1990 to
4l%o in 1995 and 42Vo in the year 2000.
At the same time, the averageqge of the labour force
would rise slightly as'the strare of 15-24 year-olds fell
frorn 29 mitlion in 1990 to24 
.willion in 1995 and tp
21 million in the year 20o0."This decline, howev'dr,
would be more than offset by the growth in the
numbers of people of prime working- age, 25-49.
Such a shift in composition can be seen as a positive
development insofar as the average worker would be
more experienced and qualified as compared with the
past.
The changes described abovewould differacross the
Community. Over the decade, the labour force in
Southern countries, especially Spain and Pornrgal, as
well as in lreland, the Netherlands and France would
grow, while in the seven other Member States, it
would remain largely unchanged. In these seven
countries, labour force would in fact decline from the
- middle of the decade onwards or stagnate in the cases
of br?:ece and the UK.
Even in Greece and the UK, however, many regions
would experience a fall in the labour force 
- 
the South
and West of the Greek mainland, for example, and
the South-East and North of England and
Scotland (Map 3). Particularly large reductions are
projected under this scenario to occur in the East
German Uinder and the North-West of Italy, while
the main areas of growth are Southern Spain, South-
ern Italy and parts of the South of France.
A high scenario
Under the high scenario, by the year 2000, 16 million
people would be added to the labour force trs com-
pared with 1990, only slightty less than the present
numbers unemployed. Trr-e additional labour force
would not be evenly distributed geographically. In
particular, the South of the Community 
- 
the whole
of Spain and Portugal, Southern ltaly and much of
Greece would experience significant growth in their
workforce over the remainder of the 1990s, as would
Ireland, much of France and the Benelux countries
(Map 4).
This growth largely reflects the assumption of con-
vergence in participation rates of women. Overall,
the female labour force would increase by ISTo over
the 1990s and would accountfor 43Vo of the total in
. the year 2000 as againstdAVo in 1990. In the parts of
' the Community with traditionaiiy low female partici-
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pation rates 
- 
many of the areas noted above 
- 
growth
in the female labour force would be most spectacular,
varying from just over 20% (Greece) to over 35Vo
(Spain and Ireland) over the period.
This increase in activity among women rates depends
on the fulfilment of a number of conditions, in par-
ticular, changes in traditional attitude towards
women working, development of job oppornrnities
in the service sector, increased availability of part-
time employment and flexible working arrangements
and the provision of child-carc facilities. There ap-
pears to have been some moves in these directions in
most Member States in the second half of the 1980s
when female activity rates increased especially
rapidly, though the 1990s may not necessarily be the
same kind of period of high employment growth.
While the projected'growth in female activity rates
is particularly high in the South of the Community
and in Ireland even in these areas the rate of increase
is no greater than over the recent pasl By the year
2000, rates of participation here would still be below
the Community average and around 15 percentage
points below the peak levels in Denmark.
Effects on regional
unemployment
The potential effects on unemployment in different
parts of the Community of ttre above labour force
scenarios are difficult to assess. Because they are only
concerned with labour supply, they leave out of account
the demftrd for labour which is even harder to predict
Moreover, it can have a major bearing on participation
If the Community continues to be affected by high and
generally rising rates of unemployment, the activity
rate assumptions under the low scenario are possibly
the moreplauible, since recordedrates of participation
tend to reflect labour demand and if this remains de-
pressed, it could discourage people from entering the
labour market. The potentially large numbers of
women who would like to work are likely to remain
frustrated by lack of jobs and would consequently not
necessarily appear in the unemployment figures. On the
other hand, part of the projectai growttr in labou
supply under ttre high growth scenario reflects popu-
Iation increases and the people concerned might be
less responsive to labour market conditions (though
the effect on inward migration of a penistent lack ofjob opporunities is higtrty uncertain).
By contrast, if demand for labour grows this would tend
to provide the conditions for rising activity rates, per-
haps especially for women if the new opportunities arc
in services, ffid so increase labour supply. The high
scenario, as indicated abovg suggests ttrattheremaybe
an additional 13 million people, most of them women
- 
as comparcd with the low growth scenario 
- 
'waiting'
. 
.for new opportrnities to arise. This reserve of labour
antie high female component are important factors to
be borne in mind when assessing the potential effects
on unemployment rates of new initiatives to stimulate
Community employment
Even under the low scenario, growth in the labour force,
though at a more moderate pace, is projected so that
neither scenario offers much support for predicitions
that demographic factors would resolve the
Communit5/'s unemploynient problems, though there
may be some alleviation of youth unemployrnent.
The above analysis also\nakes clear that the potential
additions to the labou force under the high scenario are
unevenly distributed zrcross the Community. A large
proportion are located in high unemployment regions.
For exarnple, of the 79 regions in the Community with
above average rates of unemploymenf 52, or 66% of
the total, curld have faster than average rates of growth
in labour supply in the second half of the 1990s. For the
worst affected areas, this means that there is the risk of
high rates of unemployment .on a permanent basis
urless the nate ofjob creation can be pushed to histori-
cally high levels.
The ageing
of the population
There are considerable uncertainties about the
changein working- age population in theCommunity
29
Map 6 Proportion of total population aged 65 and over, 1990 % share €a poprrldon agbd 65 and over, 1990
40
30
m
10
0
40
30
20
't0
0
DCItr(.Lv6ll dtrmty.
EUBI2: 14.8
. ?n2.4
{'
@
Map 7 Estimated proportion of total populatlon aged 65 and over, zC,?lO
Medlan growth scenarlo
15 Crarc drpopuUcr rg.d 66 .nd orr, 1090
50
ro
30
m
t0
0
,50
a0
$
20
10
o
over the longer-term, andafonion about the change
in the size of the labour force. Over the period 2000
to 2020, working-age population could increase by
I I million if the assumptions underlying the high
growth scenario are realised. Alternatively, under the
low growth scenario, it is projected to fall by 10 mil-
lion. Under either scenario, what happens to the
labour force will also depend on changes in partici-
pation rates, which are equally difficult to predicL
There is less doubt that the ageing of the population,
which has been a feature of recent years, will con-
tinue. By the year 2010 or so, in almost all Member
States, working-age population is likely to comprise
more people over 40 than under 40, though if the
rising participation of women continues, this does
not necessarily mean that the labour force will also
age in the same way.
After 2010, the ageing effect is likely to more pro-
nounced as the so-called baby-boom generation born
in the immediate post-war period passes the age
of 65. By 2020, in most parts of the Community, the
proponion of people aged 65 or over is projected to
be around 20% or more, as comparedwith an average
of lSVo at present and llVo n a number of regions
(Map 6). The ageing 'effect will be particularly
marked in regions where the birth rate has slowed
significantly over recent years. In the North of Italy
and Spain, in Germany and large par$ of France. and
the Benelux countries, the proportion'of people dg!ed':;
65 or over could be around 25Vo (Map 7). By contrast,
in Northern Ireland and the South of Spain, the
proportion could still be around 157o or less. \
Moreover the average age of those of 65 and over is
also setlo increase as more people live to an old age.
Whereas at present, around a quarter of the those of
65 and over are over 80, by 2020, this proportion
could have increased to a third.Many regions, there-
fore, will be confronted not only with the problem of
supporting more people over the age of retirement
but also with that of providing health care and other
facilities for growing numbers of very old people.
t Th, new scenctrios on population and labourforce are derivedfrom :
Eurostat (i,991), Two l-ong-term Population Scenarios for the European Community
Eurostat/NEl ( 1994, forthcoming), Two Long-term Regional Population Scenarios for the European lJnion.
Study co-financed by DG )fiI of the European Coimission.
Eurosnt/lfo (lgg4,forthcomir,g), Two Long-term l-abour Force Scenarios for tlrc European Union.
Eurostat/NEl ( 1994, forthcoming), Two l,ong-term Regional Labour Force Scenarios for the European (Jnion.
Study co-financed by DG WI of the European Commission.
31
Chapter 2 Trends output !nin the regions
After a prolonged period of slow growth in the first
half cf the 1980s, the Community economy picked
up significantly in the second half of the decade.
Growth at the Community level is an important pre-
condition for narrowing regional disparities in output
and income (as shown in previous Periodic Reporu).
Ovtirthe five-year period 1985-1990, real output in
the Community grew at an annual average rate of
3t laVo compared to lt /z%o over the previous five years.
This was followed, however, by a cyclical downturn
which began in the UK in the second half of 1990 and
gradually spread to other Member States at the same
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time as a more general slowdown in the world
eccnomy. The boost to economic activity resulting
from German unification and the substantial expen-
diture in the former East Germany initially allowed
the Community to escape the full effects of the global
slowdown during 1991 and the economy continued
to grow (lUz%o a year). Since mid- 1992, however,
growth rates have declined significantly and the
Community's economy conhacted by around I I zvo in
1993 although the beginnirgs of a recovery are evi-
dent in 1994.
Trends and differences
in the Member States
and their regionsl
These general trends were accompanied by consid-
erable variations in the performance of Member
States and regions. At Member State level, the net
effect of the differcrrces inperformance over the past
decade can be summarised in terms of a period of
slight widening in disparities in GDP, in per capita
terms, between 1980 to 1984 followed by a steady
narrowing (real convergence).
Of particular interest is the performance of the four
weakest Member States 
- 
Greece, Spain,Ireland and
Porfirgal- relative to the Community average. At the
time of the third enlargement in 1986 which brought
Spain and Portugal into the Community, the four
weakest Member States had an average GDP per
head of less thantwo-thirds $a%o) of the Community
average. Since then average real growth in these
counEies has been half a percentage point above
average which permined a slow but steady process
of convergence vis-i-vis the rest of the Community.
By 1993, average GDP per head in the four countries
reached some 70% of the Community average, an
increase over 7 years of 6 percentage points (Graph 2
and Table 3).
Within the group of four countries, however, there
was some variation. The strongest performance was
recorded by the lrish economy (with an increase in
GDP per head relative to the Community average of
15 percentage polnts since 1986). A number of fac-
tors combineto explain the improving fortunes of the
Irish economy, First, Irish macroeconomic policy
changed after L987 to reduce the budget deficit and
the accumulating publk sector debt and to encourage
wage moderation. The success of these policies ap-
pears to have provided an elerqent of stability encour-
agrng a recovery in investment by the private sector.
Secondly, the ongoing process of attracting major
foreign companies seems to have resulted in the
"ectablishment of a modern industrial base which
began to export strongly at the end of the 1980s under
relatively favourable exchange rate conCitions.
Thirdly, there was a significant loss of population
through emigration at the end of the 1980s and this
contributed to a raising of GDP expressed in per
capita terms. Fourthly, throughout the 1980s and
especially after 1988, Ireland has benefited from
increasing transfers from the Structural Funds in
support of extensive programmes of investment in
physical and human capital (see Chapter 8).
Relatively high rates of economic growth were also
achieved by Spain and Portugal- For these countries,
GDP per head increased by betrveen 5 and 8 percent-
age points, respectively,, in relation to the
Community average, between 1986 and 1993. As in
Ireland, this appears to have been based on the com-
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rpletion of macro-stabilisation programmes in the
frsthalf of the 1980s togerherwith a strong contribu-
tion from exports- These countries also attracted
subs tanti al di rec t i nves tmen t from outs i de, especially
from other parts of the Community.
In Greece, however, economic growth fell short of
the rest of the Community and GDP per head is now
less than half ttre Community average. It is only since
the turn of the decade 
- 
and the slowdown in general
economic growth 
- 
that Greece has achieved a run of
3 consecutive years of economic growth somewhat
above the Community average.
Disparities between the regions of the Community
show a more varied trend than that between Member
States (Map 9). The overall tendency seems to have
been one of slightly widening disparities during the
slow growth years over the first half of the I 980s and
a gradual narrowing over the second half of the
decade which levelled off in the 1990s. The change
in the trend in the middle of the 1980s minors the
change in the fortunes of Ireland and most Spanish
and Portuguese regions which went from marking
time, or even retrea! compared to the rest of the
Community to rapid relative advance in the second
half of the 1980s.
This trend of regional convergence refers to all the
Community's regions (defined at the NUTS 2 level)
aggregated together in a single statistical measure. It
is also instructive to examine the position of the
regions sin:ated at the extremes and to compare, for
example, the 25 richest regions with the 25 poorest
regions. Here there was no change over the 1980s,
'with the 25 richestregions having in 1991 an average
GDP per head some Ztlztimes higher than the aver-
age for the 25 poorest regions, the same as in 1980.
Narrowing the focus to compare the l0 regions at the
two extremes suggests a slight deterioration in the
sinration. The top 10 regions had average GDp per
head some 3.3 times higher than the bottom l0 re-
\
*ffir|rft1-%ffffi
a7
J'
It.
G
.lt, I ot
r'
a a
o #
q
oo
tl
ol oDEd
fllUJ ttt
d
@
CD
o
>->ccoo(! (lt(!(E
Tr !t
oo
oo
taYYol
oo
F
r^u?q vtct)<\ru?cj66gEI::qsd: c 4 3 S e €xct'-dEd6vinot;;A.zro
c
-ffiffiffiElILr
F
otgt
rF
I(o
@
ot
F
d(E
os
L
o
CL
o.a(5
.E
o
CDc6
,go
ot
CL6
=
gions in 1980 but 3.6 times higher in 1991 (Annex,
Table A.4). The widening gap betrveen these two
groups of regions comes both from the relatively high
growth rate of the top 10 regions compared to the
Community average.and to the weak growth of the
Greek economy whose regions (before German uni-
fication) accounted for most of the Community's
bonom 10.
Disparities betweenthe Member States in terms of a
basic mez$ure of. productivity 
- 
GDP per person
employed 
- 
followed a broadly similar path to that
for GDP per head for most of the 1980s (Graph 5).
After a period of little change in the early part of the
decade there was a turning point around 1984 when
productivity differences between Member States
began to decline. There were, however, considerable
variations around the trend reflecting the strong in-
fluence of the business cycle which impacted on
Member States and regions at different times and to
different degrees.
An encouraging trend was the higher than average
rise throughout the period since 1984 in some of the
Member States characterised by below average pro-
ductivity, notably in Ireland, Portugal and the UK.
The widening of disparities in productivity between
1987 and 1990 seems to have been due principally to
a slowing down in the growth of GDP per person
employed in Spain and UK compargd to the r.:1.:f
-. 
''.-t'.;;
the Community (Graphs 5 and 6 and Annex,
Table A.3). These Member States experienced vi-
gorous economic growth over this perid which was
accompanied by a significant increase in employ-
ment towards the end of the business cycle upturn.
After 1990, disparities in productivity began to nar-
row again reflecting the continuation of strong per-
formances in Ireland and Portrgal, and the fact that
the relative decline in productivity in Spain and the
UK came to a halt as a result of substantial labour
shedding when economic growth began to weaken.
In Greece, the low economic growth of the 1980s was
associated with a failure to make progress in closing
.the productivity gap with the rest of the Community
thniughout the decade, although the most recent data
indicate some improvement in L992-93 (Annex,
Table A.3).
Disparities in
an enlarged Community
The historical analysis of disparities does not include
the new German Liindor. Meaningful comparisons
for this area with the rest of the Community for the
period before German unification would be difficult
per person employed in the Member
I States, 1984, 1987,1990 and 1993
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and not very meaningful in any czrse, Estimates for
1991 indicate that average GDP per head in the
unified Germany as a whole was some l4Vo lower
than that for Western Germany alone, with GDP per
head in the 5 new Liinder taken together being only
35Vo of the Community average. The inclusion of the
new LS.nder had the statistical effect of reducing
avemge GDP per head by 3% in the Communiry in
1991.
In regional terms, average GDP pcr head in the new
Llinder in 1991 was some 5 percentage points below
the average for the group of l0 weakest regions
before German unification. In fact, when the new
German Liinder are included in the bottom 10 regions
of the Community the difference between the top
10 pgions and the bottom 10 widens from 3.6 times
to 4.5 times. The future incorporation of the new
Liinder into the analysis will, therefore, widen dis-
parities in statistical terms. As with the enlargement
of the Community southwards during the 1980s, the
extension to the East caused by the addition of the
new Liinder has added furtherto the heterogeneity of
the Community in socieeconomic terms Disparities
between East and West Germany are wider than
those betrveen the North and South of Italy but this
may change if thc process of catching-up in the
fonner case which has now begun can be maintained
in the coming years.
In view of the possible enlargement of the
Community to include four countries (Austria,
Norway, Sweden and Fintand) of the European Free
Trade Area GFTA) in the course of the 1990s it is
also of interest to consider their effect on GDP.
The historical data are particularly revealing. For the
fqrr EFTA countries taken together, GDP per head
declined from a peak of 10 percentage points above
the Community average in 1985 to a level around the
Community averageby L992. For Austria there was
little change relative to the Comrnunity over this
period, but for the Scandinavian countries, especially
Sweden and Finland, there has been a precipitate
decline in their relative growth performance (Annex,
Table A.5).
With average GDP per head in the four EFTA coun-
triesrelativelyclose to the average of the Community
as at present constituted, there would be no signifi-
cant change to average GDP per head in the
Community after enlargement. [n addition, the clus-
tering of the GDP per head of the 4 EFTA countries
around the average of the present Community means
the inter-Member State disparities would be slightly
reduced in statistical terms in a Community of
Sixteen. This contrasts with tr\e situation afterthe last
enlargements where disparities widened because the
countries concerned, Greece, Spain and Portugal,
and the former GDR, had GDP per head well below
the Community average.
At the regional level in the four EFTA countries, the
available data suggest that there are important dif-
ferences in economic circumstances and perform-
ance. A more complete understanding of these dif-
ferences compared to tfie rest of the Community will
have to await the full inclusion of these countries in
the Community's statistical systems of regional data
collection and analysis (though a preliminary ana-
lysis is presented in Chapter 12 below).
Concluding remarks
In summary, there is evidence of real economic con-
vergence in regional economic performance overthe
recent pasl Many of the weakest Member States and
regions have been able to sustain rates of growth
above the Community average over much of the
period since the mid-1980s. This has been a slow and
gradual process, however, and major reductions in
the wide disparities betrveen the richest and poorest
regions remain a long-term challenge, as pointed out
in the last Periodic Report. Within the general trend
there have been Member States and regions showing
significant improvement while certain others have
experienced a relative decline. These latter regions,
togetherwith the regions undergoing profound struc-
tural adjustment in the former GDR, are those which
present the biggest challenge to national and
Community cohesion policies (see also Chapters 8
and 9).
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In relation to productivity differences, recent trends
have generally been encouraging and certain
Member States with traditionally lower than average
levels of productivity have gradually converged to-
wards those in the rest of the Community.
Productivity gains are essential to improvements in
underlying competitiveness and, therefore, to the
Iong-term health of nationaland rbgional economies.
The real challenge, however, is one of ensuring that
productivity gains are accompanied by output
growth allowing ernployment to increase and unem-
ployment to decrease. As the following chapter dem-
onstrates this challenge has proved to be an ex-
tremely difficult one for many of the Community's
Member States and regions.
I In the analyis hu" n**nOe
income Senerated in Member States and regions by the resid.ent producer units. An altemotive measure is Gross
National Product per fuad which measures thc resources available $ter the trasfer offactor incomzs such as
interest paJmenx and dividmds. An additiontl meesure is the net n4tional disposable income which includes
'unrequited' transfers lrom abroad However, at regbnal lcvel, data are only avaikbte fur GDP per head. Net flowt
offador incomes out of or into a cou4try or rcgion lead to d.ifierences between GDP and GNP which nwy be
substanial in the case of smalkr countries or (notionally) for regions- Att dttu lor the regions are based on GDP
statktics colleaed by Eurostat using harmonised aefnitbns. Emptoyment dota (for productivity estimates) are
based on h.arnonised regional accoun8 sources fur place ofwork (an alterrutive source of employmcnt data is the
Labour Force Survey (LFS) which is based on place of residence. LFS d4ta do not therefore indicate thc
emplogent gencrated withia regions by the resident producer units).
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Chapter 3 Employment and unernployment
trends and differences in the regions
Employment
The 1980s were a period of net job creation in the
Commuhity although this was mainly due to the
growth experienced in most Member States and re-
gions in the second half of the decade. After the
recession in the early years of the decade, growth in
employment resumed in 1984 some 18 months to
Zyears after the beginning of recovery in output. By
1991, employment had expanded by 9tlz million, a
growth of Ttlz%o over 8 years.
As noted in Chapter 2, there was a marked slowdowri
in the Community's economy from 1991 which was
reflected in a contraction in employment from 199,2
onwards. In the two years to 1993, the Community
lost some 3 millionjobs in net terms and the prospects
are for further contraction in 1994.
The growth over the period 1981-1991 was most
marked in Luxembourg (24Vo), the Netherlands and
Spain (both lLVo) while average or slightly above-
average growth rates were experienced in Germany
(West) and Italy. In the UK, the growth was slightly
below average over the period. The remaining
Member States, with the exceptions of Ireland and
Portugal, where employment contracted between
1981 and 1991, experienced growth rates betvreen a
half and three-quarters of the Community average.
In most Member States, experience was more favour-
able in the second half of the decadecompared to the
first half and in both Ireland and Portugal growth
rates were firrnly positive in the 5 years 198G1991.
At the regional level, the pattern is mixed (Map 10),
though the fastest growing regions are concentrated
in only a small number of Member States : Spain,
Luxembourg, UK, the Netherlands and Italy. The
highest growth rates over the period were recorded
in Central and Easterri regions of Spain (in the range
2 to Ztlz%o a year) and Dutch regions on the Eastern
border with Germany. High employment growth also
occurred in the more nual regions of the UK (East
Anglia and South West) as well as Central and some
Southern regions of ltaly.
The regions where employment declined or failed to
rise over the period were mainly old industrial and/or
highly urbanised parts of the Community, though
they also included some of the less developed areas.
The low rate of increase in employment in France as
a whole (averaging only tlc%o a year between 1981
and 1991) was associated with a contraction of em-
ployment in many regions such as the rural areas of
Limousin and Champagne-Ardenne and the tradi-
tional industrial areas of Nord-Pas-de-Calais and
Lorraine. As indicated above, in two of the less
developed parts of the Community, Ireland and
Pornrgal, employment also declined over the 10-year
period as a whole (although for Pornrgal, data from
the Labour Force Survey indicate relatively high
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growth in employment). Declining employment in
the regions of North Western Spain reflects the dif-
ficulties of regions with older industries compared to
the Mediterranean 'sun-belt' in the South and East of
the country which seems to have attracted much of
the new investment.
The changes in total employment have been accom-
panied by changes in the sectoral composition.
Throughout the second half of the 1980s there was a
steady increase in service employment accompanied
by faliing employment in industry and agriculture. In
1990, 6LVo of total Community employment was in
services wirh32% in industry and 6tlz% in agricul-
ture. The sectoral structure differs widely across the
C ommun i ty. Typic ally, Northern Member S tates and
regions have the highest concentration of activity in
the service sector while Greece and Portugal, and to
a lesser exten! Spain and lreland, lag substantially
behind. Among the Northern Member States, em-
ployment in services is relatively low in Germany
where employment in the industrial sector remains
particularly high.
Within Member States, in some cases differences are
substantial. As would be expected, there arc strong
concentrations of service employment in the large
urban centres andcapitalcities, including Athens and
Madrid" Atthe same time, there are still many regions
of the Community where the emplolrnent structtlre
is extremely traditional, with over a quarter of tota,
employment in agriculture in parts of Greece,
Southern Spain, Portugal and Southern Italy. Herp,
there is the prospect of considerable restnrchrring in
years to come, which involves both risks and oppor-
tunities. The risks derive from further decline in
employrnent in agriculture, though the emphasis on
income rather than price support under the reform of
the Common Agriculnrral Policy should help to
maintain the small family farms typical of many of
the less developed areas. The opportunities mainly
concern the possibility of service sector growth as a
greater proportion of expenciiture goes on services as
income rises.
Much of the increase in employment in the second
half of the 1980s, in the Northern Member States in
particular, wff part-time. Of the 9 million additional
jobs created betrveen 1986 and 1991, one-third were
part-time of which 80% were taken by women.
Unemployment
Consistently, sirrce the mid-1980s, the Community
has not succeeded in creating sufficient jobs to pre-
vent unemployment from rising steadily. From L973
to 1985, unemployment in the Community increased
inexorably year after year from an average of.2.6Vo
to 10.87o. Although the economic recovery in the
second half of the 1980s brought unemployment
down, it still left the rate at 8.37o in 1990 rvhen the
mome:rtum of recovery came to an end. The fall in
unemployment would have been greater had there
not been a steady increase in the labour force over
the period. In the first 3 years of the 1990s, lower
economic growth rates brought employment growth
initially to a halt before causing a decline, with the
result that by the end of 1993 the numbers in work
had fallen by some 3 millions comPared with 1991-
With a continued growth in the labour force this
pushed unemployment rates up to I0.9Vo by the end
of 1993 (for the Comrqunity excluding the former
East Germany and to LlVo including it), back to the
peak levels of the mid-1980s. In this sense, the pro-
gress of the second half of the 1980s was largely
undone in the first three years of the new decade
(Annex, Table A.6).
Trends and differences
in the regions
The changes in unemployment rates over the
Community as a whole reflect a wide variety of
experience among the regions. The ideal circum-
stances, of course, would have been those where
falling unemployment rates in the Community in
general were accompanied by a more rapid fall in the
worst-affected regions. In such circumstances' un-
employment rate disparities would have narrowed-
In reality, disparities continued to rise in the early
part of the post-1985 economic upswing, beginning
to narrow only after 1988 (Graph 7).
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This narrowing of disparities after 1987 ended a
long-term trend towards widening gaps between the
regions which started in the mid-1970s. The change
in the trend turned out to be short-lived, however, and
disparities have widened again since 1991. In 1993,
unemployment rates in the 10 worst affected regions
averaged 25.3Vo,,7 times higher than in the l0 least
affected regions where rates averaged jast3.6%o. The
10 worst affected regions are located entirely in the
Community's less developed areas : Spain and the
Sotrth of ltaly. The least.affected !0 regions are for
the most part in Germany (West) although one is in
Greece and another in Portugal, where unemploy-
ment rates are traditionally very low(Map 1l).
Regional variations in unemployment rates at the
Community level are mirrored at the national level;
though the extent of differences is, of course, less.
Nevertheless the variation in rates in Spain and Italy
in particular is considerable. The most affected re-
gion in Spain (Andalucia) had an unemployment rate
of close to 30Vo and the least affected region
(Navarra) one of around lz%.In ltaly, the gap be-
tween the most and the least affected region was; equivalent to around 20 percentage points (Graph 8).
r\ narrowing of disparities normally coincides with a
general fall in unemployrnent rates. That this was not
the case in the yean immediately after 1985, when
unemployment rates in the Community had begun
their downward trend, was due to a considerable
degree to the 'fact that many high unemployment
regions initially remained untorched by economic
recovery. This was particularly so in Southern ltaly
where already high rates of unemploymentcontinued
to rise-throughout the second half of the 1980s, while
in many Frdnch regions, recovery occurred later in
the decade than elsewhere.
The narrowing disparities after 1988 had much to do
with a marked improvement in some of the
Community's worst affected regions. This was espe-
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cially true of the regions in the Eastern coastal area
of Spain as well as of certain regions in the UK (in
central and Northern parts of England and the whole
of Wales) where high national growth rates were i
accompanied by the creation of much new employ-
ment. The Spanish regions concerned started from a
position of having some of the highest rates of unem-
ployment in the Community 
- 
around 20Vo in 1985,
twice the Community average 
- 
but recorded the
largest reductions over the period 1985 to 1990, of
around 9 or l0 percentage points. In the UK regions,
unemployment rates of over 13% in 1985 had fallen
by 5 or 6 percentage pointr by 1990.
As indirntad rbovr, thc nrrrowing of disparitics le-
vdlcd offin l99l before awidening rcsumed rn',992
rnd 1993 in line'with rising unemployment in the
Community as a whole. Spanish regions once again
sre r major part of the explanation of this change.
Uncmployment rates increased sharply between
1992 md 1993, !o rruud 25-30% in the worst af-
fected regions. Regions which had been showing a
marked improvement at the end of the 1980s were
also affected, with unemployment rates on the East
coast and the Balearic Islands increasing by 5 p"r-
centage points and more in one year. The cyclical
downturn in Spain, which resulted in falling output
in 1 993, appears to have been particularly acutely felt
in national and regional labour markets with wide-
spread labour shedding. Fortunately, losses on an
equivalent scale do not appear to have accompanied
the downturn in other Member States and regions
(Map 12).
The outlook for unernployrnent in the Community,
and for pducing regional disparities, is linked to
overall econbmic performance. The immediate pros-
pects appear to be relatively unfavourable. For the
Community as a whole, estimates suggest that econ-
omic growth needs to exceed 2tlz% a year to keep
unemployment from rising and this it has consist-
ently failed to do in the initial years of the 1990s.
s by Member
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The chaltenge for the rest of the'decade is not only to
raise general rates of growth to above Ztlz%o but to
ensure that the regions of high unemployment per-
form better than the resl This is a task which is made
all the more difficult for some of the regions con-
cerned by their above average growth of working-
age population and labour force (see Chapter 1) and
by their need to ensurp that productivity growth 
- 
and
underlying competitiveness 
- 
is not reduced.
There is, therefore, an important role for Community
intervention through the Structural Funds to promote
the invesrnent which is necessary for more rapid
growth in productivity and competitiveness in the
weaker regims in orderto provide a sustainable basis
for increases in output and employment. Com-
plementary measures also need to be maintained to
protide the appropriate training and development of
human resources to ensure that workers are equipped
to adapt to economic change and to seize new oppor-
tunities as they arise.
The situation
and prospects
of selected sectors
\,
There is a growing concern in many Member States
about the effects of strucu.ral change and decline in
indusrial sectors which are important for regional
economic development and prospects (see dis-
cussion on Objective 2 in chapter 9). Many sectors
are concerned by this process but this chapter con-
centrates on the structure, geographical distribution
and outlook for three industrial sectors which are
often discussed in this context : automobiles, aero-
space, textiles and clothing as weil as the defence
sector which combines production, and service acti-
vities. Specific actions at the Community level are
already underway in the case of textiles and clothing
and defence (see discussion of Community
initiatives in chapter 9).
Estimates suggest that in the period 1981 to 1993,
automobiles, textiles and clothing and aerospace
together lost some 1.3 million jobs, most of them in
textiles and clothing, which is the only traditional
sector as commonly understood. This sector, which
has been in long-term decline in Europe in terms of
both output and employment" and which is important
in many of the Community's weaker regions, lost
nearly 900,000 jobs between 198 1 and 1993, largely.
as aresult of the relocation of production to low-cost
counfties as well as the introduction of new techno-
logies.
Automobiles and aerospace are growth industries in
the C-ommunity with rising output and, until the last
decade or so, rising employment. Unlike textiles and
clothing, S"t" sectors are dominated by large plants
which, togeftrer with their local subcontractors, often
underpin the industrial base of entire regional econ-
omies. Both sectors are subject to fierce international
competition which, especially in the case of auto-
mobiles, has rezulted in large gains in productivity in
a short period of time with significant shedding of
laborn. The aerospace industry tends to be concen-
trat€d in the stronger regions of the Community while
the automobile sector is somewhat more dispersed.
Thefinal sector considered here is the defence indus-
'' try'which combines a variety of activities, in both
industry and services united by their dependence on
national defenc e polic ies. Employm ent in equipment
\... manufachrrers and in military installations is now
- 
''{uid"r threat in view of the reduction in national
deferrce expenditure.
Although all these sectors are characterised by de-
clining employment" it is important to bear in mind
that the employment prospects in different sectors
and regions vary considerably at any given point in
time and there are always some experiencing em-
ployment growth. Growth and decline are part of the
normal development pattern of market economies.
Much of the growth over recent years has been in the
service sector. Even so, the Community as a whole
still lags substantially behind the US where sewices
provided an estimated 23 million new jobs between
1980 and 1991 double the rise in the Community.
Services account for 72Vo of total employment in the
US compared to only 617o in the Community.
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In general, ttre Community's poorest regions have
relatively small service s@tors (see chapter 8) and
this may indicate scope for future growth. There
appear to be favourable prospects in the financial and
business services sector whichpresently accounts for
about \Vo of the total Community employment. This
sector could provide sources of employment growth
in many of the weaker regions where it tends to be
undenepresented (alth,rugh there are certain excep-
tions to this rule such as Ireland). The weaker regions
could also expectlo see an,increase in employment
in distribution especially in those areas where in-
comes per head are rising stronger (although the
positive effects of an increase in demand might be at
least partly offset by the effects of rationalisation and
modernisation as a stmcture based on small retail
outlets gives way to one dominated by large (often
multinational) retail chains r.
In non-market services such as healthcare and edu-
cation, there appears to be a lower than average level
of empldyment in relation to population in the South
of the Community. Employment in healthcare and
education tends to be higher in areas with relatively
high levels of GDP per head2. This suggests thatthere
may be opportunities for job creation in these sectors
in the Southern regions, a process which should be
helped by the opening up of these sectors to assist-
ance under the Stnrctural Funds in the new pro-
gramnring period 1,994 to 1999
The automobile sector
Industry structure
The Cdirmunity automobile industry covers the
manufacture of private and commercial vehicles, and
of the mechanical components, bodywork and elec-
trical equipment needed to assemble automobiles.
There are six major manufacturers of private cars,
representing 75Vo of the market, and a few spe-
cialized manufacturers. For the most part these
manufacturers are also present on the commercial
vehicle market, where there is a similar rate of con-
centration, although one manufacturer accounts for
35Vo of the market, Although their activity is inte-
grated to varying degrees, both upstream and down-
stream, all the automobile manufacturers use the
services of a la.g" range of specialist and non-
specialist suppliers, including SMEs. In certain cases
the components manufactured by these suppliers ac-
count for betrveen 60 andTjVo of the final cost of a
vehicle.
With record sales of automobiles in 1992, in the
region of 12.6 million units, the Community market
is the biggest automobile market in the world. It is
also the biggest producer, ed in the same year manu-
factnred s ome 12.7 million vehicles. Over the period
1981-1991, employment in the automobile sector
declined by some 9Vo.The losses accelerated dunng
.the current recession and a further lUVo of iobs in the
seciot disappeared in the period 1991-1993 (Annex,
Table A.7). In 1993 the Community automobile in-
dustry employed some l.7l million people, one mil-
lion of these jobs being with automobile manufac-
turers, accounting for 5Vo of.ndustrial manufacturing
jobs3.
Rates of vehicle ownership still vary significantly
from one countql to another; in the case of private
cars Germany, France and Italy are major markets,
with between40O and 450 cars per 1000 inhabitants,
while Greece, Ireland ; rqd Portugal have between I 60
and 200 cars for the saine number of people, with
Sp"itt coming midway between these two extremes.
Commercial vehicle ownership in the Community
shows similar variations.
Spatial stt'ucture
Germany is by far the biggest automobile producer
in the Community. In terms ofemployment Germany
(excluding the new Liinder) accounted for 44 Vo of the
Community total in 1993, followed by France (197o),
the UK (L3Vo),Italy (l}Vo) and Spain (8To).
Major clusters of automobile plants are in Southern
and Central GermanY, the UK Midlands, and on
either side of the border between Belgium and the
Netherlands (Map 13). In France, the major plants
are overwhelmingly in the northern part of the
country often in close proximity to Paris. In ltaly, the
major employment is in the city of Turin, although
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there are important installations in the South of the
country.
Away from these centres, there are manylarge instal-
lations which often form an important part of the
industrial base of many of the weaker regions in the
South of the Community.
Over the last few years a number of Community
manufacturers have increased their capacity, often by
setting up new production or assembly units in order
to maintain or increase their share of an expanding
market. The main beneficiaries of these units were
theless favouredregions of Spain,Italy and Portugal,
and the new German Liinder.
In recent years similar motives have led certain
Japanese manufacturers to set up new production and
assembly plants, principally in the United Kingdom.
The production capacity of these plants is expected
to grow to about 1.2 million cars ayear by 1999. On
the other hand, Japanese exports to the Community
are falling, from 9.2% of the market in 199 L to 8.3Vo
in 1992.
In this connection, the opening-up of Eastern Europe
has been an opportunity for a number of Community
manufacturers to extend their activity to those coun-
tries, where they are investing in new-assembly plan!
developing disribution networks and, through joinp
ventures with local producers, modeniizing existing
plant.
Prospects
The dennnd for cars in Europe is showing a strong
tendency to increase. However, environmental pro-
tection measures, such as a carbon tax, could slow
down or even reverse this trend.
The demand for cars is extremely cyclical and the
high fixed costs mean that profitability is very sensi-
tive to demand. The sector therefore felt the full force
of the recent recession, but shows every sign of
reaping the fulll benefits of recovery. In this respect,
it should be noted that an increase of the marketmay
still be expected for the Community as a whole in the
future, going by the present rates of ownership of
both private and commercial vehicles.
After a period of relative stagnation during the first
half of the eighties, during the second half the
Community automobile industry went through a
period of intensive growth as the economy as a whole
recovered. Although from 1990 onwards the econ-
omic slow-down caused sales to begin falling off on
a growing number of Community markets, the very
sharp increase in sales in Germany following reuni-
fication offset those losses until 1992.
Since the demand created by German reunification
'has*now fallen off, the Community automobile in-
dustry is now feeting the full impact of the stagnation
of the economy. S ince the beginning of I 993, throug-
hout the Community, with the exception of the
United Kingdom, sales of new vehicles have fallen
more sharply than at any time in the past ten years.
Production fell by 15.87o in 1993 although recovery
is expected to begin in 1994. The rnarket for heavy
commercial vehicles will develop in a similar
fashion, chiefly because pf an increase in transport
services, an area in which road transport still offers
commercial advantages.
Growing European integration is having a beneficial
impact on the automobile sector. The automobile
markets are still to a certain extent nationally
oriented, with significant price differences from one
country to the next. As the automobile market
becomes European in scale, growing competition
will push up efficiency and demand. On the supply
side, the trend towar'ds mergers, take-overs or joint-
ventures is still in evidence in order to benefit from
economies of scale. This goes hand in hand with an
increasing trend towards regional division of labour,
with a company tending to produce all its European
engines (for example) in one or two production units.
Competition then compels automobile manufac-
turers to keep their costs down and refine their com-
pany strategy in orderto remaincompetitive.In order
to meet this challenge, European manufacturers are
applying, more intensively since 1992, the principles
of 'lean production' 
- 
integrated development and
production methods 
- 
which also involves a redis-
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tribution of responsibilities between manufachrers
and suppliers. This rationalization and restruchuing
phase should basically be over by the end of 1994
and could be accompanied by a significant reduction
injobs onthe manufacturing side. In view of the great
age of certain production units and sub-units, and
their consequently low productivity, which may
make it necessary to close them down, it is estimated
that job losses will be highest in certain automobile
producing regions of Germany, Spain and ltaly.
Given the interdependence between manufacturers
and independent suppliers, the restructuing under-
taken by the mantrfacturers could lead to a significant
loss of jobs in specialized suppliers. Because of the
heterogenous nature and high geographical disper-
sion of this sub-sector, these job losses are likely to
affect" to a greater or lesser degree, a large number
of regions in the Community.
Aerospace
Industry structure
The aerospace industry can be divided into civil and
military sectors with some 'dual-use' activities (see
below). In 1989, the military sector accounted for the
larger share (55%) of total urerospace turnpyer, al-
though this rvas down from around 70Vo a decade
earlier. Within each sector there are a number of
products : airframes, :rero-engines, equipment (elec-
tronic guidance systems, undercarriages, etc.),
guided weapons .and space vehicles.
Production is heavily concentrated in comparatively
few large firms and this trend has been reinforced
over time by rationalisation and consolidation aimed
at achieving economies of scale to allow the industry
to compete with US comparues. There are only a few
Europeancompanies capable of ma:raging the design
and production of civil and military aircraft and
guided weapon systems. In aeroengines, there is only
one major European producer (Rolls Royce, UK)
although there are other significant European pro-
ducers involve<i in cooperative agreements with the
major global players.
The role of small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) is therefore less significant than in the other
industries. Even in the supply of equipment to the
major airforce or guided weapons constructors, the
market comprises some very large firms although
there are niches such as in the supply of cabin furni-
ture where SMEs predominate.
In employment terms, the aerospace industry was a
growth sector until the last decade or so. Between
1981 and 1991, however, employment was virtu,ally
static in the Community as a whole. Since 1991, there
has been a dramatic decrease in employment reflect-
ing a stong cyclical downturn in civil aerospace
demar.rd and the depressihg effects on military pro-
duction oT the reduction in national defence expen-
diture (see below). Between 1991 and 1993 employ-
ment declined b y lZvo to 37 2 000 employees ( Annex,
Table A.8).
Spatial structure
Over 90% of employment in aerospace in 1993 was
in the four largest Member States. The UK had the
highest share of employment accounting for 37Vo of
the total. The major clusters of aerospace employ-
menF are in England (32% of Community employ-
ment), the Paris area (12%\, Hamburg and the
Netherlands (107o) and South-West France and
Bavaria (8To) (Map 14). In ltaly, production is lo-
":lited mainly in the centre and North of the country.
The industry is virnrally absent from the weakest
regions of the Community with the notable exception
of Spain, where there is a small but significant aero-
space industry employing up to 17,000 workers (de-
pending on data source5), concentrated in the Madrid
region and Andalucia There are also important in-
stallations in Naples (I) and Northern Ireland (UK).
The enlargement of the Community in 1995 will add
a further significant aerospace company, Saab of
Sweden.
Prospects
A recent report for the European Commission con-
cludes that for the future 'the sure prediction is that
the EC aerospace industry overall will not be much
larger in employment terms'6.
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Reduced defence expenditure in the Community will
act as a brake on the future expansion of military
aerospace products in dornestic markets, while a
reduction in squadron size is also tending to reduce
the significant after-sales servicing markel Produc-
tion will, however, be at least partly sustained by
sales to third countries. Community military aero-
space producers export proportionately more than
US firms. In the future, however, competition is
likely to become more intense as US firms seek to
compensate for falling domestic demand. The
defence industry in the former Soviet Union is also
likely to offer low-cost competition to Community
producers in third markets. At the same time, notable
cooperative ventures are still being undertaken in the
Community, such as the Tornado programme (in-
volving BAe, Alenia and Dasa) and the Eurofighter
project (the same companies plus CASA of Spain).
Missile production is being carried out by a consor-
tium of Adrospatiale, BAe and Dasa.
I
The Eurofighter 2000 programme, however, has
been delayed (the maiden flight, originally scheduled
for 1991, is now planned for Spring 1994) and the
orders reduced from the plannedT 65 to 600. National
shares of the workload are in principle proportional
to orders although uncertainty penrsts as to what the
relative size of these orders will finally be. Spain and
Germany have defened their first deliveries until
2402, so assembly of the tirst units in the late 1990s
would be only for the UK and ltaly.
Civilian demand is highly cyclical. At present, the
financial position of many major airlines remains
precarious and orders for European aircraft are not
expected to pick up until 1995 or 1996 as the sales
revenue of the majorcarriers begins to increase in the
expected economic recovery. Much of the fortunes
of the industry will depend on the Airbus Indusfrie
partnership. Airbus originally intended to expand
output to about 225 units a year by 1995, following
the opening of a second assembly line in Hamburg.
However, the most recent forecasts are for produc-
tionlevels of only 170 units in 1995, while the outturn
for 1994 may be only 120 units.
Nevertheless, over the longer term, demand for civil-
ian air transport is likely to expand. Improvements in
air traffic control systems will increase capacity on
the more congested routes; Structural Funds are as-
sisting investment in airports, especially in the less
accessible parts of the Community; and increasing
regulations on noise and other environmental im-
pacts mean that many older models will need to be
retired early.
The underlying growth in demand for civilian aircraft
is therefore strong, with some forecasts for longterm
annual air traffic growth in the 5-I0Vo range, causing
the civil market to overtake the defence side in im-
portance. The pressure to reduce unit costs in order
to improve competitiveness and match US producers
means that increased output will be achieved through
higher productivity or sourcing in lower cost coun-
tries. The employment effects of expanding produc-
tion are, therefore, unlikely to be positive.
Textiles and Clothing
Structure of the industry
The textile industry is relatively heterogeneous. Dif-
ferentiated according to end-use, it is made up as
follows : clothing and knitwear (45Vo of EC fibre
use), home furnishing s (17 Vo),carpets (l3%o),tech-
nical textiles (25%) among the largest users of which
is the automobile industry discussed above. Techni-
cal textiles (filters, webbing, etc) represent the fastest
growing subsector over recent years and demand
continues to grow rapidlyT.
Industry estimates suggest that there were nearly
77,000 textile firms in the Community in 1990, with
size ranging from giant, vertically integrated multi-
national companies such as Coats Viyella (UK)
which employed about 60,000 people to thousands
of small and medium-sized enterprises and 'micro'
firms employing only a few workers. Most of the
small textile enterprises in the Community sell only
to their home market or at most, to the markets of one
or two other Member States, while the large firms
sell throughout the Community and export to third
countries. The largest five European firms are
French (2), Italian (1) and British (2) which rank
among the largest ten textile firms in the world.
56
Map 15 Employment in the textiles and clothing industries, 1991
. 1 dot = 2000 people
DK, UK - level 1 data only
| - latest data available is for 1989
Map 16 Employment in the textiles and clothing industries, 1991
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The clothing and textile industries are closely linked
- 
the clothing industry purchasing 50Vo,70Vo and
40Vo respectively of the outputs of the cotton, wool
and silk industries. The two industries have common
features and are subject to the same trends. They both
experienced periods of expansion up to the early
1970s followed by prolonged stagnation and by large
and increasing loss of markets to extra-EC imporu.
The majority of firms in the clothing industry are
small with those employing less than 20 people ac-
counting for an estimated 22Vo of total output in
1990.
Two sectors of the market need to be distinguished,
that for mass produced, low-cost clothes and that for
high quality products. Demand for mass produced
clothes is relatively price elastic, while demand for
high quality clothes is determined morg by non-price
considerations, although the evidence of recent years
indicates that price remains an important overall
determinant.
More than most products, the demand for clothes is
determined by tastes and fashion, the demand for
which is growing. The life-cycle for a particular
garment may be very short, in some cases as short as
afew weeks. Manufacturers have considerable scope
for specialisation in market niches but this often
requires strong li4ks between manufacturing and
distribution to enable production systems quickly to
accommodate changes in consumer tastes. This ex-
plains the growth of large firms integrating both
manufacturing and distributiorr.
In employment terms, the textile and clothing indus-
tries are in long-term decline in the Community.
Between 1981 and 1991, employment declined by
nearly one-quarter from 2 560 000 to I 940 000 rep-
resenting aloss of over600,000 jobs. Estimates since
1991 suggest that decline has accelerated during the
recession with the loss of a further 25C,000 jobs or
more in the two years 1991-1993, a fall of l3vo
(Annex, Table A.9).
Spatial structure
Reflecting the size of their economies, employment
is highest in textiles and clothing in the four largest
Member States which account between them for over
70% of the total (Maps 15 and 16). Employment in
the sector is highest in Italy and the UK which
together account for 40Vo of the Community total.
The sector is also very important for Spain, Greece
and Portugal which account for 20% of all employ-
ment. There are important differerrces in the quality
of the employment especially in regard to clothing.
The Community is a world leader in the production
of high-fashion garments and Paris and Milan are the
centres of world fashion. In the Southern Member
States such as Greece and Porflrgal the clothing in-
dustry while very important in terms of employment,
produces mainly low value-added garments.
Within Member States production tends to be con-
centrated in certain regions, with, in general, both the
textile and the clothing industries being located in the
same areas, the strong dependencies betrneen the two
resulting in structural changes affecting on both in-
dustries and so having a cumulative effect on re-
gional activity.
There are particularly strong dependencies in many
of the weakestparts of the Community (Map 16). The
ten regions with the highest dependency on textiles
and clothing (accounting for more than I in 20 jobs
in the regional economy) are in Greece (4 regions),
Central and Eastern Spain (3 regions) and Porhrgal
(3 regions). At the same time, textiles and clothing
are highly important in some of the stronger regions
of the Community 
- 
in Vlaanderen (B), Central Italy,
Southern and Central Germany, North-Eastern
France, in all of which they account for at least l job
in 30. Other maj or conc entrations of textile and c lo th-
ing employnient (50000 employees or more) are
found in capital regions such as South-East of the UK
and lle de France as well as in Rhone-Alpes (D.
Prospects
The Community's regions dependent on textile and
clothing are likely to have different prospects over
the rest of the decadb according to the segment of the
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industry in which they are specialised and their ca-
pacity to adapt and innovate.
For textile products with high design and production
complexity (technical textiles and high fashion fab-
rics), Member States can expect to maintain their
competitive position. For other textile products,
standard cotton fabrics, standard chemical spun
yarns and so on, the shift of production to low-cost
countries is likely to continue.
In general, developments and prospects are driven by
the retail sector which has been subject to increasing
concentration. On the positive side :
o more professional organisation of distribution
has helped to emphasise the importance of time-
based, rather than cost-based, competition, thus
conferring an advantage in the European market
to European producers;
r greater emphasis on quality clothing generally
requires close communication between distribu-
tors and manufacturers;
o increased emphasis on shorter production runs
militates against the labour-intensive mass pro-
duction in many third countries;
o sourcing in distant markets carries more risk8.
On the negative side, the specialist sourcing facilities
developed by large distributors enables them to
undertake a more geographically wide-ranging
search for the cheapest produc ers. For many clothing
products, and in particular for large orders with long
Iead timee , distributors will favour cheaper, if distant,
suppliers.
On the policy side, the clothing and textile industry
will also be affected by a phasing out of the MFA
quota arrurngements over the next ten years. Major
preconditions specified by the Community as part of
such phasing-out are likely to include the opening of
markets in developing countries, action to curb
dumping of surplus products on EC markets, the
removal of certain state subsidies (particularly export
subsidies) to the clothing industries in the more de-
velope4 low-cost exporting countries and action to
curb counterfeiting of Community brands.
The clothing industry is one of the major employers
in the Community. While dominated by leuge com-
panies in every other sense, the bulk of the industry's
firms are small to medium sized enterprises, many
with fewer-than 20 employe€s supportal by out-
workers who are not always caphrred in official
employment statistics. This suggests that the impact
on regional employment of theongoing resrtructuring
of the clothing industry is likely to be corrsiderably
higher than the official estimate.
Defence industry
and military forces
Political reforms in the former Soviet Union and in
all of East and Central Europe, ensuing arrns control
agreements and a fundamental reappraisal <lf defence
policies are leading to defence budget cruts in the
Community Member S tates.
Disarmament is perceived to offer a unique oppor-
tunity to cut budgetary deficits and to divert valuable
resources to more 'worthwhile' objectives. In prac-
tice, however, the size of the peace dividend is
limited in the short and medium term by th,e substan-
tial costs of conversion and the time needed to find
alternative uses for the physical and human resourc es
no longer absorbed by defence-related activities.
Since 1987 annual defence expenditure in the
Community has stabilised in real terms. In 1991,
expenditure amounted to tqg UiUion ECU which
corresponded to 2.3Vo of GDP and 4.79ro of total
government spending. France, Germany and the UK
were responsible for about 70Vo of the EC total. The
general expectation in 1992 was for re,al cuts in
defence spending of up to IlVo by 1995 and up to
25Vo by the year 2000. This would lead to a reduction
of up to one percentage point in the share of military
expenditure in relation to Community GDP by the
year 2000. Expenditure cuts on such a scale would
inevitably affect all types of defence expendirure
albeit to different degrees.
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Miliary personnel accounts for almost 50% of ex-
penditure. About one fifth of the deferrce budgets of
the EC Member States is spent on military equip-
ment, the mainstay of the defence industrial estab-
lishment. About SVa is devoted to infrastnrcture
(military base construction, etc), while the remaioiog
quarter goes on operating expens€s.
Armed forces plus support staff exceed 2.3 million,
including professionals, conscrips and civilian per-
sonnel Adding the 700,000 workers employed in the
defence indusries, more than 3 million people, or
2.4% of the Community labour force, are directly
dependent on military expenditue for their employ-
menL
The reduction of defence expenditr.ues in relation to
GDP expected by the year 2000 will probably be
accompanied by reductions on a similar scale in the
share of defence-related employgnent in the labour
force. Over one million jobs in ttre defence industry
and the armed forces could be threatened. The poten-
tial impact on a number of regions is significant.
One half of Community employment in the defence
industry is concentrated in 19 regions (at NUTS
level.2). These have a share of employment in
defence of over l7o, wrice the Community average
(Annex, Table A.l0). A further one third of employ-
ment is located in other regions with an above aver-
age concentation of defence activities.
Cuts in defence spending clearly make regions and
localities where defence industries are concentrated
wlnerable to job losses. This does not necessarily
imply, however, that the difficulties encountered by
such regions will be proportional to the numbers
employed in these indusries. Decisions taken within
the Ministries of Defence on whichpieces of military
equipment to cut back on, have clear regional impli
cations.
A recent Commission studye identified the NUTS
level 3 regions with known concentrations of defence
industrial activities within the 19 'defence-
dependent' regions as well as over 100 other towns
and cities with plants producing equipment for the
military.
The shrdy found that it was difficult to forecast short
to medium-term factory closures, since because of
the controversy surrounding them decisions were
often not announced until the last moment. Respond-
ents indicated that the regional implications of
defence cuts would be determined by commercial
criteria and that most adjustment would take at least
five years.
So far, corporate responses to the forecast cuts in
defence expenditure of up to 25Vo by the year 2000
and reductions in export sales have been similar
across Europe. While most firms arc understandably
punsuing a number of strategies, it seems that in
general the leading firms have followed a 'dual tnack'
course, streamlining their defence operations
through concentrating on core military business
whilst simultaneously seeking to diversify into re-
lated, usually higtrtechnology, civil markets.
In general French and Italiancontractors are seeking
to maintain their position in the defence market,
while German and British firms have to some degree
adjusted already. There is some evidence that
German companies are following a more offensive
strategy by moving into related civil markets.
UK.companies by contrast are pursuing a more de-
fensive strategy involving lay-offs, closures and
sales of plant and equipment
So far as military bases are concerned, these are
distributed across more regions than defence indus-
try plants. In 31 regions (at NUTS level 2) the share
of military personnel in employment is over twice the
Community average of almost?%.These regions are
located in different parts of the Community and
house just over one third of all armed forces (exclud-
ing the new German Uinder). A further 300 miLitary
bases are located outside these regions.
In only a small number of Community regions is the
share of employment in both the defence industry and
armed forces twice the Community average.
The impact of plant and base closures will differ
between regions, with some isolated local areas
being more adversely affected by defence cuts than
those which are located in larger and less defence-
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dependent regions. Those resulting from detbnce Initially, there will be a need for a wide range of
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Number of regions o/o
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industry cuts are likely to be greater and less diffuse
than those resulting from reductions in armed forces
and may, in exceptional cases, cause a doubling in
the number of job losses.
Policy responses need to be adapted to the special
characteristics of the industry and region affected.
Serious problems of adjustment are likely to occur
where defence industry cutbacks are in areas where
other industries are already in decline and where
older workers with traditional skills are affected or
where a high proportion of the local worldorce is
employed in defence. Much of the industrial infra-
stnrcture in such zueas is likely to be highly spe-
cialised and may pose serious environmental prob-
lems of site decontarnination. There are very few
examples in the Community of complete industrial
conversion from defence to civil applications, al-
though many companies are pursuing strategies of
diversifieation. Much of the labour force involved is
not likely to be readily re-employed without retrain-
ing.
The impact of military base closures, particularly if
they occur in comparatively small communities or
mral areas, can do great damage to the local econ-
omic fabric. Often toruism, agriculture or fishing
provide the only alternative means of employment.
Srabgies for the diversification of the local econ-
omy should 'include the commercialisation of the
land and buildings abandoned by the military.
policy measures directed to environmental improve-
ment, site decontamination and clearance, ilrd a re-
skilling of the work-force. This, in turn, implies a
need for local coordination, given the relativ.- isola-
tion of many defence establishments and the need for
any Community response to be built on iocal and
regional initiatives.
Such a response is complicated by the fact that the
majority of areas with defence industry plants and
military bases have until recently not been eligible
for Community support under the regional objectives
of the Stmcnual Funds (Table 4). Jobs in the defence
sector have traditionally been secure and linle af-
fected by structural change.
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European Commission (1992), &nployment in Europe.
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0hapter 4 Infrastructure and
human resource endowments
Differences in infrastnrcture ar--d human capital are
widely recognised as contributing significantly to
variatio ns in reg i onal co mpetitiveness. The economi-
cally stronger and more prosperous n-rgions of the
Community are generally more rictrly endowed with
both, while the lagging regions typically havc serious
deficiencies.
In a Community which is gradually moving towards
closer union, such wide differences are less and less
acceptable. This is recognised in the Maastricht
Treaty, which lists among the central aims the pro-
motion of harmonious and balanced development
and the strengthening of economic and social cohe-
sion. In achieving these aims, the Treaty specifically
recognises the role of trans-Europgan networls in the
fields of transport, energy and telecommunications
infrastructures in enabling regions to reap the full
benefits from the Single Market and in linking island,
landloclrod and peripheral regions to the central re-
gions of the Community. The creation of greater
equality of opportunity for all European citizens and
firms, wherever they are located, requires progress
towards reducing the gapin infrastruc0rre andhuman
capital endowments.
This is why a major proportion of the Community's
aid to lagging regions has been concentrated on
trying to achieve this. Under the 1989-1993
Community Support Frameworks for Objective 1 re-
gions, the Stnrctural Funds devoted some 16 bil-
lion ECU to investment in basic infrastructure and
well over 10 billion ECU to invesunent in human
capital (at 1994 prices), or some 35% and 227o,
respectively, of total expenditure. In addition, the
European Investrnent Bank provided nearly 10 bil-
lion ECU in loan finance for inveshnent in basic
infrastructure in these regions in the period
1989-1991.
This chapter examines the 'development gap' be-
tween the lagging regions and the rest of the
Communiry in terms of the major disparities which
persist in regard to endowments in basic infrastruc-
ture and human capital
Regional differences
in infrastructure
Infrastructure is composed of four main elements :
transport and energy networks, telecommunication
links and environmental facilities (i.e. waste treat-
ment and water supply). In this chapter, new infor-
mation on transport, telecommunications and envi-
ronmental infrastructures is considered. Energy
infrastructures are also important for regional devel-
opment. Extending and improving energy networks
and improving access in the weaker regions are es-
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sential to promoting productive activities. The avai-
lability of high-quality electricity or natural gas suP
plies enables businesses in all sectors of the regional
economy to o$imise their choice of equipment. En-
ergy diversification helps to improve competitive-
ness. Such issues have been examined in a recent
report by the Commissionr and are not therefore
explored further in this chaPter.
To compare the regional endowments in infrastruc-
tures raises important concepilal and methodologi-
cal issues, which need to bebrieflyconsideredbefore
the data can be properly interpreted
The role of infrastructure
in the develoPment Process
Despite the clear association between the level of
infrastnrcture and regional development" the nature
of thecausallinkis still the subject of intense debate2.
Some of the more central regions of the Community,
for example, despite very high levels of infrastnrc-
hge provisiorU argUably face constraints on future
development because of deficiencies in rclation to
needs in certain areas, such as transport where the
existing network may be unable to cope with in-
creased volumes of traffic.
The present interest of economists and planners in
infrastructure concerns two main issues :
o first, the cost which tends to fall on the public
sector which is constrained because of financial
difficulties; this has led to growing interest in
ways of introducing private sector finance,
which, inter alia, requires improved information
on needs to facilitate invesrnent appraisal;
o secondly, the indirect as well as direct contribu-
tion of infrastructure to enhancing regional econ-
omic performance, which is related to its 'public
good' aspect, in the sense that once provided it is
available to all at zeto or low cost' expenditure
on infrastrucure can therefore improve the pro-
ductivity of private businesses and increase
profitability. The overall rate of return on such
investment can accordingly be much higher than
it appears. The historically low levels of infra-
struchrre investment (including replacement)
have arguably constrained the rate of productiv-
ity and employment growth in some Member
States.
Defining apPropriate indicators
Making regional comparisons of infras truc ture rai ses
theproblem,first, of identifying an appropriate -and
concise 
- 
set of indicators reflecting the scale and,
more especially, the quality of the endowment of
each type of infrastructure. Secondly, there is a r.eed
for simplification and ability to aggregate indicators
in order to produce indices of endowmenl Thirdly,
infrastructure provision needs to be related to other
factors, such as the structue of economic activity.
Finally, therc is a need to take account of links
between infrastructure networks both within and be-
tween regions.
The simplest measure of infrastructure is either the
physical scale of provision 
- 
eg the length of roads
per square kilometre or in reliation to population -
which indicates the potential intensity of use' The
proportion of population with access to particular
iacilities, srch as public water supply, may also be
relevant. For most types of infrastructure, indicators
reflecting quality should also be included. For the rail
network, for example, the extent of electrification
and the number of separate tracks, which affect both
the speed of service and the capacity of the network,
can be taken as indicators of quality.
To facilitate interregional comparisons of total en-
dowments, i,here is an obvious attraction in attempt-
ing to combine individual measures to produce a
single comprxite indicator. While several aggrega-
tion methods are possible, none is wholly satisfac-
tory. Subjective judgement about the choice of
measures to be included and the relative weights to
be attached to each are inevitably invoked. More-
over, changes in composite indicators tend to be
difficult to interpret, while they provide linle or no
indication about whether provision responds to the
specific needs of a region.
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The type of infrastructure provision in a given region
will have typically developed to suit existing needs,
but may constain new kinds of development. Re-
gions with poor endowments of particular facilities,
however, ftay have other advantages which more
than outweigh the deficiency. Regions with poor
road or rail networks may have a superior environ-
menf lower labour costs, and so on. While improved
infrastructure may be a desirable part of regional
development it may be neither necessary nor suffi-
cient per se to generate that development.
One of the basic factors in a region's economic
development lies in trade with other regions. Con-
nections to markets and sources of supply (not just
the movement of goods but also the transfer of infor-
mation) may be of critical importance. This is tnre
both at the interregional level, where deficiencies are
not revealed by a region by region assessment in
cases where the completion of trans-European net-
works is vital to thecompetitiveness of regions taken
as a whole and at the intra-regional level, where the
links to any trans-European network are importanl
For many peripheral and lagging regions, akey prob-
lem is the deficiency of the internal network rather
than the inter-regional linls, which is not always
revealed by any regional indicator, since this will not
take account of how well different parts of the net-
work are connected 
- 
eg whether branch lines are
well connected to trunk routes.
In summary, while the measurementof infrastrucnue
endowment is important to understanding regional
differences, any indicator must be interpreted with
caution.
Regional i nfrastructu ral
endowments in transport
A good transport system is generally recognised as a
prerequisite for national or regional economic devel-
opment. Transport systems have all of the inherent
features of infrastnrchue. They are large, indivisible,
immobile and are used by a wide variety of producers
and consumers. [n modern @onomies, based on
trade, they are also a necessity without a viable
substitute, though substitution is possible between
different modes of transport.
Transport systems particularly have a major role in
promoting the integration and cohesion, in improv-
ing the accessibility of peripheral regions and in
relieving the pressure of transit traffic in the more
central areas3.
As noted above, transport systems have to be con-
sidered in relation to regional needs. The aim is not
simply to equalise endowments. More geographi-
cally remote and less densely populated regions are
likely to need greater provision in terms of road or
rail tnack length per head of population than less
remote regions. Regions on the extreme periphery,
especially islands, will tend to require relatively more
port and ui.port facilities and typically will not be
able to use inter-regional infrastructure for infra-
regional needsa. In the most congested central re-
gions of Eruope, the combination of transit and re-
gional traffic may also necessitate a higher than
average level of provision relative to both area and
population. The difficulty is to determine the degree
of under-provision of infrastructure in the light of
these sources of variation.
Transport systems are different from other types of
infrastructure in that significant benefits are also
likely to accrue to those not resident in the region
where they are locateds. The costs, especially the
environmental costs, however, tend to fall on local
residents. This makes for difficulty in assessing the
implications of any variations in endowment which
are identified.
Roads
Roads account for the largest share of both passenger
and freight traffic within the Community. More than
70Vo of freight movements (measured in kilometre
tons) and more than 90Vo of passenger movements
(measured in passenger kilometres) are made by
road- The use of other forms of transport depend on
good local road communications for access. A good
road networks is, therefore, vital to a region for both
inter- and intra-regional traffic.
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In terms of basic indicators, the weakestiegions tend
to lag behind the EC average. The total road surface
per square kilometre in Greece and Spain is only 237a
of the Community average and in Portugal only 42Vo,
as against over 3A0% of the average in Belgium and
over 200 7o in the Netherlands and Luxembourg.
l-ocation is clearly a factor here, since peripheral
regions have less need of roads for transit traffic, as
is density of population. In relation to population,
there is a liule less variation, road surface per inhabi-
tant being around 50Vo of the Community average in
Spain, Greece and Porhrgal and around LSA% tn
Belgium. Ireland illustrates the difference between
the two measures, with twice the road surface in
relation to population than the Community average
but only 75Vo if related to land area.
At the regional level, the lowest level of road provi-
sion per squa-re kilometre is found in the remote
regions of Greece (Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki and
Kentriki Makedonia), Spain (Extremadura and
Castitla-I-a Mancha) and Portugal (Alentejo). In the
latter two countries, this principally reflects sparse
population, since all these regions have above aver-
age provision in per capita terms. The Greek regions,
however, come out low on this measure as well
(Annex, Table A11).
There is some tendency for the metropolitan regions
to have the lowest provision per head- In Lisboa, in
Portugal, the road network is less than a third of the
national average per head and in the Athens region
of Greece (Attiki) less than half the national average
per head.
To facilitate comparison, a composite indicator giv-
ing equat weighting to land area and population has
been constructed. This confirms the poor endowment
of Greece, Spain and Portugal (Graph 9).
As the road surface reflects not only the length of
roads, but also their width (number of lanes), it
already involves some allowance for road quality.
Motorways are a fuither indicator of quality. The
index combining the per square kilometre and per
head figures is highest for the Benelux countries
(more than double the Community average) and
Germany and gene.ally well below the average for
the peripheral countries 
- 
only 57o of the average for
Ireland and 9Vo for Greece (Graph 10).
At Community level, there is no harmonised m@sure
of the quatity of service provided by road networks
(eg in terms of the average travel speed) or the scale
of congestion at peak times (eg in terms of the
variability of travel time). The only data from which
quality differences may be infened relate to road
safety, as measured by the number of people killed
in road accidents. Although this indicator needs to be
interpreted with extreme caution, the figures seemto
suggest very poor roads in Portugal and Greece, with
69 people killed per 100,000 vehicles as against a
Community average of 30 (Graph I 1).
The extent and quality of road infrastructure at any
point in time is the result of a cumulative invesfinent
effort over a long period.The figures for investment
in roads help to explain the gap between the four
weakest Member States and the rest of the
Community : For most of the period 1975 to 1989,
the road investrnent relative to GDP in Greece, Spain,
Ireland and Portugal was significantly below the
level in the rest of the Community- Only in the last
two years of the period was the figure for these
countries above the average elsewhere (Graph 12 and
Annex, Table A.12). (More recent information sug-
gests that investment remained above l% of GDP
during the early 1990s).
Rail
The variation in provision of railways is less than for
roads, although the differences betrveen Member
States and regions remain significant and the spatial
pattern of variation is similar to that for roads.
In most of the more developed Member States the
density of rail lines per square kilometre is above the
Community average, whereas the four poorest coun-
tries have a relatively low density. As for roads, the
per capita figures are somewhat different. Ireland is
again well provided, Belgium, the Netherlands and
the UK less well so, reflecting the greater prevalence
of double-track lines (Annex, Table A.13).
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In terms of the composite index, Germany, France
and Belgium have the most developed rail networks,
Greece the least (Graph 13).
At the regional level, in Spain regions with poor
roads (notably Andalucia and Murcia), also have
poor rail networks, which is also true of the metro-
politan areas of Greece and Portugal. On the other
hand, a number of Spanish regions have very high
levels of rail provision, especially relative to roads,
as is the case in many Southern Italian regions. This
suggests that although national levels of provision do
not vary greatly, there is more substantial variation
between regions within the peripheral Member
States.
Three indicators of rail quality are available 
- 
the
proportion of lines which is electrified, the propor-
tion which is double track and the proportion
equipped with automatic block signals.
The degree of electrification depends not only on the
finance available for modernisation, but also on srch
factors as the availability of electricity atcompetitive
prices and the nature and density of traffic carried.
There are substantial variations in this indicator be-
tween both developed and less developed countries.
In the UK and Denmark, a below average proportion
of lines arc electrified (297o and l l%o as against a
Community average of 4lVo) while Belgium, the
Netherlands and ltaly all have figures well above the
average. ForSpain, the figures is also above average,
though the extent of electrification in the weaker
Spanish regions is below average as it is in Portugal,
Ireland and Greece 
- 
in the latter two substan-
tially so (Graph l4).
The proportion of lines which are double track is also
much lower in the less developed Member States
than in the rest of the Community (though this may
reflectdiffererrces in the level of demand and density
of service) (Graph l5).
The proportion of tracks equipped with automatic
block signalling, wh ich inc re ases spe ed and capacity,
is similarly high in more developed countries 
- 
in
Belgium, Luxembourg and the UK, it is well over
50Vo 
- 
and low in the less developed 
- 
in Spain and
Portugal, it is only around 107o, in the new German
L?inder and East Berlin less than SVo and in lreland,
zero (Graph 16).
During the second half of ttre 1970s and in the 1980s,
investment in rail infrastmcture in the Community
remained stable at around O.2% of GDP (Graph 17
and Annex, Table A.14). Of the four poorest Member
States, only Spain had a higher figure (an average of
O.25Vo of GDP a year). Investment levels in Greece
and in Ireland remained very low throughout the
period at, respectively, 0.087o and0.047o of GDP.
These three indicators suggest that rail infrastructure
in the four poorest Member States is not only less
extensive, but also of poorer quality than in the more
developed parts of the Community. At the same time,
traffic is also lower. Train-kilometres per kilometre
of rail line are only half as high as in the rest of the
Community, passenger-kilometres per kilometre of
rail line are less than60Vo as high and the volume of
freight per kilometre of linr: is less than 4OVo as high
,(Table 5). This low level of use may be one of the
reasons why these countries have given lower
priority to the modernisation of their rail networks
than to investment in roads during the 1980s, though
equally lack of investment may also be a reason why
raffic is low and declinirng. In the four countries
taken together, rail passenger traffic declined by l%o
between 1986 and 199 1 as compared with an increase
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of 7Vo in the rest of the Communiry and frcight traffic
fell by over 5Vo as against a rise of 3% elsewhere.
As noted above, the lower level of infrastructure
provision may in some cases reflect thc lower level
of trans port demand in the lagg ing regions. However,
there are clear indications that the demand for trans-
port services is rising far more rapidly in many of the
lagging regions than in the rest of the Community.
Between 1987 and 1992, freight traffic increased by
25% on the Iberian peninsula 
- 
more than twice the
average increase in the Northern Member States6.
Such a rapid expansion of traffic is likely to result in
increasing congestion, particularly in the more ur-
banised regions.
To prevent deficiencies in transport infrastnrcture
imposing serious constraints on economic develop
ment, the least prosperous Member States and re-
gions will need to increase investment to a level
significantly above that in the more developed areas.
This seems to have been happening in recent years.
Between 1984 and 1988, the four poorest Member
States devoted around IVo of theirGDPto investment
in transport, slightly more than the more prosperous
Member States. Between 1989 and 1993, investment
seems to have more than doubled in each country,
except lreland, where there is liule sign of any in-
crease. Further increases in investment appear to be
planned. Between 1994 and 1999, the four countries
together are projected to undertake expenditure of
around 2Vo of GDP, at least twice as high as the
Community average, which should enable them to
make some progress towards reducing disparities in
transport relative to the rest of the Community.
TelecommunicationsT
Telecommunications are important, both in provid-
ing key support to regional economic development
and as a complement to other infrastructure. Tele-
communications are often seen as a modern sub-
stitute for transport links, since they obviate the need
for face-to-face contacts, enable large volumes of
information to be sent more rapidly and cheaply.
However, telecommunications can also create an
increased demand for transport, establishing contacts
which tend to lead to a greater need to travel and
convey freighl Telecommunications and tnansport
systems can therefore be expected to develop in
parallel rather than as alternative.
Telecommunications can also be seen as a prereq-
uisite for the growth of modern industries and ser-
vices, which require efficient telephone, fax and data
transmission systems. The precise relationship b"-
tween investment in telecommunications and re-
gional.development is, however, Iike that of most
infrastructure, not easy to establish. Improved tele-
communications can have both centralising and
decentralising effects. On the one hand, they make it
easier for firms to service brztnches and clients out-
side a region from central points and hence can serve
to inhibit development. On the other hand, they make
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it possible for firms to take advantage of lower costs
and other benefits in peripheral regions whilst main-
taining good links with core regions.
The quality of the telecommunications system de-
pends both on the infrastructure itself and on the
services provided. For basic telephone services, the
number of lines per head is a reasonable indicator,
while the quality of service can be measured by
connection to a digital exchange, which provide ac-
cess to networks which are an essential part of mod-
ern data transmission systems.
Despite rapid growth in telephone networks, major
variations between Member States and regions re-
main. Although the number of main telephone lines
in Portugal, for example, increased by over 75Vo
between 1987 and 1992, it still had the lowest density
of any Member State at27 lines per 100 inhabitants,
much less than in Denmark (58), France (51) and
Luxembourg (50). In Ireland (30), Spain (34) and
Greece (40) network density was also below the
Community average of aA lines per 100 inhabitants
(Graph 18 and Annex, Table A.15).
Greater variation exists in some countries at the
regional level. Germany is the most notable example,
the new German Linder have the lowest density of
lines in the Community at 13 per 100 inhabitants in
I992(see Chapter 11). In Portugal there is consider-
able variation between Acores (18) and Alentejo (19)
and Algarve (34) and Lisboa e vale do Tejo (35)'
while in the Mezzogiorno, the density (32) is less
thanT5Vo of that for Italy as a whole and in Greece,
substantial differences exist between Attiki (51) and
more peripheral regions like Anatoliki Makedonia
and Traki (28) or Ipeiros (29).
Connection to digital networks reflects recent levels
of investment. High connection levels are found in
France (79Vo of subscribers connected to digital ex-
changes), where investment has been considerable
compared to Denmark, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands which have around the same number of
lines per 100 inhabitants. In Ireland and Portugal, the
rapid growth of the telephone system in recent years
has enabled new technology to be introduced earlier
than in many much rnore developed countries (in
Pornrgal, for example, the digitalisation rate in-
creased from zero in 1988 to 5O7o n L992), while in
the UK, a major investment programme led to an
equally dramatic growth in digital connections (from
under 2% in 1987 to 557o in 1992)-
To be effective, a telephone network needs to be
reliable. The number of faults per line each year is,
therefore, an important measure of the quality of
service (Graph 20). In the more developed Member
States fault rates are generally below 207o
(0.20 faults per tine annually) while in the four wea-
kest Member States, rates vary from 30% in Spain to
50% or motre in Greece and Portugal- This is despite
intensive modernisation, which halved fault rates
over the period 1987 to 1992.
From the available regional data, there apPear to be
no great difference between North and South in ltaly,
but substantial differences in Greece, with the hig-
hest fault rate being in the Attiki region (0.71)' be-
cause of the old and congested network in Athens.
During the period 1987 to 1991, investnent in tele-
communications in the Community averaged be-
tween 0.5% and 0.6Vo of GDP, though in the four
poorest Member States taken iogether it was signifi-
cantly higher at just over l%o of GDP (Graph 21 and
Annex, Table A.16). In per capita terms, investnent
in these four countries was $ome 30% grater than in
the rest of the Community (excluding Germany),
thurgh there was considerable variation between the
four (Graph 19). The high expenditure in these coun-
tries was due almost entirely to a trebling of invest-
ment in Spain and Portugal, which reached a peak
level of arourd I.4Vo of GDP and which, in percapita
tenns, far exceeded levels in the more prosperous
parts of the Community. In Greece also, investnent
increased significantly between 1987 and 1991, al-
beit from a very low base (from 0.4Vo of GDP to
0.8%), though investment per head remained very
low (iust over 507o of the Community average in
199l-1992). In lreland, investment was also rela-
tively low in relation to population and, relative to
GDP, was just above that in the more developed
Member States between 1987 and 1991, which may
be due to the fact that the Irish network was already
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significantly digitised by the mid-1980s (with a rate
of 
-46Vo 
in 1988).
The exceptionally high levels of invesftnent in recent
years enabled Spuio and Portugal to bring the stand-
ard of their telecommunications networks rnore in
line with that in the more developed Member States,
despite the latter stepping up efforts to expand and
modernise their systems too (Table 6). Between 1987
and 1992, the number of main lines in Spain in-
c reased from 62Vo of the average for B el gium, Franc e
and the UK (the only ones of the more developed
counhies for which data are available) to 71Vo, and
in Portugal, where the number of lines nearly
doubled over this period from 40Vo to 60Vo.In both
countries there was also a considerable increase in
the percentage of subscribers connected to local ex-
changeq, 
-while fault rate and average waiting time
for new connections declined significantly.
Environmental faci I ities
and water supply
Environmental infrastmcture 
- 
considered here in
terms of the capacity to supply adequate amounts of
clean water and to dispose of solid and liquid wastes
generated 
- 
is both an important conhibution to
economic activity and a source of protection against
ecological damage as development tekes place. It
therefore, helps to ensure that regional growth can be
sustained. For example, inadequate facilities for the
treatment of urban waste water can significantly
reduce income and jobs.
The main environmental problems which have im-
plications for infrastructure investnent in weaker
regions concern the management of urban waste
water and the disposal of domestic, industrial and
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toxic waste. Problems of environmental damage,
however, are widespread throughout the
Community. In certain cases, for example, contami-
nated land or urban dereliction, the problems tend to
be greater in developed areas now in industrial de-
cline than in less developed regions.
In cons idering reg ional endowm ents of environmen-
tal infrastructure, the approach adopted is not one of
examining the extent to which the weaker regions are
less developed than the stronger, but one of compar-
ing thecurrent siRration with the standards identified
in the various Community Directives relating to the
environment. This, in effect, combines quality and
quantity indicators.
Community Directives set environmental standards
and the dates by which these must be mel The supply
of water, the quality of which is governed by Dirrc-
tives, requires major investment to ensure adequate
provision for households and hsinesse$ without
undue impact on the nahral environrnent. Air qudity
and control of emissions are also governedby Direc-
tives but are not considered here because they do not
involve major public infra$ructure inveshent and
becausethecosts of meeting standards fall largely on
the pnvat€ sector.
The physical requircment for new environmental
infrastnrcture is difficult to estimate. Continuing
ctraqges in environmental poticy and standards, un-
certainty over future economic growth and changes
in tcchnolory complicate the picture, while there is
a lack of comprehensive dataon existing facilities 
-
a problem not confined to Europe. Here the aim is to
indicate the broad scale of Community differences in
endowment between regions.
Waste water
The capability of regions to treat their waste water
varies widely. In West Germany, in 1988, the ratio
of waste water treatment capacity to waste water
production was 105%, while in Ireland the figrre was
one-third and in Greece only LL%. The Ministry of
the Environment in Italy recently reported that a
number of the lreatnent plants in the Mdzzogiorno
wete not in operation, often because they were not
connocted to the sewer or power system8.
To be treated, waste water has to be collected, which
requires in turn a major investnent in infrastructure.
In 1991, onlll 53Vo of the population in Spain was
connected to waste water treatment facilities, while
in lreland the figure was 447o and 3l% in Portugal.
These proportions compare with 68% (France) and
98% (Denmark)
Untreated waste water is generally discharged into
rivem and evenhrally the sea. The quality of bathing
waters therefore give an indication of the effective-
ness of waste water treafinent system. In Denmark,
where y2% of the population is connected to waste
water treatment facilities, 96% of beaches met the
standard set in the Bathing Water Directive. In Spain,
90% of beachcs reached the standard, but in
Andalucia this figure fell to 8l%, while in Sicily the
figurc was only 78% and in East Germany as loW
as68%e. The UK figure is also comparatively low
at76%.
Solid waste
Municipal solid waste can be disposed of by incin-
erating, composting, recycling or landfil. I^andfill is
the most coilrmon and least expensive method, but in
order to ensure thatlandfill sites meet environmental
standards 
- 
so that" for example, contaminated water
does not leach into ttre water table 
- 
they need to be
controlled. In Pornr gal,62%o of municipal solid waste
was disposed of in uncontrolled sites in 1989 and this
rises to93% in the Algarvelo. In the poorest regions
of Spain 387o of waste was disposed of in such sites
in 1990 and 71% nCastilla I-a Mancharl, in Italy an
estimated TAVo of the waste generated in the
Mezzogiorno is disposed of in unauthorised sitestz.
The disposal of industrial and toxic waste is a major
problem in all Merr'ber States and there is a lack of
agreement on the methods to be used. Even in the less
developed regions, the amounts of toxic and hazard-
ous waste being produced have reached significant
levels. Greece, for example, generated approxi-
mately 450,000 tonnes ayeu:t3 but has no treatrnent
or disposal facilities, and it is estimated that Portugal
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produced over I million tonnes of hazardous waste
in 1987, 82Vo of which was disposed of to uncon-
trolled landfilla'
Water supply
Proper management of the environment requires that
the process of supplying waterdoes notinterfere with
the ecosystem. Water is needed for both industry and
households. The poorer regions, where agriculrure is
a major water user, face problems of shortages, sea-
sonal fluctuations in both supply and demand and
potentialcontamination. There are permanent supply
problems 
- 
'water stress' 
- 
in the South and South-
West of Spain, Attiki (GR) and Abruzzi and
Sardegna (I). Shortages are particularly acute in
Communidad Valencianaand Murcia (E). In lreland,
only 807o of the population was connected to the
public distribution network in 1990 and 65Vo in the
Norte region of Pornrgal in 1990 as against99Vo in
France and the UK in 1989 (Graph 23).
Even where the public distribution system is rela-
tively extensive, the amount of water lost from the
system can be high 
- 
as much as 34To in Spain and
3OVo in the Mezzogiorno in 1987rs.
Walcr dsirbt,lion: GR f 98O; Waste water disposal: B, GR 1988
77
Investment requ irements
If measuring the scale of the initial problem is diffi-
cult, assessing the costs of meeting environmental
standards is even more so.
It is estimated that investrnent of over 900 mil-
lion ECU a year will be needed in waste water man-
agement in the four poorest countries of the
Community plus Itaty over the next ten years to
comply wittr the drinking water Directive (80n78)
and to achieve a 95Vo connection rate (Table 7).
These figures, however, do not include the renewal
of existing but inadequte facilities nor operating
costs, which together could double the required ex-
penditure.
In the case of urban waste water, investment is re-
quired for the provision and renewal of sewers and
treatment facilities. The Urban Waste Water Direc-
tive (9ll27l) sets out precise standards to be
achieved by all waste water discharges and a time
schedule with final completion by 31 Decem-
ber 2005, by which date all treatment facilities re-
quiredby the Directive must be installed. Investnent
alone, however, is not enough to ensure that starid-
ards are met. There are rnany examples of new plants
lying idle or functioning inadequately because of the
costs of maintenance, a lack of trained employees or
organisational problems.
As GDP grows, so does the quanttty of waste gener-
ated. The composition of the waste also changes,
w ith the p roportion of organic matter decreasing. The
provision of recycling and incineration facilities
(which must themselves respect air pollution stand-
ards) is costly. Irndfill is likely to continue to be the
most important form of disposal for the foreseeable
future, but as well as investment in the provision of
sites, therc mustalso be effective monitoring of these
and a charging system which reflects the true costs,
environmental infrastructure proiects in,Objective'l regions,
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lhvestment,:.p,a. tof,Gie"r",in,.lnOU-tnamaiaiOo* waste proibcts is 2 million ECIU
provides an incentive for waste minimisation and/or
recycling and deters illegal disposal.
The generation of toxic and hazardous wastes per
head is lower in the less developed than in the more
industrialised regions, but is increasing as industry
develops. Lack of law enforcement, local opposition
to the location of facilities and other political prob-
lems are important in restricting invesftnenl
Investment in water supply tends to be directed to-
wards three aims : collection, purification and dis-
tribution. Important problems to be addressed in-
clude the possible deterioration of ground water
quality from po llution and guaran teein g a conti nu ou s
supply of water, particularly to Southernpartsof ltaly
and Spain and to Attiki in Greece.
Planned i nvestment wilI make considerable progress
towards improving wastewater and solid wastg treat-
ment and water supply in the weaker regions in the
coming years (Graph 24).Total expenditure in these
areas will double between 1989-93 and L994-99.
The expected changes will be dramatic as illustrated
in the case of Portugal. Secondary level treaunent of
was,te water should rise from 20To to 90Vo over the
next 6 years while the proportion of municipal waste
disposed of under conEolled conditions is expected
to rise from 40Vo in 1990 to 98Vo in 1999.
Investment in infrastmcture can have a significant
effect on the economy of a region, both directly and
indirectly. The installation of new facilities generates
employment both during the construction period and
when in operation. One estimate is that 26,000 job
years in construction, contracting and the supply of
equipment werecreated as a consequence of projects
financed by the Structural Funds and by Member
States on environmental projects in 1993t6.
Regional differences
in human capital
endowments
The competitiveness of the Community and regions
depends not only on physical infrastructures endow-
ments but, to an increasing extent" on those of human
res ourc es. Effec ti ve educational and trai ning systems
can therefore be important in strengthening com-
parative advantage. Despite the efforts made over
recent years, however, disparities are still very wide.
Adjusting educational and training systems to pro-
found structural changes is a priority for the whole
Community. The need is to respond to technological
advances which make existing skills redundant and
to demographic trends which are reducing the num-
ber of people entering the labour market.
Disparities in educational levels
The educational level (or attainment) of the working.
age population is a fundamental indicator of the
availability of human capital.
In the four poorest Member States, alargeproportion
of the adult population (aged between 25 to 64 years)
OR , IRL EUR1 t :. I
79
has not undertaken a secondary education -77Vo tn
Porflrgal, 64Vo in Spain, 53Vo in Greece and 33To in
Ireland as against a Community averageof 17Vot7 -ln
most of the more developed countries, the figwe is
virurally zero (Graph 25).
Furthermore, there are wide regional disparities in
the least favoured Member States. For example, in
Porfirgal, the proponion of the population of working
age without secondary education varies from 69Vo
(Lisbon and the Tejo valley) to 85% (Madeira) and
in Greece from 38Vo (Attiki) to TlVo (Eastern
Macedonia). Those living in towns or cities are
generally better educated than those living in rural
areas reflecting the relative ineffectiveness of exist-
ing educational systems.
Patterns are more varied in regard to post-compul-
sory secondary education (Graph 26)- While it is the
case that the poorer regions of the Community have
a lower proportion of population who have attained
this level compared to the Community average, this
also applies to certain more prosperous Member
States, notably the UK and Luxembourg-
Disparities in participation rates
Basic education and initial training is essential to
improving the quality of ttre future worldorce in
Member States. It gives young people a better chance
of finding their first job and is essential preparation
for further education and training-
In all Member States, virtually the whole of the
population aged up to 15 years is now undergoing
(compulsory) education- Over time, this will pro-
gressively erode the wide disparities in educational
attainment described in the previous section.
The number of young people taking postcompulsory
educati onal/training c ourse$ has inc rea sed consider-
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ably throughout the Community in recent years.
There has been substantial progress in the least de-
veloped regions of the Community. Nevertheless,
marked differences still exist in the proportion of
young people of 15 to 19 remaining in education,
particularly between the less developed countries
and the rest of the Community. In the more developed
counties, over 75% of 15 to 19 year olds were in
secondary or higher education in 1989-90, except in
Luxembourg (72Vo) and the UK (S9Vo)). In the
poorest Member States, the figure was around 60%
or.less except in Ireland (69%).
There are also imponant differences in the case of
the 20 to 24 age group. In the Netherlands, ZgVo of
this group and in Denmark and Germany (excluding
the new Liinder) 27% were still in education, while
the figure for Greece and Portugal was lTVo and for
Ireland orly l1Vo. There were, however, notable
exceptions. Among the more developed countries,
the UK had a figure of l|Vo and among the less
developed countries Spain one of Z5Vo.
Closer examination of the data for yoturg people in
the 15 to 19 age group shows that the high figures in
the most developed regions are the result of high
levels of technical and vocational tnaining. On the
other hand, in the least developed regions, in general,
academic forms of education predominate. These
same regions are often those most affected by unem-
ployment among the under 25s.
To reduce present disparities, it is not sufficient
simply to increase the capacity of education and
trainingystems in the less developed areas. Al-
though important, enrolment rates give no indication
of the quatity of the content of courses or the educa-
tional methods used. The repeat and dropout rates
provide some insight in to these aspects. Countries
with low enrolment rates also have high repeat and
drop-out rates. In Spain, for example, the repeat and
drop-out rates in secondary education increased from
IZVo in 1988 to22Vo n lgg} and rates are also high
in Italy (l9Vo) and Greec e (9.5% in general second-
ary education and 24.5Vo in technical and vocational
training)tt.
Disparities in continuous
education and training
Data on continuous education and training are diffi-
cult to collect and interpret. Existing sources such as
surveys of the l,abour Force Survey indicate the
broad scale of disparities within the Community, the
proportion of l5 to24-ye,ar-olds in employment and
receiving training, forexample, varying from 33Voin
Germany to less than 2% in Greece and pornrgal
in 1991.
In general, the most highly educated and those work-
ing.in large companies seem to have more chance of
receiving further training, which implies problems
for the least favoured regions with their more poorly
educated workforces employed mainly in small and
medium-sized enterprises. The fact that training is
most needed in those regions where there is least
provision calls for measures to increase the oppor-
tunities available, through, for example, better links
between initial and continuous education and train-
ing systems.
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Chapter 5 New inward investment
and the regl0ns
Mobile investment
in the Community :
where are the most
attractive locations?
The prosperity of regions is.depeqpent on their ability
to attract and retain productive activity. The features
of a region which attract eronomic activity tend to
change over time as do theconditions requiredby the
activities themselves. Historically, the structure of
economic activity has undergone massive changes as
agriculrure gave way to urban manufacturing which,
at least in terms of employment, has in turn dim-
inished in importance as services have expanded.
Within manufacturing and services, there have also
been rnajor structural changes as the scale of activity
has expfrded both in terms of the range of products
produced and geographically.
The multinational firm has become the symbol of
modern economic activity at the end of the twentieth
century. These firms have a much greater influence
on activity than their size would suggest because of
the ancillary manufacturing and services which they
generate as they locate in different places. Neverthe-
less, outside the multinational sector, small and
medium-sized companies continuously make loca-
tional decisions only some of which can be ascribed
to the behaviour of large firms.
The factors which determine the locational beha-
viour of companies have been the subject of many
studies. This chapter does not attempt to review the
findings, but instead focuses on the evidence of a
survey of firms which were asked how different parts
of the Community measured up to their locational
requirementsr. It then goes on to consider the magni-
tude and direction of foreign direct investment flows
over the period 1986-1991.
Factors affecting
location decisions : a brief review
The survey covered 87 firms includin g l7 multina-
tionals which had recently taken decisions on the
location of their activities in.the Community. The
findings confrmed the importance of the classic
determinants of location :
proximity to the market
the quality and availability of labour
o suitable infrastructure (transport, telecommunl-
cations, etc)
r the quality of life and personal factors
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r cultural affinitv
o promotional policies
o the existence of other firms in similar areas of
activity, or the clustering effect.
None of these are surprising, though the identifica-
tion of the clustering effect has potentially important
consequences for regions. The decision of where to
locate of around half the companies interviewed was
affected by the desire to be close to companies
carrying out similar activities. This was particularly
true of manufacturing companics which believed
they would have more choice as regards component
suppliers and specialised maintenance services in an
area where similar products were being manufac-
tured. Component suppliers also preferred to be lo-
cated close to similar companies, both for supply of
intermediate goods and for access to rnajor cus-
tomers.
The findings of the survey at a more general level are
also revealing. First, the survey indicated that the
moti ve underlyi ng the dec is ion to locate, or re- locate,
is a desire to gain or retain market share. The Single
Market appea$ to be particularly imponant in this
respecl On the one hand, firms from outside the
Community viewed investment in Euope as a means
of protecting their market share. On the other, many
firms inside the Community have responded to the
Single Market by reorganising their activities geo-
graphically. The data reviewed below confirm the
substantial growth of investment flows into the
Community, * well as between Member States, in
the second half of the 1980s.
Second, in75Vo of cases, the firms surveyed selected
the country in which to locate first and only then the
region. ln25% of cases, the final choice was between
regions in different countries. This means, therefore,
that in most cases the attractiveness of a region was
closely linked to the attractiveness of the Member
State concerned, though in a significant minority of
cases, the region seemed to be selected on its own
merits.
Thirdly, a single factor stood out as the key influence
on the decision in only a few cases. In most cases, the
region selocted had a particularcombination of char-
acteristics which best satisfied the criteria specified
by the decision-maker.
Fourthly, directcost factors werenotalways the most
decisive. Firms were prepared to forego the lowest
c ost location in favour of other benefits, though these
often had an implicit cost dimension 
- 
good quality
labour, for example, affects costs as does the
proximity of markets.
Perceptions on different
Member States and regions
The firms surveyed were asked to explain why some
c ounhies were included in their short-lists of possi ble
locations and others excluded. In general, the
Member States most frequently included were
Germany, France and the UK because of the import-
ance of their large market. In the case of Germany
and France, physical location on the European main-
land was important especially when combined with
the good level of infrastructural provision which was
perceived. These counEies were also reckoned to
offer a high quality labourforce, thoughconcern was
sometimes expressed about cost. For the UK, the
language and culture were seen as particular advan-
tages, especially by outside investors from the US
and Japan.
The other large Member State, Italy, wds short-listed
much less frequently than Germany, France and the
UK, largely, it would appear, because investnent
there was thought to involve more risk than in the
other three countries. Language difficulties were also
frequently cited against short-listing ltaly, while
some respondents viewed peripherality, the political
system and low labour force quality as problems.
For the smaller Northern Member States 
- 
Denmark,
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg 
- 
the
absence of a large national market seems to be a
major factor militating against their inclusion on
company short-lists. Companies, at the time of the
survey, were just beginning to view the Community
as a single market. This is probably therefore a tran-
84
sitory matter which is likely to change as companies
adapt theirproducrion and marketing to the reality of
a fully operational Single Market. On the positive
side, Belgium was often perceived by investors as
being at the heart of the Communig, due to the
presence of the European Commission and the head-
quarters of a number of major multinationals. The
Netherlands was often included fordistribution sites
due to its excellent port facilities and road network
as well as its accessibility to indusrial areas else-
where.
Perceptions on Greece,
Spain, lreland and Portugal
The attractiveness of locations in the weakest
Member States 
- 
Spunu Greece, Ireland, Pornrgal 
-
is of particular importance for cohesion. Their per-
ception by the firms suweyed can be summarised as
follows:
Spain
Spain was increasingly being included on short-lists
in cases where proximity to a large population was
important. A number of firms surveyed menticned
that for many products the Spanish market was ex-
panding as the economy grew and was therefore a
good sales opportunity for them.
As well as an expanding marke! the main reasons
given for short-listing Spain were low production
costs and the generous incentives on offer.
The main reasons for not short-listing it were its
distanccfrom the core Community market which
c aused logi stic problems and hindered clos e relation-
ships with customers, language difficulties and, in
the case of US and Japanese fi rms, the lack of cultural
affinity. A few companies also referred to problems
of labour quality.
lreland
Ireland was considered more attractive than Greece
or Portugal. Its key attraction was that costs were low
because of low wages, low corporate taxation and
generous incentives. This, together with the lan-
guage, was frequently cited as the reason forlocating
in Ireland. From the replies, Ireland was beginning
to be recognised as a centre of excellence for elec-
tronics and software andhad aready supplyof skilled
labour.
The main reasons for not short-listing heland were
its peripherality and the difficulties of transporting
goods to the European mainland.
Greece and Portugal
Greece and Porhrgal were short-listed in very few
cases. Where they were, the main reasons were low
production costs and the generous level of incentives
offered.
The chief reasons given for not short-listing the two
countries were their peripherality and the associated
transport difficulties and high costs, inadequate in-
frastructure, low quality of labour and the lack of
particular skills. Some companies expressed difficul-
ties of 'doing business' in countries with a small
industrial base and a lack of industial tradition com-
pared with countries such as Germany.
In some cases, specific business-related reasons,
such as a lack of service facilities for machine main-
tenance, were also cited.
Concluding remarks
It emerged from the survey that for many companies,
deciding on their location, a key issue was how to
balance the advantages of being close to their main
markets against the lower costs and other benefits
often associated with a more distant location.
The survey implies that regions nearest to the econ-
omic centres of the Community wiU continue to
benefit from this. Other regions might be able to
counteract such an advantage through lowerconges-
tion, beuer quality of life, lower costs, financial
incentives, and so on. This applies especially to re-
gions which are not too distant from these centres. It
seems likely, however, that headquarters of multina-
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tionals and specialised financial services will con-
tinue to be located in central regions.
Thrcugh lower costs and financial incentives, the
most peripheral regions have also beerr able to attract
a substantial amount of investment in the recent past,
especially in manufacturing (see below). Notable
examples include parts of Scotland and Ireland
(Midwest), the Lisboa and Porto regions in Portugal,
several areas on the Spanish Mediterranean coast
(Barcelona, Valencia, Malaga), Puglia (Bari) in ltaly
and the Thessaloniki region in Greece, which are all
areas with fairly well developed socio-economic in-
frastructure.
In the fuh.re, the cost advantage of 'peripheral' re-
gions may become smaller as further economic inte-
gration leads to the harmonisation of macro-econ-
omic conditions and upward pressures on wage
levels (see chapter l1). There is, therefore, greater
onus on these regions to maintain or increase their
attractiveness for mobile investment through im-
proving their accessibility and the conditions they
offer for knowledge-based activities.
The survey also has important implications for re-
gional development agencies trying to attract invest-
ment. It suggests, first, that a combination cf factors
tends to determine a firm's decision; secondly, that
the key determinants differ from case to case; thirdly,
that companies tend to choose regions where acti-
vities similartotheir own already exist. Finally, firms
indicated that local promotional policies and support
were very important in their final choice of location.
Trends in
Foreign Direct
Investmentz
A lagging region derives two kinds of benefit from
foreign direct investnent (FDI 
- 
the capital with
which an enterprise finances the purchase, creation
or development of subsidiaries abroad or acquire
share in foreign companies) :
o an rnjection of capial, which increases invest-
ment in its productive capacrty and hence its
growth rate;
o access to advantages which multinationals can
bring; examples often cited are technical know-
how, the opportunity for the local worKorce to
learn new skills and management techniques.
These benefits will be greater where there is a spiii-
off to local industry as the multinational interacts
with indigenous firms.
There are, however, at least two reasons why this
favourable outcome may not occur. The first is that
FDI in a productive activiry may, because of the
competitive edge of the multinational concerned,
inhibit the development of local finns in that sector-
Secondly, foreign firms do not alv,'ays develop links
with the local economy.
Il is nevertheless generally acceped that a balanced
development strategy which succeeds in attracting
and integrating inward investment can significantly
assist the cmvergence of lagging regions. As shown
below, FDI flows are a major source of capital for
these regions often outstripping rweipts from the
Stnrcural Funds.
Difficulties in measurement
FDI statistics are well known for measurement diffi-
culties. D3ta are usually collected at a national level
ody, so precluding any regional analysis. They are
also often incomplete. What is defined as FDI varies
from one countqt to another as do the systems of data
collection. Figures on the oufflows from one country
to another, theretore, ofteri show major differences
from the figures on inflows estima'ted by the latter
(the so-called asyrnmetry problem).
In cgnsequence, the data should be treated with a
great deal of caution. In particular, little can be con-
cluded from small inter-country differences. The
analysis below begins by reviewing the major global
trends in FDI flows. While the main interest is in
inflows into the Community it is also necessary to
consider outflows since tire two are often related.
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FDI : The major global players
There are three major sources of foreign investment :
the US, Japan and the European Community. Ac-
cording to European Comrr^ission statistics, in the
period 1986 to 1991 inclusive, FDI undertaken by the
Community, US and Japan totalled nearly
370,000 million ECU. The Community and Japan
each accounted for nearly 163,000 million ECU of
this. US FDI abroad therefore totalled some
48,000 million ECU over this period, less than one
third the level of either the Community or Japan. The
figures also indicatethat outflows of investment from
the Community and Japan exceeded inflows (espe-
cially in the case of the latter) while the US was a
major net recipient of foreign direct investment
(Graph 27).
The data, however, do not include reinvested profits,
which according to the estimates could account for
as much as 8A7o of total US FDI abroad. The
Community has been a major beneficiary of US
investment and by 1988 the accumulated stock was
estimated at some 107,000 million ECU. Indeed,
many US companies have been in Europe for so long
that they are no longer considered foreign investors.
In the late 1980s, Japanese FDI abroad increased
significantly, peaking at 40 billion ECU in 1989 as
against 15 billion in 1986 and an average of 8 billion
in 1984/85. Although Japan is a major investor in
neighbouring Asian countries, the eyldence also sug-
gests that Japanese investors are increasingly target-
ing the Commrurity reflecting in large measure their
desire to benefit from theopporhrnitiescreated bythe
Single Market, now effectively expanded to include
six cotmries of the European Free Trade Associ-
ation (EFTA). Japanese investment in the
Community tends to be dispersed across a wide nange
of economic activities taking in not only manufactur-
ing but also commercial activities such as property
and financial services where joint-ventures and part-
nerships are common.
The increasing interest in the Community by foreign
investors is reflected in the scale of flows over time
though there are significant year to year fluctuations.
The flow of FDI into the Community was only 7 bil-
lion ECU in 1986 but reached a peak of 33 billion in
1990 before falling back to 2l billion ECU in 1991.
On the other hand, the out{low of FDI from the
Community was not much different in 1990 and I 99 I
(19 billion and 27 billion ECU, respectively) than in
1986 (22 billion ECU). In analysing trends in FDI,
flows between the Community and the rest of the
world need to be distinguished from flows between
Member States.
Flows between the Community
and the rest of the world
Of the FDI undertaken abroad by Community coun-
tries, the major recipient is the US, accounting for
63% of the total in the period 1986-91. This largely
comes from four Member States. Over this period,
the UK was by far the largest investor outside the
Community accounting over a third (36Vo) of the
Community total. The three other major investors
were Germany (L9Vo of the total), France (also L9Vo)
and the Netherlands (iL%o), with the remaining
MemberStates having combined shares of only L4Vo.
The FDI flows into the Community from oulside
- 
some 120,000 million ECU 
- 
are of relatively
diverse origin and flows from the Community to the
US are not reciprocated to the same degree. The US
accounted for an average of 25Vo of the total foreign
investment into the Community between 1986 and
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1991, the major source of FDI being the EFTA
countries which provided 35Vo of the total, nearly
three times the share of Japan (13%). FDI from the
EFTA countries grew steadily up to 1990, reflecting
increasing integration with the Commrurity in the
years before the formation of the EEA and the ac-
cession negotiations of Norway, Sweden, Finland
and Austria.
Just as it is the major investor outside the
Community, the UK is the major destination for FDI
flows into the Community, accounting between 1986
and 1991 for around 45Vo of the total. Of the other
MemberStates, major shares over the period went to
France (l3%o), Spain (9Vo), the Nerherlands (9%),
Italy (8Vo) and Belgium/Luxembourg (6Vo). Abso-
lute shares are liable, however, to be misleading and
it is revealing to relate the FDI inflows from third
countries into each Member State to the size of its
economy (measured by GDP 
- 
Table 8). In this
regard, the large economies of the Community
- 
France, Italy and Germany (in particular) _
received shares significantly smaller thanthe relative
size of their economies. The exception was the UK
which received a shareof FDI which was greaterthan
its share of Community GDP (Graph 28). Ireland and
the Benelux also attacted disproportionately large
shares of FDI from outside the Community while for
other countries the shares were broadly in line with
those in regard to GDP.
lntra-Community Investment
Flows of investrnent between Member S tates are als o
significant at an estimated 150,000 million ECU
between I 986 and 199 1. France was the major inves-
tor accounting for some 30Vo of the total, with
Germany close behind with Z3%o,only slightly more
than the Benelux countries with 22Vo. The UK was
responsible for progressively less FDI in the rest of
the Community as recession set in at the end of the
1980s, its share averaging 8Vo over the period as a
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whole. On the other hand, the UK's share of FDI
receipts from other Member States was maintained
overthe period atAo%o of the total. France, the major
investor, was also a major recipient of FDI with 16%o
of the total while Spain and Belgiumlluxembourg
were also important destinations with 19% and 147o,
respectively.
Again, however, it is of interest to compare the
inward invesfinent of Member States from other
parts of the Commmity with the size of their econ-
omies. Those with disproportionately largest shares
of inward investment in relation to their GDP were
Ireland, Belgiumlluxembourg, Porhrgal and Spain
over the period (Graph 28).
A frnal approach to the analysis of the tends is to take
the net flows between Member States and their
Community and non{ommunity partners which can
be standardised for comparative puposes using popu-
lation. The evidence suggests that FDI is contributing
FDl, gross inflow
to cohesion and that the four poorest Member States
are all net recipients. Net receipts exprcssed per head
of population are highest in Ireland followed by
Spain which is by far the largest net recipient in
absolute terms. The LIK, the fifft poorest Member
State, is also a net recipienl All the dher Member
States are net contributors except Belgium/
Luxembourg (Tabte 9).
FDI and the Structural Funds
compared
Comparisons between transfers received from the
Community Stnrctural Funds and FDI flows are
fraught with statistical difficulties and can only be
regarded as broadly indicative of the relative magni-
tudes involved. For three of the four main recipients
of Stnrctural Funds assistance - Spain, Portugal and
Ireland 
- 
inward foreign direct investment, as
measured, has tended to be larger in value than
Community regional aid. This is especially tnre of
Portugaf
I
I
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Spain, where the former averaged around four times
larger than the latter in the six years 1986 to l99l
(Graph 29). In Pornrgal and lreland, the two magni
tudes were more similar over the period, especially
during the earlier years, though both experienced a
substantial increase in inward FDI in the later years
which pushes up the average for the period.
In Greece, on the other hand, transfers from the
Structural Funds averaged around twice the value of
inward investment over this six-year period.
The tentative conclusion which can be drawn from
these comparisons is that in most cases 
- 
Spain in
particular 
- 
foreign direct investment is at least as
important as Community regional support as a source
of capital formation in the less developed areas. The
relatively strong growth experienced in the second
half of the 1980s in Spain, Porhrgal and Ireland
almost certainly owes something to such investment,
though equally the fact that growth was strong is
likely to have been a factor attacting foreign com-
panies to invest in these countries.
Ireland is the major destination forboth external and
intra-Community foreign investment in relation to its
size. This comes mainly from the US, though the UK
is also impo(ant while the Community's share of
total FDI received by lreland tended to decline be-
tween 1986 and 1991. FDI has led to the estab-
lishment of a modern productive base in industries
such as electronics and pharmaceutics. The capital-
intensive nature of much of this investment, how-
ever, and the comparative absence of local linkages
have contributed to a rclatively low employment
content in economic growth (see Chaptzr 2).
Greece has attracted relatively low levels of inward
investment and what there is tends to be linked to
tourism in such areas as hotels and catering, which
does not create the opportunities for learning the
skills relevant to high value-added industry.
Almost half of Portuguese inward investment comes
from the UK. FDI increased considerably (virtually
tripling in nominal terms in the second half of the
1980s). Textiles, banking and wholesaling feature
prominently among the sectors concerned and in-
vestment has undoubtedly been attracted by cost
considerations with Portugal exploiting its low wage
advantage. One concern is that FDI may not have
contributed suffi c iently to indusnial diversi fi c ation
and that necessary skills are not being taughr The
lackof infrastruchrre is ahindrance, especially given
the peripheral location, though the position is chang-
ing rapidly.
There have been massive increases in FDI going to
Spain over the 1980s, more so than to any other
Community country according to the evidence. This
has mainly come from other Community countries
and has principally gone into transport machinery,
textiles, chemicals and metal products. There has
also been substantial FDI in banking and wholesal-
ing. The broad base of FDI in Spain has probably
contributed to general efforts to raise skills, espe-
cially of managemenl
As already noted, the UK is the major recipient of
outside investment and, as indicated in the suruey on
location factors above, this seems to be associated
with cultural affinities and the language. The UK is,
however, the major destination of FDI from non-
English-speaking countries such as those in EFTA.
While English is often the preferred second lan-
guage, this finding may have to be treated with
caution. The UK aPpears to have been the only large
c ountry w hich has succ eeded in attactin g s i g nific ant
amounts of inward investmentto its peripheral,lagg-
ing regions, rather than the cor1e, successful regions-
The UK's approach may therefore be of interest to
others (see chapter 10).
Foreign direct investment :
manufacturing
It is of interest to consider the results of an enquiry
into the nature of US andJapanese investment in new
manufacturing plants in the Community's regions.
As mentioned above, the advent of the single
European market, provided a new impetus for firms
from outside, not only to sellto, but to produce in the
Community in the second half of the 1980s. US and
particularly Japanese firms have expanded their
operations in the EC, through portfolio as well as
greenfield investments (Tables 10 and 11).
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Itoct lmportant Investment rcglons
UK
FR of Germany
Franoe
Spaln
Netherlands
ltaly
lreland
Belglum
Luxembourg
59 11400 Wales, Midlands, North, South
U 3400 Nordrhein-West'alen
, 23 3600 Bassin Parisien, Elzas, lnrraine, Ile-de-France,
Centre Est
I I 1400 C-atalula, Valencia
9 450 Brabant, Limbrug
8 1600 Nord Ovest, Lombardia, Nord Est
7 600 Dublin, Cork
5 450 Vlaanderen
I 100
Total t47 23000
' 1]: .,.:-1:j::::: : 'l:.
Soure,'IJCI"tl
US Companies
FDI in manufacturing by US concerns w:ls highly
concentrated in two countries, the UK and Germany.
France, Italy and the Netherlands followed some way
behind. Compared with the 1960s and 1970s, the
regional distribution of direct investrnents remained
much the same in the 1980s.
Of particular importance is new, or greenfield, in-
vestment in the regions which is the kind highly
prized by Member States because it tends to bring
with it new activities, technologies, managerial skills
and so on. In the period 1986 to 1989, almost two-
fifths of all new US greenfield plants were located in
the UK. Active regional policies (development
grants and agencies) diverted much of these to devel-
opment areas, particularly Scotland and Wales.
The second- and third-ranked destination countries
for these investments were France (30 plants) and
Ireland (28 plants). In France, there is aclearconcen-
tration in the metropolitan area and surroundings
(Ile-de-France and Bassin Parisien) and in the inter-
mediate regions in the South (Mediterrande, Rh6ne-
Alpes, Auvergne and C6te d'Azur). International
transp ort and telecommunicatio n links and numerous
technical and scientific centres of excellence appear
to have creat,ed an attractive investrnent cfimate in
these regions for US firms.
Despite Ireland being one of the smallest Community
markets, its language, cultural ties, young qtralified
worldorce, tax concessions and other incentives and
the marketing efforts of the IDA (IndusEial Devel-
opment Authority of lreland), have attracted many
US invdStors.
Japanese companies
As indicated above, Japanese foreign direct invest-
ment increased considerably in the 1980s. According
to a recent questionnaire, nearly a quarter of the
270 Japanese responding companies were motivated
to invest in Europe (Jetro.1990) as a step towards a
globalized business strategy. The second reason was
to satisfy expanding demand by local production
instead of exports and the third to meet the needs of
European consumers. For all of these reasons, the
participation of Japanese manufacturers in European
business began to accelerate in the latter half of the
1980s and there were 529 companies in operation or
planning to operate in Europe in 1990.
The UK (133 firms), France (95 firms) and Germany(89 firms) are the three main European countries
where Japanese manufacturers tend ti locate. Up to
the mid-1960s, there were only 28 Japanese manu-
facnrring companies in the UK, less than in France(35 firms) and Germany (36 firms). After 1995,
Japanese manufacturing investment in the UK in-
creasedrapidly in awide ftrnge of sectors, the number
of firms exceeding the number in Germany in 1986
and the number in France in 1988. The Japanese are
also very active in investing in Southern Europe, with
Spain (55 companies) being by far the most import-
ant destination and the largest investnent being in
c hemicals, en gineering, electronic s and vehicles.
Over the period 1986 to'1989, I47 Japanese firms
located in Europe, 59 in the UK. As well as going to
the South East of England, Japanese firms like US
companies have located in large numbers in periph-
eral regions in Wales and the North. In France also,
Japanese firms show a similar locational pattern to
their US counterparts, except more have gone to the
North-East (Alsace and Lorraine) than to the
Southern sunbelt
In Germany, Nordrhein-Wesdalen is the most im-
portant location for Japanese companies, their
presence there dating backto the immediate post-war
period.In the 1960s and 1970s a Japanese centre was
created in Dtisseldorf which acted as a magnet at-
tracting further Japanese invesftnenl
Concluding remarks
The Member States of the Cognmunity have been
heavily involved in foreign direct investment, both
as investors inside Europe and in the rest of the world
and as recipients of inflows from Japan, the US and
the EFTA countries. This has almost certainly
brought major benefits to national and regional econ-
omies, though the scale and nature of the effect
differs from case to case, according to the quality of
orl
the employment created and the extent of local link-
ages established3.
One Member State, the UK, has atrract€d a dispro-
portionately large share of inward investment into the
Community from outside. C\rlurnrlfactors in general,
and the English language in particular, appearto hqve
been important underlying reasons, thoug[ as noted,
the UK is also the major destination for invesment
from non-English speaking cotmtries alike.
The evidence also zuggests that originators of FDI
are also recipients, large-scale outflows from
Member Statcs such as France andthe Benelux coun-
tries being matched to a major extent by inflows.
Countries such as Spain,Ireland and Portugal, how-
ever, receive much more FDI than they invest abroad.
The large amount of FDI going to Spaia from both
the Community and otrtside confirms that it is in-
creasingly seen as a favourable location for new
activity. There arc errcouraging sigus for the weaker
Menrber States that efforts to attract FDI to their
regions can pay off (see Chapter l0).
Finally, any residual fears about tlre implications of
foreign companies investiqg in the C:mmunity, which
at present seem to be focused on Japanese firms, need
to be tempered by the thought that there used to be
similar corrcern about US muttinationals in earlier
perids. With the passage of time, these in many cases
have ceased to be regarded as foreign producers and are
seen as integral, and essential, to the national and
regronal economies in ufrich they are located.
Netherlands hornmic hutitate and Ernst andYowg (1993), Nent locationfactorsfor nnbile investmcnt in Europe.
Regional Development Studies No.6. Sudyftwnced by DG XVI of the European Commission-
Tlu datafor the analysis of FDlflows are nlccnfrom
(i) European Conunission ( 194| Direct Investm.ent in thc Community, I9U-91 Eurostat Theme 6,'Series D.
(ii) European Commission (1991), Foreign Direct Investment in the Peripheral Member States.
See Greenaway, D. (1993)Trade and Foreign Direct Investtnent in The European Commu,nity as a WorldTrade
Partner, European kornmy M 52, DG II of the European Commission.
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Chapter 6 The role of
deuelopment in the regions
research and technological
Many of the €uses of disparities in economic devel-
opment can be haced to disparities in productivity
and competitiveness. Although not the only'factors,
Research and Technological Development (RTD)
and, more generally, the capacity to innovate and
upgrade, particularly in prodrrcts and processes, ile
vital components of regional competitiveness. This
might lead, in turn, to a raising of regional output
through increased interregional and international
trade. New or improved products and processes,
lower costs, greater flexibility of production, higher
quality and quicker market response, are all ways in
which RTD can confer a comparative advantage on
particular regions.
The fact that most factors which favour RTD and
innovation (defined here as the necessary steps 
- 
or-
ganisational. managerial, commercial and financial
as well as technical 
- 
required to introduce a new or
improved product or process onto the market) are
vi rrually defi ning characteristic s of the Commun ity' s
core regions serves to underline their importance in
the Community's effort to increase social and econ-
omic cohesion. These factors include :
I well developed communications networks;
r good scientific infrastn-rcture;
o easier access to skills and know-how;
o advanced markets for business services;
o information services-
From a regional development perspective, RTD and
innovation are important insofar as they increase the
capacity of producers to consolidate and diversify
and thereby guide them to maintain or increase their
competitiveness in a continually changing interna-
tional markel Since innovation has become a con-
tinuous process requiring the rapid introduction of
each new advance, the economic success of a region
depends to a large extenton the possibilities available
for securing access to innovation and technological
developments on an ongoing basis. Succe.ss depends
also on how much of indigenous effort can be turned
into new products and processes.
The problem for weaker regions is therefore twofold:
to generate and develop their own indigenous RTD
activities and to adapt technological developments
which take place elsewhere to a specific regional
context. The tnaditional approach of many regions
has been to seekto attract outside leading technology
enterprises with well-established links in the RTD
area. Recent studies have shown that, on average,
foreign-owned companies in Spainr and Ireland2
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have a higher proFnsity to condrrct rcsearch acti-
vities than native firms.
Such a strategy is unlikely to be sufficient, however,
for the wider incorporation of new technologies into
the productive base. For the weaker regions, the
productive base often consists largely of small and
medium-sized firms, usually working in traditional
sectors and lacking an outward-looking perspective.
In many cases, highly qualified people are in short
supply and ancillary services are inadequate 
- 
such
as traditional banking practices which inhibit inno.
vation. In such regions, therefore, further investment
in RTD, or its extended application, is a wider issue
than it might initially appear.
In less favoured regions, the wider incorporation of
new tchnologies into the productive base depends
not only on the availability, quality and degree of
intcgration of technology supply with local demand,
but also, and most importantly, on the business envi-
ronment, including entrepreneurial culture and de-
gree of cooperation among regional socioeconomic
actors 
- 
that is, on the existence of an environment
which fosters the rapid diffusion of innovations
throughout the local economy
Differences in RTD :
an overview
Measues of the 'technology gap' between Member
States srggest that it is considerably wider than the
gap in income per head discussed in Chapter l.
A standard measure of the level of RTD activity is
gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) expressed in
relation to GDP Oable l2). The Community's four
weakest Member States in this respect 
- 
Greece,
Ireland, Spain and Porflrgal 
- 
have levels which are
96

less than half the Community average - at just over
2% of GDP (Graph 30). Despite doubling their RTD
expenditure relative to GDP during the 1980s,
Greece and Porhrgal have levels which are still athird
of the Community average.
In Portugal and Greece, more than two'thirds of
GERD is carried out by tire pubiic sector - much the
same proportion of expendinue which is undertaken
by the private sector in more advanced countries.
Indeed, in these two countries, the public sector
proportion tended to increase during th"- 1980s. On
the other hand, in both Spain and Ireland the share of
GERD in the private sectorincreased steadily during
the last decade, and by 1992 the public-private split
had almost reached the Community average. From a
regional development perspective, this deeper invol-
vement of private firms in RTD in the weaker regions
is a promising sign of modernisation.
So far as RTD manpower is concerned, Greece and
Portugal have only between a fifth and a quarter of
RTD personnel per 1000 employed (on a full-time
equivalent basis) than the more advarrced Member
States (Graph 31). For example, Denmark with a
labour force of nearly 3 million has more RTD per-
sonnel than Pornrgal and Greece together with a
combined labour force of nearly 9 million- In Spain,
moreover, the proportion of scientists and engineers
in the labour frrce was only around 50% of the
Community average (Map l7).
While the gapbetweencountries remains large, it has
tended to narrow ov,er time. RTD employment in
Ireland rose steadily during the 1980s, particularly in
the business sector. In Spain, the rate of increase was
one of the highest in theCommunity overthis period,
at some 9Vo a year, with the average rise in the
busines s sector approachi n29 I6Vo3 .
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Since RTD activities can be characterised as intan-
gible long-term investment carrying a high risk, there
is more difficulty in finding sources of finance out-
side the more developed regions. In 1989, for
example, the total risk capital available in Portugal
and Ireland was less than a quarter of that available
in the Netherlands. In Spain, there were less funds
than in Belgium which has under a quarter the num-
ber of peoplea.
The net result is one of substantial trade deficits in
technology and a high degree of dependence of the
weaker countries on the stronger. Spain is a classic
example with exports less than20%o of imports and
a technology deficit which doubled between its ac-
cession into the Community in 1986 and 1990, when
it reached a peak of nearly 1,400 Million ECU, three
times that of France, Italy or Belgium, the biggest
component being technical assistance. In Greece and
Portugal, foreign patent applications were nearly
38 times domestic applications, as compared with,
for example, Italy, France or Germany, where the
figure was under 5 timess
In strictly economic terms, the lrckof basic scientific
research in the weaker regions is less worrying than
the deficiency in applied research, or innovation,
directed at the effective incorporation of technology
into the production process.
In these regions, there is also a problem of lack of
finance for innovation, which is associated with a
financial environment offering linle access to ven-
ture capital and other forms of finance for innovation.
lslands of innovation
Recent Studies6 have examined the geographical pat-
terns of RTD activity in the Community. The most
striking finding is that laboratories and enterprises
Map 18 Major'islands'of science-based innovation, 1991
I Innovation area
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which are involved in RTD projects are highly con-
centrated in comparatively few 'Islands of Innova_
tion'.These islands arerelatively small, mostly urban
areas, with a dense network of enterprises and re_
search labonatories interacting in the development of
new products and processes of production (Map lg).
A limited number of such islands in the Community
stand out from the rest : Greater London,
Rofterdam/Amsterdam, Ile de France, the Ruhr area,
Frankfurt, S tuugart, MunictU Lyon/Grenoble, Turin
and Milan.
Up to three quarters of all public research conEacts,
including those funded by the Community, are esti-
mated to be concenhated in these few places. They
also tend to work closely together as part of a highly
exclusive network. The large majority of science-
based innovative activities in the Community, there-
fore, involves laboratories and enterprises located in
this innovative core. By contrast, laboratories and
enterprises located in peripheral regions of the
Community only participate in 5-BVo of networks.
An additional aspect of geographical diversity con-
cerns the type of agency engaged in these networks
of cooperation. The further the distance from the
central Islands of Innovation, the more partners tend
to be laboratories rather than enterprises and the
smaller and more specialised the projects becbme.
Finally, RTD activities in the Community,s weakest
Member States are often concentrated in a few re-
gions, normally around capital cities. In Spain, only
around a quarter of the national RTD effort,
measured in terms of both GERD and RTD person-
nel, takes place in the weakest regions which account
for 60Vo of the population. In Greece, Athens domi-
nates RTD, accounting for nearly 60Vo of govern-
ment expenditure and possibly for as much as 70Vo
of private expendinrre. In Portugal, nearly 90Vo of
public sector RTD is canied out in Lisbon and the
Tagus Valley, which also accounts fornearly 50Vo of
business RTD. In lreland, at the end of the 1980s,
nearly two-thirds of nationat GERD and almost half
of industrial RTD wzrs concentrated in the Eastern
region. In Italy, only 3Vo of industrial research under-
taken by the private sector takes place in the Southt
and, in 1989, barely 9Vo of public sector research.
Even though this concentration is, to a large extent,
a result of a natural process of scarce RTD reso!.uces
tending to become lccated in a few places to gain the
benefit of economies of scale and externalities and
even though it is closely in line with the territorial
distribution of industries and the stronger univer-
sities, it is still necessary to ensure that results and
know-how are transferred to enterprises in weaker
regions.
Structural factors
underlying disparities
Small firms are often regarded as a major source of
innovation. At the same time, their capacity to inno-
vate has firnits and they tend not to possess the
resoruces required to respond to rapid technological
change in increasingly global markets and the devel-
opment of new products of ever higher quality which
it invokes. The problems are more serious for firms
in the weaker regions. According to some, the main
difficulty facing small brminesses here is not so much
their size but their isolations.
Small businesses in the less developed regions are
also having to contend with increasing competition.
In part, this originates from producers in less de-
veloped countries which are gradually gaining mar-
kets which were formerly the preserve (sometimes
because of protection) of fi rms in the more developed
countries. Equally, there are competitive pressures
from front-line countries such as Japan, which set the
standards in terms of rapidly changing patrerns of
innovation and short life spans of products.
Small businesses in the weaker regions have diffi-
culty in competing with producers in developing
countries in terms of wage costs. On the other hand,
in attempting to move into higher technology areas
they must match the demanding pace of product and
process innovation set by firms in the more pros-
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perous regions of the Community as well as in the
US and Japan.
In adopting a modernisation strategy in weaker re-
gions based on innovation and the incorporation of
new technology, as opposed to a strategy of com-
parative advantage based on specialising in low wage
production, regional planners have to address not
only a supply problem (the lack of RTD capacity and
mechanisms for diffusing technology) but also 
- 
and
probably most importantly in the first place 
- 
a
problem of demand.
This problem is one of receptivfD,.1h" lackof recep-
tivity is reflected in the fact that SMEs in weaker
regions fail to generate a demand for the oirtput of
RTD in the form of new products and processes. In
many cases, there is an absence of the most basic
information to indicate the need to innovate in order
to compete in the global market in both dynamic and
traditional sectors. so that such firms are not able
successfully to identify and express their demand for
RTD and innovation services. In some cases, there is
insufficient recognition of the need to strengthen
specialised business services to be able to compete
in new markets. In effect, the demand-side problem
is an additional challenge for the weaker regions.
Improving the demand side is an area where public
policy has not always been as helpful as it might have
been. Those responsible often tend to impose stand-
ard policy prescriptions on innovative problems in-
stead of adopting an approach based on partnership
between the private and public sectors and on estab'
lishing administrative structures flexible enough to
respond to a region's true economic problems.
Regional innovation strategy needs to involve the
various local actors, especially in the private sector,
in the definition of policy priorities and the im-
plementation of measures for promoting innovation.
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It is also important to note, however, that a narrowly
defined local approach is to be avoided since it may
undermine the possibility of weaker rcgions benefit-
ing from synergies with other policies and actsrs at
the national and European level. This is particularly
true of technology, which is, by definition, an inter-
national process not constrained by national borders
and one of the driving forces behindthe ever increas-
ing internationalisation of the economy.
554-555, 185-248 pp.
' Cirro Group Europe ( Ig93), Thematic evaluation of the impact of CSFs for Research and Technology in Greece,
Ireland and Ponugal, CEC Draft report, Brussels.t puintonilln M A (February-March 1992), Recursos dcl sistenta de Ciencia y Tecnologfa en Espafia, Arbor CXLI,
554-555, 31-76 pp.n Muldur tl (1991), I* financement dc R&D au croisement des logiques industrielle, financiire et politique,
F as t- Mo nito r P ro gramme, Brus s els.t OECD (1992), Main Science andTechnotogy Indicators, MSTI 1992-1, Paris.t FAST (May lgg2), Archipelago Europe 
- 
Islands of innovation, (Jlrich Hilpert; Prospective Dossier N"/ ; Science,
- 
Techrctogy and Social and Ecorwmic Colusion in the Community.
' OECD (|991) Reviews of National Science andTechnobgy Policies : Italy.
E ' Morgan K and Cooke P (1991), Thc intetligent region : industrial and institutional intwvation in Emilin Romagna,
Regbnal In^dustrial Research Report No 7, University of Cardiff.
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Chapter 7 Periphera I ity reconsidered
The notion of peripherality is often used to explain
why certain regions consistently fail to catch up with
developments in other more centrally located re-
gions. It seems that nahrral resilience, which allows
regions to deal with adverse developments, is much
greater in central regions. There, both private busi-
ness and public authorities appear to have more
connections and contacts with counterparts else-
where, and this appears to facilitate adaptation to
stmctural change. This chapter examines the notion
of peripherality, first, from the perspective of the
nation-state, and secondly, from that of the
Community in the light of the extensions in transport
and communication networks in prospect.
From the point of view of the Member State, border
and coastal areas can be considered peripheral. Bor-
der areas suffer from peripherality because the neigh-
bourin g c ountry has different social, ec onomic, legal
and political systems. This tends to limit the econ-
omic and adminishative linkages which are normally
establisfrd between adjacent 
"rr*. 
This is the case
both for the internal border regions of the
Community and to an even greater extent for its
external border regions. Moreover national borders
often follow the course of rivers, mountain ranges or
other geographical barriers, which further restrict
cross-border interaction and co-operation. Coastal
regions can be considered as border regions separ-
ated from their neighbours by the sea. The
Community's border and coastal regions are de-
scribed below, focusing on what they have in com-
mon as well as their great diversity.
While border regions are often some distance from
national centres of political and economic power, a
number of them are centrally located from a
Community standpoint. The Community's central,
as opposed to peripheral, regions are identified below
in terms of the accessibility of major European
centres of economic activity to business travellers
based there. The potential effectof planned improve-
ments in the Community road, rail and air networks
in reducing the time rcquired to reach these economic
cenftes is then examined.
Coastal and border areas
The Community's coastline stretches for more than
60,000 km. Areas around the coast gain some import-
ant benefits from their location, being generally re-
garded as pleasant places to live, which can atract
firms to locate there. Tourisrn, for instance, tends to
be especially well-developed in coastal regions. The
fishing industry also plays an important role in most
coastal regions, even after the anticipated reduction
of overcapacity. Businesses in othera.reas of activity
can be attracted by seaports and the access to world
markets which they afford, as well as by transport
links to inland areas which are normally very good
in respect of the larger ports. These benefits, how-
ever, do not accrue equally to all regions. The time it
takes to travel by road to the nearest major seaport
differs considerably between regions. Coastal ereas
105
which are some way from large pofts can in many
cases be counted among the Community's most pe-
ripheral regions. In general, however, coastal regions
are favoured by their location and reasonably well
integrated into the European transport network-
The land borders of the Community Member States
stretch for almost 10,000 kilometres in total. About
a half of these are between Member States, the other
half with third countries (Table l4). I6Vo of the
Community population lives in what can be defined
as border areas, which account for 22Vo of the
Community's land mass. Of the 184 Community
border regions (excluding those in the new German
Leinder now undergoing administrative reforms)
defined at the N{.ITS 3 level, lZ}have borders with
other Member States, 58 with neighbouring countries
in Central and Eastern EuroPe.
From a historical perspective, the geographical fea-
tures defining natural borders tend to be important
determinants of the economic perfornance of border
regions. While rivers facilitate access to cities and
towns located on their banks, mountain mnges make
international trade and cooperation difficult and may
retard development on both sides of the border. S imi-
larly, political borders are artificial baniers in some
ways closing off regions from theirnaturalhinterland
and obstmcting social and economic development
(Graph 32 which indicates that average GDP per
head tends to be less in border regions than in other
parts of the country concerned).
There is a marked difference between Spanish,
Portuguese, Irish, Greek and Danish border regions
and those elsewhere. They are very sparsely popu-
lated (with population denriities in the range 3G60 in-
habitants per square kilometre compared to a
Community average of 153), accounting for 47Vo of
the land mass of Community border regions but only
2OVo of their population. The Danish border regions,
for example, have a maxirnum population density of
64 inhabitants per squar€: kilometre (Table 15) as
opposed to an average of 105 inhabitants per square
140
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kilometre for all border regions. Not by chance, the
densely populated border regions are located in the
centre of the Community, while those which are
sparsely populated are at the periphery.
Differences in economic prosperity benveen neigh-
bouring Member States are not always reflected in
the relative levels of GDP per head in regions on
either side of the border. Dutch and Belgian border
regions have higher levels of GDP per head than
neighbouring regions in Germany, in contrast to the
sinration at the national level (Graph 33). Along the
French-Spanish border, the Spanish regions have
much the same level of per capita income as their
counterparts, despite avererge GDP per head in Spain
being only two-thirds that in France.
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The sometimes important differences in GDp per
head and other socio-economic characteristics be-
tween regions on either side of a border largely
reflect variations in the development potential of the
regions concerned. However, in many cases they also
reflect decades of artificial separation and the diffi-
culties which such regions encounter if the people
living there wish to cooperate. Regions with different
economic characteristics would normally seek to
identify cooperative measures which are com-
plementary : eg a rural area might be developed for
weekend recreation increasing the attractiveness of a
metropolitan area across the border as a location for
industrial investment. Regions with similar econ-
omic characteristics, on the other hand, would
usually tend to develop their common strengths.
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Border regions
and the Structural Funds
Differences in economic performance of border re-
gions explain the varying degree to which they are
eligible for support from the Community Structural
Funds. Underthe new programme established forthe
period 1994 to 1999, out of the 184 NUTS level III
border regions, 40 are eligible for support under
Objective 1 criteria, 27 under Objective2,60 under
Objective 5b, 13 under two Objectives (2 and 5b or
2 and l) while 45 are not entitled to any regional
support at all (map 191 Incomparison with the period
1989-1993, the number of eligible regions has in-
creased from 109 to 140, mostly under Objective 5b.
Total population coverage has risen by over one-
sixth (L67o) in border areas, slightly more than in the
rest of the Community. The share of border regions
in total eligible population in the Community under
the three regional Objectives of the Stnrctural Funds
has increased from L7 .8Vo to 18.l%o (which compares
with the I6Vo of Community population for which
they account). All the regions on the Northern
Ireland-Irish and Spanish-Portuguese borders are
classified as Objective 1 as well as regions along the
Community's external border in Northern Greece
and Eastern Germany. In other parts of the
Community, the population covered by either Objec-
tive 2 or 5b or both is around 4AVo (Table 15).
Overall, 55Vo of the population living in border areas
are eligible for regional support from the Structural
Funds (58Vo if the new German Hnder are included),
as compared with 52Vo in the Community as a whole.
On German unification, borders between East and
West Germany ceased to exist while the Community
acquired a new set of border regions. East German
regions of approximately 24,W0 km2 with 3 million
inhabitants now need to explore how to re-establish
and extend relations with rieighbouring areas in
Poland and the Czech Republic under market condi-
Itil,o","nilf ;;n;;t
BF, BL,'P': $ DDK"'.,',D 1
NUTS 3 regions; L is a single region I , ',' '
, 
i'., .:. ..:.:: , :
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tions; Efforts in this direction are currently being
hindered by differerccs in the rate of progress to-
wards the establisbment of a market economy and in
the cost of production (ceating additional pessures ;
for struchual adjustrnent) and wage levels (atfiacting
workers tothe new Ldnrler, tending to exacerbate the
alrcady serious problem of wremployment and con-
tributing to the growth of the black economy), as well
as by the inadequate cross-border transport and other
links. Similar problems are also evident along the
Northern borders of Greece and the Italian border
with Slovenia.
Further enlargement of the Community to include
Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden would make
the Community a direci neighbour of Russia,
Hungary and the Siovak Republic and lengthen the
Comnrunity land borders by 8L% and its coast lines
by 68% (Annex, Table A.l7). The land area of
Community border regions woqld incre4se by l3O%
: lrs against an overall increas€ of 48% in total
Community land-space 
- 
though the population liv-
ing in these would expand by only L6% as compared
with a 7Vo ncrease in total Community population.
Large parts of these four countries can be classified
as coastal and/or border areas, most of them rela-
tively prosperous and located on the periphery of the
Community 
- 
a combination which is not very com-
mon in the Community as it is at presenl
Passenger transport
networks and rbgional
accessibility
In the Third Periodic Report (1987), regions were
classified as central, intermediate or peripheral ac-
cci:ding to an average of their physical distance to all
Map 19 Inteneg ll - ellglblllty of border reglons
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other regions, weighted by GDP. This was a first
attempt to give operational content to the notion of
peripherality. This section aims to refine and extend
this analysis by measuring the accessibility of
194 major econornic centres in the Community, the
EFTA countries and Central Europe for business
travellers from over a thousand Community NUTS 3
regions. The indicator of peripherality estimated is
the average time required to travel to each of these
major centres by road, rail or airr.
The simple distinction between central (Western
Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and
Luxembourg) and peripheral (Ireland, Greece, Spain
and Portugal) Member States and regions is much
less evident if NUTS level 3 regions are examined
and if air travel is taken into account.
Business travellers from the large agglomerations in
the heart of Europe,like Brussels, Paris, London, the
Rhine-Ruhr and Rhine-Main areas, Stuttgart,
Munich and Milan, can on average travel in the least
time to business destinations across Europe
(Map 20). More peripherally located larger cenEes
with international airports, like Glasgow,
Copenhagen, Berlin, Athens, Rome and Madrid,
however, are also relatively well-connected when air
travel is taken into account The integration of srch
cities into the European air transport network is cru-
cial for their furttrer development, facilitating long-
distance travel and networking and providing world
market access to local producers of high value/low
weight goods, though for other products, transport
costs will continue to distance them from central
Community markets. However, such costs also offer
some protection to local firms against competition
from producers located in other regions.
Apart from the major capitals, all of the
Community's Southern and Western fringes as well
as nearly all of its islands are still disadvantaged in
terms of access to the 194 economic centres identi-
fied. [n these often sparsely populated regions the
economic returns on major investment in transport
infrastruchre are often insufficient to justify the ex-
penditure required, whether private or public. Never-
theless, a minimum degree of access is required in
order to sustain economic activity in such peripheral
areas.
The average time required to travel to the 194 econ-
omic centres is also relatively high, however, for a
small number of regions which are geographically
close to the Communit5l's centre. These areas, such
as Mecklenburg-Vorpommern in Germany and the
Southern interior of France, are economically weak
and often sparsely populated with under-developed
transport linlc.
With the furtfier extension of international tnarnport
networks being a priority of Community policy and
being supported by both the European Regional De-
velopment Fund and the Cohesion Fund, an evalu-
ation of tb joint effect of curent plans on travel
times and regional accessibility is of interest2. In
general, thc estimatd reduction in average travel
time to tlre 194 centres from the implementation of
thc expansion plans for road, rail and air transport
networks is greafier for peripheral regions than central
ones (Map 2l). There are likely to be significant
gains in Grcecg ketan4 the Southern and Western
regions of the Iberian peninsula, Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern and Nord Pas-de-Calais. There are also
likely to be widespread gains in other parts of France,
Belgium and l.rxembourg, but much fewer in the
other central countries. Overall, the plans appear to
reduce the degree of peripherality of outlying regions
and therefore open up new markets to producers
located there.
Ease of access to nearby markets is also important,
as indicated by the total population of the NUTS
level 3 regions which can be visited on a single-day
business trip (implying a three-hour limit on one-way
travel time Map 22). Contary to the previous indi-
cator, on this measure of market access the largest
gains from the present plans are likely to accrue to
the densely populated, central regions and their sur-
rounding areas, primarily from the extension of the
high-speed rail network 
- 
as well as the Channel
Tunnel 
- 
to connect the major metropolitan areas in
the South-East of England, Northern France,
Belgium, the Netherlands, the Franco-German bor-
der region, the Southem Rh6ne valley and Piemonte
in Italy.
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There are, however, some exceptions. A number of
regions in the Spanish North-East and South-West,
in Central Italy and in Northern Greece, as well as
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, which are among the
most sparsely populatedand peripheral regions inthe
Communiry, are expected to enjoy a considerable
increase in rccessible population, the proposed ex-
tensions of the road network and new air linl$ bring-
ing major population centres (in the above cases,
Madrid, Athens ad Berlin) within reach.
On the other hand" it remains the case that the cen-
trality or peripherality of a region's location can be
improved but not fundamentally changed through
inve'stment in transport. In the less densely populated
parts of Europe, the increases in easily accessible
population from such investment will always tend to
be relatively small as compard with the more Popu-
lous central regions.
An alternative option for periphcral areas is to accel-
erate the rate of adoption by local enterprises of new
techniques of information processing ard telecom-
munications. In many cases, srch tcchniques (in the
form of telefax, teleconferencing, telcmatics, cellular
mobile radio and telephone networts) may serve as
a partial substitute for personal contacl As cornpared
with investment in traditional transport infrastnrc-
turo, therefore, the further extensim and modcrni-
sation of the Community telecommunication nct-
work might be a more cost-efficient way of linking
peripheral areas with the Community's cenhes of
economic activity (see chaper 4 on telecommunica-
tions infrastnrchue endowments in the regions).
Market a@ess is dependent not only on the quality
of the transport infrastnrcore linking supply and
demand, but equally on the institutional structures
which guide international trade relations. The com-
.pletion of the Single Market, by abolishing border
formalities, has in a practical sense increased the
accessibility of border regions for trading partners
from abroad. The foundation of the European
Economic area has tended to reduce the periphetality
of, for instance, the Danish regions and the Alpine
areas of Germany and Italy by facilitating trade with
the EFTA countries. Reforms in Central and Eastern
Europe are generating Eadebetween East and West,
potentially benefiting the regions on the
Community' s Eastern borders.
Improvements in the international transport and tele-
c ommunic ation networks, instinrtional reforms lead-
ing towards European integration and industrial
change in general open up growth opporu.rnities for
enterprises, no matter where they are located in the
Community territory. In the competitive struggle to
take advantage of these opporurnities, the likely win-
ners will be those firms which are best able to expand
their customer base urcross Europe while maintaining
a flexible and cost-efficient prodrrction stnrcture- The
latter often implies a regional division of labour and
a decentralisation of business locations. All of these
developments lead to increased requirements for di-
rect penonal @ntacts between business operators at
the various locations, which can only be achieved
through their fult integration into the international
passenger transport and telecommunication net-
works. Consequently, the attractiveness of a region
as a business location is increasingly deterrrined by
,the connections provided by these networla to main
centres of economic activity in Europe and beyond-
and Airport Networl<s. Studyfinanced by the European Commission.2 Th" plnns concerned are those which were under consi.deration by the Commtssion servictts in 1992.
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Section c The regionaf policies and
problem areas of the Community
Regions assisted by the Community l ggg-1993
Community regional policies 1 gg4-1 9g9
Regional policies in Member States : recent trends
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Chapter I Regions assisted by
the Community 1989-1 993
The reform of the Stnrctural Funds, which was
agreed in 1988 and implemented from 1989r, wun an
important watershed for regional policies at the
Community level. It introduced 
^ 
genuine
Community vision of regional problems, whereas
previorxly policy had essentially taken the form of
intervention in support of the regional policies pur-
sued by each Member State individually. The aim of
this chapter is to examine the economic perforrnance
of these regions.
In order to have a fuller appreciation of the main
developments in them, the analysis begins- in the
mid-1980s, somewhat before the reforms were im-
plemented. Thechapter is nottherefore an evaluation
of the effects of the reforms (see Annual Reports on
the Implementation of the Reform of the Structural
Funds for this) although it provides some indications
of what has happened since 1988.
The definition of problem regions under the reform
was based on a typological approach. Three types of
problem region were defined which the Community
adopted as 'objectives' of policy under the Structural
Funds. The first of these objectives, Objective 1,
aimed to promote development and structural adjust-
ment in regions which were lagging behind, defined
as those with GDP per head below 75Vo of the
Community average. Changes in GDP per head in
this group of regions compared to the rest of the
Community is, therefore, a key indicator of progress.
To obtain a more complete picture, developments in
these regions in respect of other related aspects is also
examined below :
o the record on unemployment and job creation
which is essential to alleviate the serious excess
supplies of labour and lack of employment op-
portunities often associated with low GDP per
head;
o trends in productivity which are important in
relation to improving competitiveness and, there-
fore, the potential for growth.
The second objective, Objective2,aimed to promote
theconversion of areas affeptedby industrial decline-
The key defining characteristic of these areas is their
relatively high unemployment rate which is used in
the present analysis as the main indicator of develop-
ments. The third objective, Objective 5b, is aimed at
rural areas affected by problems of sffuctural adjust-
ment linked to the decline of agriculture. All of the
main indicators are relevant for assessing progress in
these regions.
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Developments in the
Community's weaker
regions 1986-1 993 :
Objectives 2 and 5b
The performance of the Objective 2 and 5b regions
in respect of the indicators discussed above is con-
sidered below in comparison with the rest of the
Community. Developments in the Community's
weakest regions (Objective 1) are then examined in
more detail to assess the main differences emerging
between them (Table 16).
Analysis of Objective 2 and 5b regions is hampered
by data problems. Statistics for small eligible arsls
(often below NUTS level 3) are not available on a
harmonisedbasis. Theanalysis, therefore, has to rely
on estimates which are more valid for certain series,
such as unemployment rates, than others, such as
GDP and employment.
The data indicate that experierrce as regards unem-
ployment in the Community's weaker regions has
varied significantly in the period since 1986
(Table 16). As indicated in chapter 3, the laner half
of the 1980s was a perid of economic recovery.
Unemployment in the Community as a whole fell by
2 percentage points from lO.7Vo in 1986 to 8.57o in
1991 before increasing to I0.4Vo in 1993.
ln respect of unemployment, Objective 2 regions as
a whole outperformed other parts of the Community
assisted and unassisted areas alike. Unemployment
rates in the Objective 2 regions were 4 percentage
points lower in l99l (10.8%) than in 1986 (l4.7%o).
This fall was partly reverged over the following two
years although the rise in unemployment was not as
great as for the Community as a whole. As a result
the difference between the average unemployment
rate in Objective 2 regions and that in the Community
as a whole narrowed from 4.6 percentage points in
1986 to only 1.7 percentage points in 1993.
This is aparticularly encouraging outcome given that
a reduction in unemployment disparities is the prin-
cipal aim of Objective 2 assistance.
Part of the explanation for this is probably related to
labour supply developments. Most Objective 2 re-
gions are highly urbanised and therefore often among
those where demographic changes and population
ageing have reduced the number of new entrants to
the labour market. At the same time, job losses in
traditional indu tries 
- 
co al, steel, engineering 
- 
have
tended to affect men in middle and older age groups,
a significant proportion of whom have withdrawn
completely from the labour market.
The impact of falling labour supply should probably
not be exaggerated, however. Tencative estima.tes of
employment change suggest that the Objective 2
regions had a faster rate of net job creation than the
rest of the Community. Over the period 1986 to 1993
the average rate of increase was approximately
double the Community average Cfabte 16).
The Objective 5b regions generally have relatively
lower rates of unemployment, a traditional feature of
rural areas outside the Community's least-developed
regions. From an average rate of 8.3Vo n 1986,
unemployment in the Objective 5b regions fell to
only 6.1Vo in 1991 increasing again to7.3Eo in 1993.
Although reducing unemployment is not an explicit
aim under Objetive 5b, the apparent relative im-
provement is encouraging. This is underlined by the
tentative evidence on employment change 
- 
which is
likely to be more directly related to the process of
strtrcoral diversification in rural areas 
- 
where the
figures suggest gradual net job creation at a rate
equivalent to the Community average (Table 16).
This evidence also suggests that the falling unem-
ployment in rural areas cannot be anributed to on-
going rural depopulation.
In the Objective 2 regions, trends in GDP per head
over the five-year period were generally slightly
downward. This might suggest that economic re-
struchrring led to an increase in the share of total
employment in sectors with relatively low productiv-
ity in Community terms 
- 
such as certain services. In
Objective 5b regions, there was little change overthe
period, GDP per head remaining at aroun d 80Vo of
the Community average.
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Developments
in Objective 1 regions
In the Objective I regions the rndicators present a
mixed picture. These regions include virnralty all the
areas of highest unemployment in the Community.
In 1986, the average une'mployment rate in the for-
mer was l5.4%o, half as high again as the Community
average and double the rate in Objective 5b areas.
Since then, there has been little improvemenf the rate
declining to I3.9Vo in 1990, before increasing to
16.7 Vo in 1 993, above the level in I 986. Although the
evidence on changes in employment in the Objec-
tive I regions is more encouraging, rates of increase
do not seem to have reached those of the Objective 2
areas. Part of the high and persistent unemployment
is due to labour supply growth, as noted in Chapter l,
and for the medium-term at least, reducing unem-
ployment is likely to represent something of a mov-
ing target as new entrants, especially women, come
into the labour market in significant numbers.
Although the structure of employment in Objective I
regions is changing, there are still significant num-
bers employed in agriculture. In 1990, the average
share of agriculhrral employment in the Community
was 6.6Vo whereas in the Objective I regions it was
nearly 3 times higher at 17 .7 To.This means that while
the Objective I regions as a whole accounted in 1990
for l job in 6 in the Community, in agriculture they
accounted for nearly I in 2 (Annex, Table A.l8).
I-abour market developments reflect a combination
of cyclical and structural changes affecting the
Community' s regions in general These changes tend
to be accompanied by changes in regional productiv-
ity and hence in levels of economic output, or GDp.
As noted above, it is the change in GDP, measured
in per capita terms, which is the cental indicator of
progress in the Community's Objective I regions. On
average, these regions taken as a group marginally
increased their GDP per head from 6l%o of the EC
average in 1986 to 64Vo in 1991. This small increase
is illustrative of the challenge involved in bringing
about real convergence in the Community. A sub-
stantial narrowing of disparities can beexpected only
over the long term.
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The main trends and differences emerging within the
group of Objective I regions are the subject of the
following sections.
Employment creation
and unemploYment
More detailed analysis of the labour market develop-
ments for individual Objective I regions since 1986
suggests that they can be divided into three main
sub-groups. The first consists of Ceuta Y Melilla,
Canarias, Murcia, Comunicad Valenciana and
Andalucia which experienced a rapid rise in employ-
ment levels. These coastal regions in Southern and
Eastern Spain, had employment in 1991 some 157o
and more above that in 1986. They, therefore, appear
to have benefited more than other Spanish Objec-
tive I regions in the Iberian interior and on the
Atlantic coast in the North-West from joining the
Community in 1986. In effect, they seem to be part
of a larger group of Spanish regions including
Catalufra and Madrid which represent nodal points
on the road and rail networks linking the peninsula
with France and the rest of the Community. Cataluf,a,
which is largely covered by Objective 2 of the Stnrc-
tural Funds, for example, experienced a rise in em-
ployment of over 207o between 1986 and 1991, the
highest amongst the Spanish provinces.
The second sub-group is more geographically
diverse and comprises regions where employment
increased by more than the Community average but
by less than in the first group of regions. The regions
in this second group are located in the Spanish inte-
rior (Extremadura, Castilla 
- 
Iron and Castilla 
- 
La
.Mancha) and also include the Western Mediter-
ranean islands of Sardegna and Corse. Rates of net
job creation in these areas varied from over 77o in
Corseand Castilla-La Mancha to l}-L3%ointhe other
regions in the Spanish interior.
The third sub-group is the largest and most geo-
graphically diverse taking in, on the one hand, the
Mediterranean regions of southern Italy and Greece
and, on the other, the Atlantic coastal regions from
Portugal and Spain (Galicia and Asturias) in the
South to Ireland and Northern Iieland in the North.
Typical rates of net job creation in these regions were
around SVo over the five-year period, although em-
ployment remained virnrally unchanged in Greece'
bahbria in Italy was the only region to record a fall
in employment
The structure of employment is relatively similar
across the Objective 1 regions. The share of employ-
ment in agriculture in many cases is over ZOVo and is
around 40% in parts of Portugal. In only a few
regions 
- 
pafts of Spain and Northern Portugal - is
the share of employment in industry above the
Communiry average. In all but a few regions the
share of employment in services is below the
Community average of 6l Vo andis as low as 5OTo or
less in many parts of Greece, certain Spanish regions
and Portugal. Tourism sustains high shares of service
employment in some regions such as Canarias and
Andalrrcia in Spain, or, a combination of tourism and
the public sector.
The perfonnance of Objective I regions in terms of
unemployment over the same period 1 98G 9 1, gener-
ally mirrors that of employment described above
(Annex, Table A.l9). As indicated in chapter 3,
however, the relationship between the change in
employment in a given region and changes in unem-
ployment rates is often a complex one. For example,
when new jobs arc created some of the new employ-
ment may be taken up by commuters - often the case
in city regions 
- 
or by new entrants to the labour
market. As noted above, many Objective 1 regions
had faster than average rates of increase in labour
supply, as a result of higher birth rates in the past"
coupled with the increasing participation of women'
For the regions where employment grew by most the
effect on unemployment was as expected. In the
regions of Southern and Eastern Spain, the ccrollary
of rapidly rising employment between 1986 and 1991
was a substantial fall 
- 
of five percentage points or
more 
- 
in unemPloYment rates.
In the Spanish interior, the fall in unemployment
rates were almost as great. In the Western Mediter-
ranean islands, however, with lowerrates of employ-
ment growth than the regions in the South of Spain
but still slightly above the Community average, the
*4#U*)l*r:.r*ifr#Ej!frljfr3*@w- iri!4+r'+'4-4'&+j!t...aJ.@
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tall in unemployment was correspondingly more
modest at around zto 2.5 percentage points.
For the remaining regions the picture is more mixed'
On the one hand, there were regions where the fall in
unemployment was relatively high, such as in
Portugal and Ireland (5 and 4 percentage points re-
spectively). On the other, many regions in the Italian
Adriatic and Southern Italy experienced significant
rises in unemployment which suggests relatively
high growth in the labour supply- Greece also saw a
stight increase in unemployment between 1986 and
1991. In the Spanish Atlantic regions, modest rates
of employment increase were reflected in a compara-
tively small fall in the unemployment rate, of I to
2 percentage points, over the period.
The preceding analysis focused on the period 1986-
1991 for which regional employment data are avail-
able. In 1991, the Community entered a period of
recession with the frst firm signs of recovery emerg-
ing in l994.The most recent data, forunemployment
rates only, suggest that the depth of the recession has
differed substantially from Member State to Member
State and region to region. The figures up to 1993
show a fairly general increase in unemployment
across the Objective I regions. The rise has been
particularly marked in Spain, with regions in the
South and East of the country which had previously
shown the largest reduction in rates being among the
worst affected In the Italian regions, unemployment,
which at most had fallen only slightly during the
economic recovery, began once again to rise at a
faster rate than the national average, while in Ireland,
rates of unemployment by the end of 1993 were
head.ing back towards 20Vo- Elsewhere, increases in
unempb'yment have been the general rule, though
the extent has been more modest.
The French overseas departments (Guadeloupe,
Guyane, Martinique and R6union) are not included
in the above analysis because of data problems' The
available evidence suggests that in these areas of
extreme geographical peripherality in relation to the
rest of the Community, job creation was relatively
rapid but insufficient to offset the even more rapid
rises in working-age population. In fact, rates of
population growth in the French overseas depart-
ments were well above those in other Objective I
regions. With labour demand failing to keep Pac€,
unemployment rates reached higher levels than in
most of continental France.
Productivity and GDP growth
Other things being equal, rising employment accom-
panies growing GDP. Job creation is both a reflection
of and acontributory factor to growth in outpul The
extent to which the two go together depends on
developments in output per worker or productivity.
Growth in productivity is impoftant for regions since
it tends to mean that efficiency in production is
improving which helps to control unit costs and to
maintain or improve competitiveness. The challenge
is to achieve increases in all three variables simulta-
neously : output, productivity and employment. It is
essentially this challenge which is addressed in the
Commission White Paper Growth competitiveness
and emplo),ment.
In terms of GDP per head, there were marked vari-
ations in experience among Objective I regions in
the period 1986 to 1991 (Annex, Table A.20). The
regions in the South and East of Spain grew fastest
together with Castilla-La Mancha in the Spanish
interior, Ireland and Portggat. All of these regions
converged strongly towards the Community average'
by between 6 and 9 percentage points. Of particular
encouragement is the fact that they were among the
poorest parts of the Community at the start of the
period with GDP per head equal to or less than 60Vo
of the CommunitY average.
The Spanish Atlantic regions, C-astilla L6on and the
Italian Adriatic regions converged more gradually
towards the Community average GDP per head, by
I to 3 percentage points over the period.
The remaining regions all showea u Au"'gence away
from the community average. This was particularly
tnre of Northern lreland, where GDP per head fell by
7 percentage points over the period to 72Vo of the
Community average. In other regions, the decline
was more modest, at around 1-3 percentage points'
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These changes in GDP per head were associated with
martedly different variations in prodrctivity growth
(Annex, Table A2ll.Ireland and Portugal experierrced
a rapid convergerrce of GDP per head mainly as a result
of dramatically rising productivity over the period
relative to dre Community average. As discussed in
Chapter 1, productivity growth was particularly pro-
nounced in the large foreign-owned industial sector in
Ireland. The national accounts data also suggest that
prodrctivity rose at a similar rafe in Pornrgal, though
the rate of increase falls significantly if the LFS em-
ployment data are used instead In some Southern
Spanish regions there were significarrt improve,ments
in prodrrcti.'ity notably in C:stilla-La Marrcha and
Bcrcmadura In other regions, however, productivity
declinod (eg Murcia, Ceuta Y Melilla) or increased
Inore slowly (eg Canarias) which would be consistent
with rising employment in services linked to the growth
of torrism.
In Northem keland, Corse and Sardegna, prodrctiv-
ity fell substantially relative to the Comrnunity aver-
age with no change in Greece. This is a worrying
development when combined with the fact that in all
of these regions, GDP per head has been falling
furtherbehind the Community average. It may reflect
the emergence of a vicious circle of declining pro-
ductivity and declining competitiveness resulting in
dectining CDP and further decrease in prodrrctivity.
In Greece, economic progress seems to have been
held back by macroeconomic problems including
difficulties in regard to inflation and public sector
deficits which have acted as a brake on new private
investment.
Northern lreland, the region with the biggest fall in
relative productivity, is not typical of Objective I
regions and shares many of the characteristics of
indusrial areas in severe decline. The region was
once aworld centre in shipbuilding and linen textiles.
Today the economy is highly dependent on public
sector employment, though the industrial sector has
undergone extensive modernisation with the devel-
opment of many highly productive enterprises.
Snrdies suggest that the problems often lie in the
small business sector with many parts having low
productivity.
Concluding remarks
In surnrnary, it is possible to conclude thatthe weaker
rcgions have made some progress towards converg-
ing in real terms with the rest of the Community.
There are encouraging signs that this may have ac-
celerated after the reform of the Structural Funds in
1989. But the process has generally been slow and
regions have been affected to differing extents.
The evidence strengthens the impression that struc-
tural change is a slow process, especially perhaps
with regard to the Community's most backrrard re-
gions. For individual Objective 1 regions, however,
the evidence also suggests that substantial progress
is possible even over a period as short as five years.
The experience of Objective I regioru has been
mixed in the period since 1986. Some undoubtedly
have made progress including many which were
among the weakest at the start of the period. Others
have managed only to maintain their relative econ-
omic position. Of particular concern :ue the minority
of Objective I regions which seem to have fallen
back in key respects cornpared to the rest of the
Community in spite of the efforts of recentyears. For
such regions economic development policies may
not be sufficient and there are undoubtedly other
constraints of a social, political orinstitutionalnature
holding back the growth of their prosperity. In other
words, national and Community regional policies
may need to be complemented by reforms which are
more broadly based in order to hasten the process of
regional economic convergence and cohesion.
The Community's policies for the coming period are
the subject of the next chapter.
1 In 1993/94, new lists ofassisted. regions were designaad. Thc problem regians discussed in this claptcr are those of
the period 1989-93. In view of their langierm rcstructuring problems the vast majority of these reginrc were
re-proposed by their national autlmrities and are r€tained on rte rcw lists,
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Financial resources
The Community's regional (and other) policies over
the rest of the decade are being formulated and
implemented in the context of moves towards greater
integration. [n December 1991, the Community's
govemments signed the Maasticht Treaty, which
sought to broaden and deepen the range of issues
subject to shared decision-making. Of particular sig-
nificance for regional policy, thg new Treaty recog-
nised the need for increased solidarity and cohesion
within the Community as a basic condition for further
economic and social progress.
It is the role of the Commission to translate the
ambitions of the Maastricht Treaty into concrete
proposals for action over the 1990s. Faced with the
ongoing challenges of the Single Market and the new
challengEs posed by economic and monetary unifi-
cation, including the adoption of a single currency by
the end of the derade, the Commission's medium-
term budgetary proposals covering the period 1993
to 1999r 
- 
the Delors II package2 
- 
called for another
significant increase in structural expenditure to pro-
mote economic and social cohesion. This was gen-
erally accepted by Member States, even though the
Maastricht Treaty had not yet been ratified. In con-
sequence, the funds devoted to structural policies
will increase by 4lVo from over 21 billion ECU in
1993 to 30 billion ECU in 1999, including rhe new
Cohesion Fund created to provide additional aid to
the poorest Member States Spain, Greece, Ireland
and Porhrgal with a GDP per head of less than 90%
of the Community average. Stnrctural Funds in 1999
will, therefore, be three times their real value in 1989.
The increasing importance at[ached to structural
policies in the Community is reflected in their in-
creased share of the Budget. In 1993, the last year of
the old programming period, expenditure in structu-
ral measures accounted for 3l% of the total as against
SIVo for agriculture. By 1999, the figure will have
risen to 36Vo,while the share of spending on agricul-
ture will have Ceclined to 46Vo (table 17).
Of the 14 | .47 | billion ECU (at lgg2prices) available
for the period 1994 to 1999, 96.346 billion ECU
- 
7 4% of the total 
- 
was allocated by the Council to
Objective I regions (those where development is
lagging behind). IlVo went to Objectives 3 and 4,
while the rest was divided fairly evenly between the
other Objectives3 (Table 18).
The original recommendations in the Delors II pack-
age were based on four key principles underlying the
I 98 8 reform 
- 
c oncentration, pro g ram ming, partner-
ship and additionality. These principles were dis-
cussed in the previous Periodic Report and in the
Commission's mid-term review of the Structural
Fundsa.The principle of concentration of assistance
on the worst-affected areas is key to the analysis of
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the impact of the funds and is discussed in more detail
below in the light of the new decisions on the Stmc-
tural Funds, L994-1999 (modifications to the other
principles, which concern effecti ve implementation
of development progftrmmes, were also introduced).
The regulations governing the use of the Structural
Frurds for the new propiramming period introduced a
number of changes with the aim of improving their
effectiveness, as follows :
o the integration of action in the fisheries sector
and in fishing dependent areas into stmctural
policies;
o the creation of a new Objective 4 designed to
facilitate the adaptation of workers to industrial
change and changes in systems of prrrduction;
o a broadening of measures in Objective I regions
to irclude education and health;
o a simplification of decision-making procedures;
I the involvement of the social partners in
decision-making;
o a strengthening of procedures to verify
additionality;
o greater emphasis on evaluation, appraisal and a
more precise formulation of quantitative inter-
mediate objrctives;
r indicative allocation by Member States for all the
Strucnral Funds decided by the Commission.
Concentration
In order to be most effective in reducing disparities,
the limited resources available for regional policy
need to be concentrated on the worst-affected areas.
The evidence suggests that there has been a greater
concentration of Community support in the sense that
a higher share of resources are going to Objective I
areas. Between 1989 and 1993, the proportion of
funds going tothese regions rose from 62Vo to 65Vo
and by 1999, it will increase ta 73Vo (including the
Cohesion Fund). The four poorest Member States
received 50% of the funds in 1992 as against 427o in
1988. With the Cohesion Fund this share will rise to
54% by 1999. For these four, total Community struc-
tural expenditure under Objective I in 1999 will be
twice the level in 1992 in real terms. Other Objective
I regions will also receive a rising share of resources,
from l9%oto justunder 237o over this period. Expen-
diture on other Objectives will therefore decline in
relative terms (though it will rise in absolute terms).
In terms of the population covered, the proportion for
the Community as a whole for all regional
Objectives, has risen from 43Vo in 1989 to 1993 to
52% in 19949619. Except for Greece, Ireland and
Portugal, where all the population was already
covered, coverage has irrcreased inall MemberStates
(Table 19) but half of this increase relates to the
addition of the new Liinder. Spain and the UK have
experienced the smallest rise 
- 
L-2% points 
- 
while
in the other countries, apart from Luxembourg, the
increases range from 7 percentage points (Belgium)
to20 (Germany). Denmark and Luxembourg are now
the only Member States with no regions eligible
under Objective I (Map 23).
The decisions which led to the increased coverage
were taken against an economic background which
had deteriorated significantly since 1988189. Econ-
omic growth rates declined markedly at the begin-
ning of the 1990s in most member States and unem-
ployment rose sharply.'The need for coordinated
action 1s rcyitalise the Communit5l's economy was
recognised at the Edinburgh summit at the end of
L992, which agreed a package of infrastnrcture
measures to stimulate economic activity, and a year
later the Commission presented further propcals in
the White Paper Growth, competifivencss and em-
ployments.
Against this backgroun{ regional policy was also
seen to have a lole in stimulating the growth of
weaker regions. The general perception was that the
number of regions suffering from lagging develop-
ment or s0uctural decline 
- 
as opposed to temporary
cyclical problems 
- 
was increasing.
In determining eligibility under Objective 1, the
regulations adopted by the Council maintained the
central criterion that these should be NUTS 2 regions
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with a level of GDP per head (in PPS) of less than
75To of the Community average. At the same time,
however, it applied the criterion more flexibly, so
widenir$ the scope for regions to be included under
Objective 1.
When the first list of Objective I regions was estab-
Iished in 1988, this flexibility was used to allow the
inclusion of Northern Ireland and Corsica. In 1993,
the Council included some 8 regions or areas not
strictly fuHilling the GDP per head condirion (North-
ern lreland, Corsica, Abruzzi and Molise, the new
areas of Hainaut in Belgium, pd of Nord-pas de
Calais, the Highlands and Islands Enterprise Board
Area and Merseyside). Other new additions to the
Iist, with GDP per head below 75Vo of the
Community average were the five new German
Liinder and East-Berlin, Cantabria in Spain and
Flevoland in the Netherlands.
Since no region has been taken off the list 
- 
though
Abruzzi will be on I January 1997 
- 
the result is thar
the population covered under Objective I has in-
creased from 70 millionto 92 mitlion or from 2l.7%o
of theCommunity total to26.6?o (this will declineto
26.2Vo when Abruzzi, the most prosperous of the
Objective I regions, loses its status n l9g7).
The new Objective I regions in Belgium, France and
the UK added a new dimension to the defining char-
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acteristics of Objective I regions. These are notareas
of lagging development in the traditional sense but
regions where the decline fmm relative prosperity
based on industrial rctivrty has been particularly
acute.
East Berlin and the new German LZinder with
16.4mi1lion inhabitants also present a new type of
regional problem 
- 
one of nansition from a centrally
planned to a market economy, a process without
recent historical precedent (see Chapter 11). These
were granted a total of 3 billion ECU (1991 prices)
by the Council6 to assist economic and social reform
between 1991 and 1993, bridging the gap before the
start of the 199499 programming period. Although
statistics on GDP on standarddefinitions did notexist
for the relevant period, there was no question in 1993
that the new Liinder qualified for Objective I assist-
ance. The result is that ov er 2O% of the population of
Germany now lives in Objective I areas.
In Belgium, almost L37o of the population lives in
Hainaut, which has become an Objective I region,
while the frst Objective I region in the Netherlands,
Flevoland, accounts for under 2% of national popu-
lation. There was also an increase in the proportion
of the population of Spain, France and the UK living
in Objective 1 rcgions.
In surnmary, though the popmlation coverage of Ob-
jective I regions has risen and the geographical con-
centration of assistance has declined, this is mainly
due to German unification and the extension of aid
to the former East Germany. Of the 2I.9 million
additional people covered, 16.4 milli on 
-75% - live
in East Germany.
As regards Objective 2 assistance, the proportion of
population covered remains at L6.8Vo as before 1994,
though the numbers have irrcreased from 54 million
(in 1990) to 58 million in 1994-1996.In general, the
average size of eligible area has declined while their
number has increased. Many of the areas included on
the new listT were proposedby national governments
in anticipation of a permanent shake-out of labour in
key sectors caused by the current recession. Areas
with population of over 20 million were included on
the Objectle 2list under the declining sectors pro-
visions. Four areas 
- 
Hainaut (part), Cantabria, Nord
(part) and Merseyside 
- 
which used to qualify for
support under Objective 2 now fall under Objec-
tive 1. Eligibility for Objective 2 stahrs will last for
three years, in the first instance, and will be reviewed
in 1996.
Objective 5b regions have been defined for the full
six-yearperiod on the groundsthat structural changes
in rural areas tends to be relatively slow- In addition
to the general economic Pressures discussed earlier,
rural areas in the Community face new challenges
from the reform of the Community agricultural pol-
icy as well as from the effects of the GATT Uruguay
Round. Accordingly, the population covered under
Objective 5b has been increased ftom 5To of
Community population in 1989 to more than $Vo
in 194. Though the increase is relatively uniform
across the Community, there are large rises in the
proportion of the population covered in Luxembourg
and DenmarkE.
The macroeconomic
weight of CommunitY
regional po!icies
Colurrunity i'egional expenditure influences the de-
velopment of Member States and regions in two
principal ways :
o through the co-financing of invesEnent in physi-
cal and human capital raising their productive
capacity;
o through income transfers which allow imports to
be increased without a worsening of the balance
of payments.
The investment effect of Community regional
policies can be illustrated by the ratio of ERDF
expenditure 
- 
the principal vehicle for physical in-
vestment under the Structural Funds 
- 
to total gross
fixed capital formation (GFCF) in the economies
concerned. In 1989, the ERDF financed O.4Vo of
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Objective 1
regions in
ERDF commitrnentr
Investment (GFCF)
1989 1993 1999
s as a percentage of
i
i GDP
i tseg 1es3 leee
The Structural Funds
and Cohesion Fund
as a percentage
of GDP
1989 1993 1999
Greece
Spainl
lreland
Portugal
7.3 I1.0 12.6
2.6 4.0 6.6
5.2 9.3 7.8
5.3 7.0 8.0
t.4 1.9 2.2
03 0.9 1.5
0.9 1.5 1.2
1.4 1.8 2.1
2.5 3.3 4.0
1.0 1.5 2.3
2.r 3.1 21
2.7 3.3 3.8
EUR4
(of which Cohesion Fund)
6.0 7.83.9 0.9 t.71.3 1.6 2.3 2.9(0.4) (0.6)
New German Liindef
Italy3
Other Community Member
Statesa
(0.e)
3.6
3.3
1.8
4.0
2.5
n.a.
1.7
2.0
n.a (0.4) 0.8
0.4 0.7 0.8
0.4 0.6 0.s
n.a. (0.8) 1.7
0.6 1.1 1.2.
I I1.41.0
All objective 1 regions 5.0 4.73.0 1.21.10.7 2.11.81.2
EURl2 0.90.60.4 0.20.10.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
Source,:.'Eurtsiat, DG II, calculatiotrsl,DG WI ,, 1 .,,. ..,., , ,;,,
.: :.::::: r: -
Increase in GDP I9%- 1999 : 2.5% na
'. 
j 
.., ..
! EWitrg*rs include,;Cizntabriar : 
::. '': :
" For l989,nd l993,,,Northc;n',Itihnd in.{u UK'otd Conida in France;:.for 199P, including also Hairuw; the
O-r4i.,,Vietrc;in*s od Ar;ii i;'Flrritana; MersQiidg an'd ine nightands & Istands Enterprke Area-
GFCF in the Community and 3Vo of that in Objec-
tive 1 regions. In the four poorest Member States, it
financel 4Vo and in other Objective I regions,
around 2Vo (Table20).
By 1993, the figure for all Objective I regions had
risen to SVo and that for the four poorest Member
States to 6Vo. By 1999, the Community's contribu-
tion to investment will rise further in real terms,
though the share of GFCF will depend on what
happens to the latter in the meantime. If GFCF were
to grow by 2.5Vo a year, the average for the
Community over the 1980s, the ERDF would still
finance 5Vo of investment in (the now enlarged group
o0 Objective I regions but nearly 8Vo in the four
poorest Member States.
The effect of regional expendinrre on the ability to
import can be assessed by relating the amount in-
volved to the GDP of the area concerned. In 1989,
Structural Funds' support to the Objective I regions
as a whole was 1.27o of their GDP and in the four
poorest countries, l.6Vo of GDP. By 1993, these
figures had risen to I.\Vo and 2.3Vo respectively.
By the end of the current programming period in
1999, if GDP grows at 2.5Vo a year, the average for
the Community in the 1980s, the Stn:ctural Funds
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will represent 2.lVo of GDP in Objective 1 regions
and 2.9Vo of GDP in the four poorest Member States.
To have a lasting effect on productive capacity, these
funds need to be used to increase physical andhuman
capital. Moreover, the scale of the effect depends on
counterpart financing from the Member States con-
cerned, which is why the additionality principle is
considered to be important and why it has been
strengthened under the revised regulations, especial-
ly in relation to the provision, in the regional plan, of
adequate financial information on the extent of na-
tional expendin:re on development-related expendi-
ture.
Community initiatives
The total funds available for Community initiatives
in the period 1994 to 1999 amounr ro 13.45 bil-
lion ECU in 1994 prices. Initiatives will focus on
seven broad themes : cross-border and transnational
cooperationn rural development, the most peripheral
regions, employment and the development of skills,
the management of industrial change, urban areas
and fishing (table A.22 in the Annex shows the futl
list of initiatives). There is, in addition, a reserve of
1.6 billion ECUs for allocation at a later stage.
Several of the initiative.s reflect a desire for conti-
nuity. This is tme of INTERREG, the largest one
which is mainly for cooperation across internal bor-
ders but which is intended to cover cooperation on
external and certain coastal borders to a greater ex-
tent than previously. This is linked with measures to
prom ote energy netw orks formerly undertaken under
REGEN. There are also follow-ups, with increased
finance, for LEADER which is for rural development
and REGIS which is for ultra-peripheral regions.
In addition, it is proposed to continue initiatives
assisting regions hit by the decline of the coal, steel,
textile and defence industries 
- 
RECHAR,
RESIDER, RETEX and KONVER 
-up to the end of
1997 and a specific initiative for the Portuguese
textile industry has been added. A new initiative,
ADAPT, financed from the Social Fund, has been
introduced to help workers threatened with unem-
ployment because of industrial change and to help
enterprises improve their competitiveness.
Another initiative directed at small and medium-
sized enterprises is also intended to ease adaptation
to industrial change. This will incorporate some of
the successful features of the existing PRISMA,
STRIDE and TELEMATIQUE initiatives, as well as
reflecting the thinking in the White Paper, arrd will
be focused mainly on Objective I regions.
The Employment Initiative will incorporate elements
of the existing NOW progftrmme, for women, and
HORZON, for the disabled, but will be widened to
cover other disadvantaged groups such as the long-
term unemployed, while YOUTHSTART will aim to
provide a guarantee of training and employment for
the under 20s throughout the Community.
The new initiatives for urban problems and PESCA
for fishing dependent areas complete the list.
The Structural Funds
and the regions
of the candidate countries
The neg oti ations over the acce ssi on of the four EFTA
countries have also included the issue of Structural
Fund assistance. The allocation of Objectiye I assist-
asce has been agreed and a new category of aid,
Objective 6, has been creaied.
Only Austria has a region which qualifies for Objec-
tive I assistance, Burgenland with a population of
269,000, 3Vo of the total population of Austria. Ac-
cording to the latest assessment, the financial aid
fixed for the period 1995 to 1999 as a whole will be
184 million ECU, which represents an amount per
inhabitant of slightly less than in present Objective I
regions (outside Cohesion Fund countries)
(Table 21).
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Noruray Sweden EURs
(excl. GR, E,lRl. p)
Population
ObJectives 1 and 6
population ('000)
Objectives 1 and 6
7699
269
350%
4241
587
13,80vo
rt37
8559
450
525To
t420
4998
837
16,7AVo
17M
28336s
45036
15,90vo
67247
?so/o of national population
Structurat Funds 199s-99 1 1623
(1995 prices MECU)
of which :
Objectives 1 and 6
Other Objectives
184
1439
384
769
268
511
r t93
34r
3224't*
35000
237Structural Funds per head (ECU) | Ztt
' I est i'nntc oJ st ;airat r^*' ia,ut ri fu';'6; [i..' 1 ya gro, rrs' :,
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A new Objective 6 has been established for regions
- 
defined at NIITS level tr 
- 
with ourstandingly low
population density (below 8 inhabitants per squue
kilometre). Regions eligible for this wil be in the
three Scandinavian countries. Objective 6 wilt be
sinrilar in kind to Objective 1 and will be subjecr to
revisions in 1999 at the s:rme time as the Sfructural
Fund regulations are reviewed. Until then aid willbe
regulated through a protocol in the Treaty of Ac-
cession. The regions which are etigible, which are
also identir'ied in the protocol, cover a population of
1.874 million and will receive a rotal of 1.109 mil-
lion ECU (at 1995 prices) over the period 1995 to
1999 as a whole 
- 
equivalent to 592 ECU per person
(an average of 118 ECU a year) which is lTVo lower
than the average for Objective I regions in the rest of
the Community (outside Cohesion Fund countries).
After negotiation, the position of each counbry under
Objective 6 is as follows :
o in Sweden 450,000 people, or 5.3Vo of the popu-
lation, will live in regions eligible for assistance
(mainly in three northern counties). They will
receive a sum averaging around 101 ECU per
person a year over the period 1gg5 to lggg;
o in Finlan4 837,000 people, l6.7Vo of the popu-
lation, Iive in eligible regions, mainly in Lapland
and other areas bordering Russia. The sum in-
volved has been fixed at the equivalent of
122 ECU per person per year over the period
1995 ro 1999;
o in Norway, some 587,000 people, l3.8%o of the
population, are likely to live in eligible regions
and to receive an average of 125 ECU per person
per year over the period 1995 to 1999.
So far as other objectives of the Structural Funds are
concerned, the Commission has indicated, without
giving a precise figure, that the population covered
by Objective 5b is likely to be significant and larger
than the population under Objective 2. Objective 5a
is also likely to be important.
Because of relatively low rates of unemployment in
tiie. candidate countries, with the exception of
Finland, the population covered by Objective 2 as-
sistance will probably be minimal in Norway and
Austria and wel! below the Community average in
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Sweden. In Finland, s a result of high unemploy-
ment since 1990, the population covered by Objec-
tive 2 might be relatively high.
Although neither the eligible areas nor the global
coverage of population has yet been established (this
remains to be done before the 1 st January 1995 which
is the envisaged date of accession), the total amount
of finance available for Objectives 2,3, 4, 5a and 5b
has been agreed. Including Community initiatives,
the Budget for 1995 to 1999 has been fixed at 4.6 bil-
lion ECU.
The total available for the four candidate countries
from the Stnrcural Funds amounts to 5,884 mil-
lion ECU (at 1995 prices), which represents an addi-
tional expendihre of 4.5Vo in relation to an expansion
of 7 A% in the Community's population. The average
assistance per person under a1l the Objectives com-
bined is slightly below the average for the existing
8 Member States excluding the four Cohesion coun-
tries.
Thc budgetary period 1993-1999 differsfrom the programming periodfor regianal actians whichfor Obiectives I
and 5b runs from 1994 to 1999, andfor two 3-year periods, 1994-1996 and 1997-1999,for Obiective 2.
European Commission : The mcans to match our arnbitions. COM(92) 2N0.
Includin g innov ativ e and trans itional ac tion s.
European Convnission ( 1992), Community Structural policies.' Assessm ent and Outlooh COM (92) 84
European Cownission (/,993), Growth, competitiveness and employment Com(93) 70ofinal
Reguhtion (EEC) No 3575/90 of tlu Council at its meeting of 4 December 1990
Thc list is published in the fficial Journal, L8I of 24 March 1994.
Thc list b publishcdin the Official Journal, L96 of I4 April i,994.
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Chapter 10 Regional policies in
Member States : recent trends'
The past five years have been a period of consider-
able uncertainty and upheaval in the regional policies
of Member States. Major geo-political develop-
ments, economic fluctualions and almost continuous
strucftual change have combined to create a difficult
environment for regional policy. These changes are
reflected in Northern Member States in a decline in
large scale, automatic support to br:siness in favour
of a more selective approach with more emphasis
than in the past on develoF.ing the business environ-
ment (assistance to producer services) and small
enterprises. In Southern Member States and Ireland,
expenditure on regional incentives has increased and
is now among the highest ir,. the Community in rela-
tion to GDP. These countrirls have maintained rela-
tively extensive geographical coverage in their re-
gional incentive schemes whereas in Northern
Member States such coveftrgt) has been reduced. This
has tended to reduce differences in expenditure on
regionalincentives across the Community when ex-
pressed per head of population. The major exception
is Italy where expenditure per head remains substan-
tially ahead of the rest of the Community.
Definitions of regional policy
Since the promotion of productive investment is the
major means of stimulating regional development in
all MemberStates, the focus is c'n regional inceirtives
and, to a lesser exten! on the prcvision of infrastruc-
ture to aid business expansion. Where major infra-
structure investment is concemed (transport, tele-
communications and energy networks) Member
States tend notto distinguish systematically between
that of a general nature and that undertaken specifi-
cally to promote regional development. For this rea-
son, regional policy conducted at Community level,
which has a strong emphasis on infrastruchrre, is
difficult to compare directly with that of the Member
States.
The analysis below is divided into three sections. The
first reviews recent changes in the objectives,
priorities and context of regional policy in Member
States, including the importance accorded to regional
incentives to business and to business-related infra-
structure. The second examines changes in the design
of regional incentiVes as regards their form, value,
spatial coverage and the targets of assistance. The
final section considers trends in expenditure on re-
gional incentives since 1980, focusing, in particular,
on developments during the late 1980s.
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The objectives and
context for regional policy
The major feature of national regional policy over the
past decade has been the reformulation of policy
objectives (see Box, for a summary of the major
changes in policy in each of the Member States).
During the 1980s, regional policy became less
oriented towards redisributing income and employ-
ment and more towards encouraging structural
change to achieve greater diversification and raise
the overall potential for economic growttr-
In recent years, policy makers have had to contend
with several different kinds of stnrchrral adjustrnent.
The primary concern, particularly in Northern
Member States, has continued to be regions depend-
ent on traditional industries. Problems of structural
adjustment, however, have affected a much wider
range of regions throughout the Community, es-
pecially those containing single activity towns or
cities dependent on industries such as defence, which
has experienced plant closure or conversion of pro.
duction to non-military goods, or fishing or agricul-
tural communities affected by over-capacity and
quota restrictions.
The emphasis on promoting strucnrral adjustment of
regions reflects the influence of mrcro-economic
developments and geo-political changes. Economic
crises during the 1970s and early 1980s, associated
with widespread uremployment and accompanied
by sfuctural change affecting all regions, reduced
the importance of regional policy on the political
agenda in several Member States. Budgetary restric-
tions and changes in attitude towards subsidy-based
intervention led to lower expenditure and a more
selective approach to regional development in many
countries.
The recovery from the recession of the early 1980s
was followed by strong economic growth throughout
the Community, but unemployment in many regions
remained high, including certain urtan/industrial ag-
glomerations. (In the UK, the social, economic and
e nvi ronmental problems of inner ci ty areas prompted
a growing range of urban policy measues which
graduatly supplanted regional policy in terms of pol-
itical priority and expendiure.) The spatial concen-
tration of growth also brought problems for some
developed regions : over-heating and congestion en-
couraged renewed interest in measures to decen-
tralise economic activity from cities such as Paris,
Athens and London.
Other aspects of structural adjustment are attribut-
able to geopolitical developments. Preparations for
the Single Markef with the potential f<.rr enhanced
c ross -border cooperation and c om pe d tion, promoted
greater @ncern with the competitiveness and pro-
ductivity of industries and firms. The impact of pol-
itical and economic transformation in Eastern
Europe has had greatest impact in Germany where
unification has required major restructuring pro-
gmmmes in virtually all economic sectors of the new
Crerman Linder, including a massive irrcrease and
reorientation of regional policy resources. Elsewhere
in the Community, the lowering of East-West tension
is apparent in the closure or rational isation of miliary
bases andcutbacks in production andemployment in
def.ence industries.
Against this background, regional policy has focused
increasingly on assisting the restrucuring of regional
prodrction systems. Although regional financial in-
centives are still the main instrument for the promo-
tion of new prodtrctive investment in the regiorn,
policy makers are moving away from their former
reliance on subsidies for invesfrnent and employ-
ment, and measures are being oriented more towards
improving competitiveness and the regional business
environment through business-related infrastrrcture
development (notably it' rhe Netherlands), technol-
ogy transfer and consultancy services, especially for
marketing and exports. The nature of
business-related infrastructure provision is also
changing : the traditional provision of industrial es-
tates, factories and local services is being supplanted
by the creation of enterprise and incubator units,
technology and science parks and telematic centres.
This broader approach to the promotion of produc-
tive activity in problem regions is also reflected in
the administration of regional policy which is becom-
ing more integrated with other areas of policy (eg
urban/regional policy coordination in the UK) and is
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the subject of more coordination between central and
regional government (as in Belgium and Spain).
The reorientation of policy is, however, being under-
taken within a context of tightening budgetary con-
straints and varying degrees of political commitrnent
to regional policy. In addition, rhe monitoring of aids
under Community competition policy 
- 
in the inter-
ests of creating a 'level playing field' 
- 
has focused
on both the extent (coverage of assisted areas) and
intensity (rates of assistance) of regional policy. This
is particularly so in the Northern Member States. In
Derur.ark, almost all conventional regional incen-
tives were abandoned in 1991 in favour of a new
national system for the promotion of business devel-
opment; in the Netherlands, regional assistance has
been confined to the North of the country (although
there are some other areas with temporary designa-
tion); and in Germany, both the level of expendinrre
and the extent of assisted areas have been reduced
substantially in the former West Germany though
assistance has been increased massively in the new
Eastern Liinder.
By contrast, Member States in the South have gener-
ally maintained or increased expenditure on regional
policy in recent years, aided by support from the
Strucn:ral Funds, especially to Objective I regions,
and more liberal conditions under competition pol-
icy. Nevertheless, they too have not been immune
from cutbacks, at lea.st as regards the promotion of
productive investment. Besides Italy, where political
change has led to the temporary suspension of re-
gional ggencies and prograffrmes, in both Spain and
Portugal reductions in national expendin-rre on aid is
expected to occur over the next few years. As indi-
cated in Chapter I 1, however, it is important for the
weaker Member States and regions that overall re-
gional expenditure is maintained so that, with the
increased resources available under the Structural
Funds for the period 1gg4-gg, a firm foundation is
laid for catching up.
The design of
regional incentives
The shift in national regional policy objectives to
focus more on structural adjustmenl with increas-
ingly limited resources in many Member slates, is
evident in the design of incentives to attract new
productive activity. A common theme in the compo_
sition of incentive packages, their administration,
spatial coverage, the conditions for eligibility and the
rates of support is a more selective approach to
promoting indigenous regional development.
Over the past decade, both the number and form of
regional incentives used by Member States have
becomemorelimited. The diversity of incentives, com-
mon in most Community countries during the 1970s, is
disappearing (particularly as regards fi scal concessions
and interest-related subsidies), and most incentive
packages zue now heavily grant-based. The diversity
whichremains tends tobegreatestin the less developed
countries : Greece, Italy, Ireland and portugal typically
have more numerous and varied incentives, including
labour-related subsidies, than other Member States.
Many of the incentives which have been abolished in
recent years were major, high value, automatic
schemes. Examples include WIR regional allow-
ances in the Netherlands (terminated in 1983), re-
gional devclopment grants in Great Britain and
standard capital grants in Northern Ireland (1999),
investment allowances in West Germany (1989) and
almost the entire package of Danish measures
(1991). By contrast, the new schemes introduced
have tended to be less costly,.indirect or focused on
small firms, eg regional enterprise grants in Britain
(introduced in 1988), aids for decentralisation and
small flrms in France (1991) and the business envi-
ronment policy 'BOB' in the Netherlands (1992).
The demise of major automatic schemes has given
rise to an important shift in the administration of
regional incentive policy. Whereas at the start of the
1980s automatically-administered incentives were
prevalent, especially in the larger Community coun-
tries, by the end of the decade only in Italy was
large-scale automatic support still the basis of re-
ale@4!<M-@@.rt 
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gional incentives. Elsewhere, most support now has
a significant discretionary component. An additional
administrative trend, as noted above, has been the
development of a more decentralised approach in
many Member States, particularly in respect of sup-
port for smaller projects and firms-
Associated with these administrative developments,
the eligibility conditions for regional incentives now
involve greater selectivity and more discretion so as
to increase the cost-effectiveness of assistance. In a
number of countries, assistance has come to be
limited to those sectors where it is considered effec-
tive, excluding sectors with over-capacity. In other
countries like Belgium and Porhrgal, eligibility con-
ditions take more account of the industrial charac-
teristics of projects. The emphasis on promoting the
business environment is reflected in the extension of
eli gible activitie s to include certain producer service s
with a greater focus on high-tech, innovation and
consultancy.
Incentives have also increasingly been focused on
new firms or projects as opposed to existing ones'
especially in Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands.
Start-up projects qualify for more generous awards
and are subject to less restrictive eligibility
conditions than extensions, while projects involving
rationalisation and reorganisation rarely receive as-
sistance.
At the same time, the spatial coverage of assisted
areas has become more restricted and more focused
on problem regions in Northern Member States. Over
the period 1980 to 1992 in Belgium, Denmatk,
(West) Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, the
average population in designated problem regions
has fallen from just over 35% of the total to
around 27Vo (Graph 34 and Table 22). Apan from
Denmark, where although there are designated prob-
lem regions they have not received assistance so far,
the most notable reductions have occurred in the
Netherlands (a decline of two-fifths), the UK (one-
fifth) and Germany (one{hird).
By contrast" in Southem Europe and Ireland - much of
which are designated as Objective I regions -there has
been no reduction in spatial coverage since 1985. In
Greece, Pornrgaland Spain, there has beenvirnrally no
change in areas eligible for assistance since their ac-
cession to the Community, while in Ireland the only
change has been a temporary extension to assisted arei$
between 1989 and 1991. Nevertheless, within assisted
areas, Southern Member States are targeting regional
aid more precisely through graduating rat€s of support.
In Italy, different rales haye been introduced in different
parts of the Mezzogiorno and in Spain, six different
maximum nates of support apply according to the de-
velopment stahs of the area.
In general, the overall maximum rates of award of
regional support on offer in the Member States have
not changed markedly, being determined primarily
by Community aid ceilings. However, there has been
a number of changes to the rates of support for
specific incentive schemes reflecting the greater se-
lectivity noted above. In Northern Member States,
the c hanges were mostly irl a dow nward direction and
in favour of start-up projects. In the Netherlands, the
maximum rates of support under the IPR were re-
duced from 257o to ZOVo (l5%o for subsequent exbn-
sions), in the former West Germany, the maximum
preferential rate was redtrced from 257o to lSVo and
in lreland, the murimum rate for extensions was
reduced in two stages from 6!0Vo or 45Vo (depending
on location) to l|Vo. By contrast, in Southern
Member States, rates of support generally increased,'
In ltaly, rates were raised in the mid-1980s and in
both Pornrgal and Spain, new regional incentive sys-
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Population coverage
in assisted regions
(% national population)
1980 1986 1992
RIE per head
of population
In assisted regions
(ECU 1990 prlces)
1980 1985 1990
RIE
(% national GDP)
1980 1985 1990
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Greecel
lreland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
UK
3950 33.10 33.10
27.00 24.N 19.90
38.20 39.00 40.00
36.00 35.00 n.00
65.0 58.00 58.00
28.00 28.00 28.00
35.60 35.60 3s.60
100.00 100.00 79.70
27.40 25.00 19.90
100.00 100.00
58.60 58.60
49.50 36.80 36.80
38.15 49.67 4.7 |
9.82 10.62 5.q
16.85 1r.73 7.57
30.07 28.38 33.15
7.r3 36.28 s2.47
117.00 57.46 58.14
185.19 238.72 40l'.63
63.97 23.t2 70.9r
58.45 42.10 33.09
27.35
31.93
70.6t 62.27 36.92
0.13 0.14 0.l l
0.02 0.02 0.01
0.05 0.04 0.02
0.08 0.07 0.07
0.07 0.35 0.49
1.66 0.75 0.63
0.60 0.72 1.04
0.51 0.17 0.41
0.13 0.08 0.05
0.38
0.19
0.30 0.20 0.10
EUR9
EUR12
37.90 35.50 33.40
41.00 39.1C
tems introduced after their entry into the Community
involved higher ceiling on support.
Expenditure on
regional incentive policies
The differences in policy trends across the
Community are reflected in the changes in expendi-
ture which have occurred over the past decade. In
most Northern Member States, spending on regional
incentives declined markedly in the course of the
1980s (Graph 35). This is especially true of
Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK where the fall
was more than 507o. However, in Belgium and 
- 
to
a lesser extent 
- 
Luxembourg, there was no clear
tendency either up or down, while in Germany a
tendency for expendinrre to fall in the frst haHof the
1980s was reversed as spending on investment
allowances increased dramatically in the second half
priorto theirwithdrawal in 1989. With their abolition
and the withdrawal of special depreciation allow-
ances (for the former Border Area) in 1994, the
regional aid expenditure in West Germany will be
30Vo lower than in 1991. On the other hand, in the
new East German Ldnder, regional expenditure is
rising rapidly. The total regional budget for the new
L?inder was DM 11.4 billion in l992,over ten times
more than in the West of the country.
While the underlying expenditure trend in most
Northern Community countries is clearly down-
wards, in Southern Member States regional incentive
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spending has increased significantty since the mid-
1980s. Current budgetary pressures, however, sug-
gest that growth is unlikely to continue in the 1990s.
Member States can be divided into four groups in
terms of expendinre on regional aid. At the bottom
come Denmark and France, with expenditure of
under 0.02Vo of GDP in 1990. The second group
comprises, in ascending order, the Netherlands,
Germany, the UK and Belgium wittr expenditure of
0.05-0.1Vo of GDP and with rhe Netherlands rapidly
declining towards the boftom group. The third group
consists of Luxembourg plus fourcountries where all
or most areas are Objective I regions 
- 
Spain,
Porhrgal, Greece and Ireland 
- 
with expendinre of
4.4.0.6Vo of GDP. (Spending in Spain, in facr, was
lcwer than this in 1990 but within the range in 1989.)
Finally, in Italy, expenditure in 1990 anounted tojust over lVo of GDP, reflecting significant social
security concessions and a marked rncrease in spend-
ing in 1990 (in previous years, expendinue generally
being around 0.7Vo of GDP 
- 
still more than else-
where in the Community).
Because, however, countries with a low level of
expenditure tend to confine the coverage of policy to
relatively few and narrowly defined assisted areas,
' t tus chopler ,s based on a shon srudy : European Policy Research Cente ( I99j), The regional policies of rte Member
States : a review of recenl trerds, studyfinarced by DG XW ofthe Evropean Commission
differences between countries in terms of expendi-
ture per head of assisted population tend to be much
less marked. Thus, with the exception of Denmark
and France at one extreme and Italy at the other, in
all countries spending in 1990 was between2T and
70 ECU per head of the population of assisted re-
gions, with Luxembourg, keland and Greece close
.to the top of this range and Spain and Portugal and
the other countries close to the bottom (Graph 36).
These figures indicate that the intensity of regional
aid to business in the Northern Member States has
declined relative to that in'southern Member States.
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Chapter Gurrent issues and problems11
Transition to EMU
The final transition to EMU requires Member states
to meet strict nominal convergence criteria regarding
inflation and public finances, as well as to maintain
exchange rate stability. These criteria are specified
in the MaastrichtTreaty. They are interlinked and the
need for progress in meeting all criteriain amajority,
at least, of Member States was underlined by events
in 1992 and 1993 which, as discussed below, led to
a series of crises in the Exchange Rate Mechan-
ism (ERM). In facg very few Member States fulfilled
these criteria in 1992 or 1993. With the exception of
Ireland, the countries with the highest concentration
of Objective 1 regions in particular still have some
way to go. Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece all had
rates of inflation and long-term interest rates well
above the Maastricht norns and none achieved the
nec e s sary exchange rate s tab i lity. The budge t defi c its
of ltaiy and Greece represent a-major problem, while
in both countries as well as in Belgium and lreland,
public debt ratios are much higher than the bench-
mark set. The transition to EMU will in these coun-
tries and in others involve the implementation of
appropriate policies to rneet the Maastricht criteria
(Graphs 37 
- 
40 and Tabl e 23). Such policies involve
the control of inflation 
- 
both actual (as measued by.
the consumer price index) and expected (as reflected
in long-term interest rates) 
- 
a reduction in budget
deficits and public debt and the avoidance of ex-
change rate fluctuations.
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Prospects for the regions
under EMU
The achievement of Economic and Monetary Union
in the Community promises enhanced prospects for
the developed and the less favoured regions alike.
The reduction of transaction costs and the elimina-
tion of exchange rate risk may promote regional
specialisation and intra-Community trade in goods
and services. The weaker regions can benefit from
this specialisation by exploiting more fuily their
comparative advanbge. Furttrermore, a general ex-
pansion of trade is likely to be beneficial for econ-
omic growth which provides in turn favourable con-
ditions for lagging regions ro catch up. Finally,
increased capital mobility encouraged by fixed ex-
c hange rates and the tendency towards quas i- unifo rm
inflation rates will tend to equalise interest rates for
any given level of risk, which should favour the less
developed regions where capital is often relatively
scarce afi'd capital costs, therefore, relatively high.
While yielding potential benefits, the increased inte-
gration of the Community under EMU is, however,
not without costs or rislqs for the laggng regions.
These arise both from the macroeconomic adjust-
ments required in the mn-up to EMU and from the
additional constraints imposed on Member States by
full membership of EMU which could adversely
affect economic and social cohesion. Both aspects
are examined in more detail below.
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The Maastricht
Table 23
convergence criteria, 1993
Inflation
rate
Public Finance lnterest
rate'
1 992
Exchange
rate4
Total
score
B udget
deficitl
Debt
ratio2
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
lreland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
UK
2.8
1.4
3.4
t3.1
4.7
2.3
2.0
4.4
3.6
2.1
6.7
3.4
7.0
4.4
15.5
7.2
5.5
2.3
9.4
2.5
4.0
8.1
7.6
138.4
90.6
48.9
tzt.2
559
44.1
99.0
l l8.t
10.0
81.4
66.4
48.8
8.7
9.0
8.0
16.6
r2.l
8.6
9.1
1 1.9
7,.9
8.0
13.2
9.r
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
5
a
0
I
4
3
0
4
aJ
0
2
EUR12 average 3.8 6.0 65.9 10.2
Convergence criteria 3.3 3.0 60.0 r0.7
I ,,
2,
3
Long-terminterut rdes in 1992
Cuierrl stability criterion: tlw' natiotu[ cwrency has not devalued in rhe past two yars and lus rcmaincd within the normal
2.2 5 % fl ua uai o n ndi g i ru, oJ the e xt )ta qry e r a e mech4 ni s m
Sourcv : Abrahanand,VanRomp:uy (19F3), updated DG )(V7 :' ,
Experience during 1992 and 1993 demonstrated the
degree to which the Maastricht criteria are inter-
linked. The persistence of differences in inflation
rates, budgetary imbalances and the situation in the
real econorny produced a series of crises in the ERN,I.
This culminated in the withdrawal of two currencies
from the system, realignments of other currencies
and a substantial widening of fluctuation margins to
plus or minus l5o/o. This experience demonstrated
the very real difficulties faced by some Member
States in adjusting to the Maastricht criteria without
damaging economic performance.
Chapter 11 
- 
Current issues and problems
In order to maintain a fixed exchange rate, it is not
sufficient for price inflation in each Member Sute to
remain in line with the average of the others. As
experience has denionstrated, it has to be reduced to
the level prevailing in the counLries witir tiie lowest
inflation rates. Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece will
each have to adopt a policy to curb inflation in the
run-up to EMU, which can be a painful process. since
it implies tighter control on domestic production
costs and, in particular, the cost of labour. This
cannot easily be achieved where annual rises in
prices and wages are institutionalised and where
Iabour organisations zue asked to moderate wage
demands in anticipation of lower inflation. Where
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wages rise but prices are restrained, there would be
a squeeze on doniestic profit margins and a tempor-
ary or possibly more pernranent contraction of do-
mestic production and employment. This could be
avoided if productivity increased more rapidly to
reduce unit labour costs.
Tentative estimates of the effects of reducing the
1992 intlation rate to the EC inflation convergence
criterion for EII4U suggest that the average unem-
ployment rate would increase, at least in the mediuni-
term. by 4 percentage prrints in Greece ,by 2 percent-
age points in Porn:gal and by I percentage point in
Spain and Italyr.
In addition to the implementation of anti-inflationary
policy, Greece, Italy and. to lesser extent, Portugal
and Spain. will have trt endeavour to reduce budget
deficits to the 37c Maastricht level. On the basis of
1993 figures. the required reduction in the budget
deficit r.vould be ovr:r l0 pcrcentage points of GDP
in Greece and 7 percentage points of GDP in Italy.
For Portugal and Spain, the effort required is more
modest (respectively around 2 and I percentage
points of GDP).
The benefits of a significant improvement in the
fiscal position of Greece and Italy and further con-
solidation in Portugal and Spain are important insofar
as [hey contribute to alleviating the 'crowding out'
effect of interest payments on growth-enhancing
public and private investment. The combined effect
of fiscal restraint and exchange rate stabilisation
should result in lower levels of nominal and real
interest rates. This should help to create a more
favourable climate for domestic and foreign invest-
ment. Finally, fiscal restraint is also likely to reduce
the balance of pavnient cletlcits of the four countries
concerned to levels corupatible with sustainable capi-
tal inflows and transfers from other countries"
Horvever. the positive efiecls of sustained fiscal con-
straint have to be balanced against its potential costs,
which in some degree will depend on the way it is
achieved. If it is attained by a mixture of tax increases
and public expenditure cuts, it may entail short-term
deflationary effects. especially in countries such as
Greece and ltaly. where the scale of measures re-
quired to achieve the Maastricht targets is substan-
tial. This would delay the catching-up process in
these countries and their resions in both the short and
medium-term.
Given the need for real convergence and the streng-
thening of cohesion in the long-term, it is essential
that the required fiscal consolidation is pursued se-
lectivell,' in a manner which does not jeopardise the
competitive position and, therefore, the growth pros-
pects of these countries concerned. The Fourth Peri-
ocJic Report identified the key determinants of the
competitiveness of lagging regions as the cost of
credit 
- 
especially for snrall and medium-sized firms
- 
income and corporate tax rates, the supply of quali-
fied manpower and the availability and quality of
basic infrastructure. Every effort should be made to
avoid fiscal consolidation reducing development-
related public expendirure in the lagging regions or
increasing the costs facing local businesses.
In this context. the recent decline in the share of
public gross fixed capital formation in GDP in some
of the weaker Member States suggests there is some
cause for concern. Whilst for the Community as a
whole, the share was the same in 1992 as in 1985, a
substantial reduction is apparent for Ireland and
Greece and to a lesser extent Italy (Table 24). This is
a worrying development, even for Ireland despite the
rate of economic growth being relatively high in
recent years while public capital formation has been
cut back. Over the longer term, such reductions are
likely to depress the rate of economic grow*r.
In view of the need to sustain efforts towards real
convergence, the necessary cut in the real growth of
total government expenditure should be accompa-
nied h-v a restructurins of expenditure which avoids
cuts in capitirl fonnation in lagging regions. Tlte sante
holds for public expenditure cln education and train-
ing. Only if the least developed Member States and
regions step up their investment in basic infrastruc-
ture and human capital can they -hope to sustain
significantly higher growth rates over the longer
term.
To sunrmarise. the necessary budgetary restraint
agreed at Maastricht should be pursued in a way
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which minimises the burden on the laggng regions.
The required reduction in the growth of public ex-
penditure should be accompanied by a restrucnring
of expenditure and taxes as appropriate, in favour of
the elements which foster the competitiveness of the
weakest regions. A balanced restmcturing of public
expenditure will, in addition, complement the
Community's efforts under the increased Structural
Funds and enhance the growth prospects of lagging
regions. At the serme time, any stengthening of the
investment effort in absolute and relative terms will
ease the burden of meeting inflation targets to the
extent that productivity is increased and unit costs
reduced.
Thebenefits of such an approach are likely to emerge
over the medium-terrn as the Irish experience shows
to some degree. Sound mzrcroeconomic policies and
fiscal consolidation will tend to lead to lower costs
and higfrr post-tax rates of return on private capital.
These will in turn give rise to better invesunent
opportunities if at the same time infrastructure and
labour force skills in lagging regions are streng-
thened and upgraded
Adjustment mechanisms
under EMU
A full-fledged EMU, and the imposition of. fixed
exchange rates in particular, will impose additional
constraints on the regions which could have an im-
portant effect on economic and social cohesion.
Exchange rate flexibility is important in that" it ptitt-
ciple, it enables a country, through devaluation, to
offset a loss in international competitiveness in a
relatively painless manner. As such it facilitates
short-term adjustnent to general, or country-specific
economic shocks which reduce regional growth and
raise unemployment.
The nature of the shocks to which regions are ex-
pos ed greatly affec ts the b alance of benefits and cos ts
of economic and monetary integration Mostanalysts
agree that the cost of removing the exchange rate as
an instrument of stabilisation is lower the more simi-
lar is the economic structure of the countries joining
the monetary union. Countries or regions whose
structure differs substantially from the norm are
more vulnerable in the vent of a shock. The evidence
available suggests that this is certainly the case for
some of the least developed Member States like
Greece and Portugal. The removal of the possibility
of exchange rate adjustment, therefore, represents a
more important loss to them than to the stronger
countries.
The question remains as to how a Member State or
region can adjust to adverse shocks under EMU. In
the US, workers losing their jobs in one State often
move to another in search of work. l,abour mobility
% GDP 7o change
198s-1992
1985 1992
Greece
lreland
Italy
Portugal
Spain
EUR1 2
4.4
4.0
3.7
2.5
3.7
2.8
3.6
2.4
3.1
4.4
5.1
2.8
-0.8
-1.6
-0.6
1.5
IA
0.0
'.....
Sutrce : Abralam and VanRompuy (193), updatcd. DC XVI
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does not occur to the same degree in the Community,
where intenegional and international migration is
comparatively limited within the Community. Nor is
a massive labour outflow necessarily beneficial for a
depressed region especially if it takes the form of an
exodus of more skilled and better educated workers.
Variations in labour costs represent a second poten-
tial adjustment mechanism though for these to occur
wages and labour costs need to respond to employ-
ment conditions. Evidence relating regional and na-
tional wages to unemployment suggests that a lUEo
increase in the unemployment rate w ill tend to reduce
wages by 0.5% to l.SVot. Unfortunately, there is no
way of judging whether a reduction in labour costs
of this scale is sufficient to offset the employment
effects of economic shocks. Rigid labour contracts
and national systems of wage determination tend to
impede regional wage adjustment in the Southern
Member States.
A third regional adjustment mechanism comes from
the action of automatic fiscal stabilisers which oper-
ate to reduce the tar-take from, and increase the
public expenditure transfers to, hard-pressed regions
as economic activity declines. Estimates suggest that
the US fiscalsystem offsets inthis wayabout}0-33?o
of any decline in regional income relative to the
national average. Most Community countries are
characterised by an even higher degree of regional
stabilisation because talc rates and the level of unem-
ployment benefit tend to be higher than in the US.
This mechanism is, however, much more effective
within Community countries than between them be-
cause there is no central mechanism rvhich plays the
role of the Federal Budget.
The need for
Com munity intervention
In summary, EMU is not without risks for some of
the weaker Member States and regions. In particular,
some of the weakest countries need to make major
adjustments to meet the nominal convergence crite-
ria laid down in the Maastricht Treaty. Antiinflation
policies, fiscal consolidation and the loss of the ex-
change rates as an instrument of adjustment could
adversely affect the economic performance of a num-
ber of Member States.
At the Edinburgh Summit meeting at the end of L992,
Member States agreed to increase resources to sup-
port economic and social cohesion in the context of
EMU. The expansion in the Structural Funds and the
creation of the Cohesion Fund should make it easier
for weaker counEies to achieve the budget targets
specified in the Maastricht Treaty whilst maintaining
the relatively high levels of development-related
public expendiu,rre required to reduce the deficiency
in their infrastruchre and human capital and modern-
ise their economies (see Chapter 9).
In the longer term, Member States which have tradi-
tionally rclied on periodic devah:ation to maintain
national and regional competitiveness and whose
capacity to absorb adverse economic shocls is rela-
tively limited grve potential cause for concern. Rela-
tively low labour mobility and lack of wage flexi-
bility tcnd to inhibit adjusfinent in these economies.
The Stnrchrral and Cohesion Funds' support for
measurcs aimed at improving underlying competi-
tiveness and increasing diversification should help to
reduce dependency on exchange rates and vulnera-
bility to shocls. At the same time, the Funds could
focus more on strengthening the regional capacity for
adjustment, stimulating processes of adaptation in
the labour markets of less developed regions and
increasing action to create new jobs.
The challenges faced by these regions in the transi-
tion and final stage of EMU represent an important
additional justification for the agreed enhancement
to resources for structural action in order to promote
lasting improvements in their underlying competi-
tiveness. Community efforts cannot, however, re-
place behavioural changes and govemment policy,
as the example of German unification demonstrates.
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The previous enlargement :
the situation of, and
prospects for, the new
German Lender
S ince unification in 1 990, a clear picture has emerged
of the effort required in the new German Ld.nder to
turn them from a centrally-planned into a social
market economy. The transformation encompasses a
rapid introduction of wide-ranging changes in the
legal, social and financial framework, including the
administration of regions, as well as in external com-
mercial and political relations. It alsci requires
changes in the stnrchue of economic activity and
employment, in the tax system, in pricing, in the
management of enterprises and in property rights as
well as modernisation of the infrastructure. Just as
importantly, environmental improvements need to be
made to comply with more advanced Community
standards.
These challenges face each of the five new Liinder as
well as East Berlin, but vary in nature and scale
according to regional circumstances. Substantial ef-
forts have been made over the 3 years since unifica-
tion but the process of reform and restructuring has
proved more difficult and more protracted than many
had initially foreseen.
Population
The population of the new German Uinder is declin-
ing, whereas in the rest of Germany and the
Community, it is rising, if only at a low rate (Annex,
Table A.23). Only in a few regions of Greece and
Italy, is there a more rapid decline. Except for short
periods of growth at the end of the 1960s and 1980s,
population in the former East Germany has been in
continuous decline since 1950, as a result of outward
migration accompanied in the 1970s by low birth
rates. In the past few years, the decline has accel-
erated and between 1989 and 1992 the new Liinder
lost more than 5Vo of their population, when the
annual rate of decline was six times more than be-
tween 1950 and 1980. Net outward migration of
more than amillion between 1989 and mid-1992 was
the most important factor, though there was also a
dramatic fall in birth rates. Births per thousand of
population fell from 13 in 1990 to an average of under
8 in 1992 and to 5 in mid-1993, lower than in any
other part of the Community (the lowest figure in
other regions being 6 p"r thousand in Liguria in
It"ly).This led to a natural decline of 100 thousand
a year in 1991 and 1992 
- 
or 0.6Vo of East German
population. The decline was particularly marked in
already sparsely populated rural areas (especially in
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Northern
Brandenburg), small and medium-sized industrial
towns and inner-city erreas, while growth has oc-
curred in suburban areas of larger towns, where
economic performance has been stronger and unem-
ployment lower. Declining job opportunities in the
West and rising wages in East Germany, combined
with some inward migration, have reduced the rate
of net outward migration. For the reduction to con-
tinue, however, depends on improvements in econ-
omic and labour market conditions and specifically
more job creation.
Economy
Output and employment in the new Liinder have
fallen dramatically sinceunification. With the former
Czechoslovakia, the GDR was generally recognised
' .-:,,.. . : 
..,. ; . ,.;,.;,. ..,. ,.,,:. ,. ' . .j. .
Uigradon Oetwebn ttre new and old German
LEnder,1988-1992i ', ",' .
lfil(}sof pspb,,,', : 
,, .,
''---''''''''''''''''''''j
160
t.t0
120
100
80
60
rl(l
&
o
r60
1.f0
1n
151
as the most advanced part of the COMECON area.
GDP per head was estimated to have been around
trpo-trirds of the Community average in 1988. By
1991, the level had fallen to a third of the average.
Since then, however, it has recovered to a level of
nearly half the Community average" Preliminary es-
timates suggest a level of GDP per head of some 43Vo
of the Community average nl992and49% in 1993.
This wzrs accompanied by a fall in employment im-
plying an even big ger increase in labour productivity.
At the same time, average wages increased by nearly
35% in 1992 andl2% in 1993.
Underlying the rpcent growth in output there was a
significant rise in investment, of'24% and 167o in
1992 and 1993, respectively, in the form mainly of
an increase in construction (36Vo and 24Vo), though
the rise in investrnent in new capital equipm ent (llVo
and 8Vo) was also significant. This pushed up the
share of gross investment in GDP to nearly 50Vo in
1992 and 1993, much higher than in the rest of the
Community (20%) (Table 25). Investment has been
largelyconcentrated in services, the share inindustry
declining from around 33Vo to under 3A% between
1991 and 1993. @onomic surveys suggestthat such
high rates of investment growth are unlikely to be
maintained in 1994 especially in manufacturing,
where even lower investrnent than in 1993 is ex-
pected.)
The restruchrring of the East German economy has
led to significant imbalances in tradebetween the two
parts of Germany, with East Germany being very
dependent on financial transfers from the rest of the
country. This is reflected in the fact that domestic
spending in East Germany exceeded internally
generated real income by around 80Vo in 1992 and
1993 zubsidised mainly by transfer payments (of the
order of 100 billion EC[I) from West Germany.
The instability of the East German economy is espe-
cially evident in the performance of manufacturing,
the output of which fell in L992and in 1993 was only
twethirds the level in the second half of 1990. The
stnrcture of industry has changed extensively since
unification. In particular, mechanical engineering
has declined in importance while strong demand for
food combined with the boom in constmction have
increased the importance of related industries- This
has also influenced the pattern of privatisation which
has progressed most in these sectors, while small and
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medium-sized firms in these industries have per-
formed better since privatisation.
The privatisation of companies is intended to be
completed by the end of 1994, though the task is
becoming increasingly difficult Among the enter-
prises remaining with the State Trust Agency are
large-scale producers in chemicals and mechanical
and electrical engineering in which there are likely
to be furttrer job losses. These industries are concen-
fated in such regions as Halle, Magdeburg, Dessau,
Cottbus and Chemnitz and it is here that the process
of restrucn:ring and the need to revitalise industrial
centres will be particularly acute over the coming
years. Privatisation has produced no net revenue for
the government budget 
- 
on the contrary, the State
Trust Agency will probably show a large deficit of
nearly 140 billion ECU or more at the end of the
privati sation process.
Employment
The decline in employment has been widespread,
affecting all five new L?inder as well as East
B erlin .The extent of the adjustment and reshuchrring
process is perhaps most clearly indicated in the rapid
fall in employment between 1989 and I99Z
(Graph 42). The figures suggest that since unifica-
tion one in every three East Germans has lost their
job. Sectoral changes have been extensive. Between
1989 and 1992, employment in 4griculture fell to a
third of its previous level; inmining and manufactur-
ing, it declined to below 307o of the level in 1989. In
1993, although the rate of decline in both total and
manufacturing employment slowed down throug-
hout the region, there was still an overall fall of just
over 3To,while the share of employment in manufac-
turing declined to207o (35Vo inWestGermany). This
decline was accompanied by a fall in employment in
research and development in industry (from 80,000
in 1990 to 20,000 n 1992). At the same rime, the
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Map 24 Unenrployment In the new
Gennan [5nder,1994
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numbr of self-employed increased (from around
200,000 in 1989 to 560,000 n L992), reflecting the
growth in services, though by not nearly enough to
compensate for losses in other sectors.
Unemployment
Job losses led to registered unemployment increasing
to around l5%inboth 1992 and 1993, well above the
average rate in Germany and the Community
(Graph 43). On Community labour Force Survey
estimates, the unemployment rate on ILO definitions
was I3Vo in April 1993,3 percentage points above
the Community average. Without the many direct
labou market measures (short-time working, public
works and furtlrer education programmes) unem-
ployment might well have exceeded 3lVo.Including
early retirement and commuting to the West the
deficiency in jobs amounted to some 38Vo of the
labour force in 1992.
Women have been more seriously affected by unem-
ployment than men, their share of employment fall-
ing from 49Vo to 43Vo between 1989 and 1992 and
their share of unemployment exceedng 60Vo. In
January Lgg4,registered unemployment was 23Vo for
women as against l3vo formen. Activity rates among
women have remained well above the Community
average (atl7Vo in 1992 as against a rate of 587o for
West German women).
l.ong-term unemployment has also emerged as a
problem. 27Vo of those registered as unemployed in
May l992had been out of work for more than a year
attd by November l992,this had risen to 46Vo. Short-
time working, further training and public work pro-
gramrnes as well as commuting to the West to work
are indicative of the extreme pressure on the East
Crerman labour market, and for some time the rate of
job crcation is trnlikely to be sufficient to prevent
long-term unemployment from continuing to rise.
Although all East German Uinder show similar
trcnds in unemployment, there are signs of agrowing
disparity among them. The difference between the
NUTS level 3 regions with the lowest and highest
unemployment rate widened from 5 percentage
points in 1991 to l? percentage points at the end of
1993. The capital cities of the new Liinder- Dresden,
Bcrlin, Potsdam, Magdeburg and Erfurt 
- 
as well as
a number of other larger urban areas have profited
from job creation in public and private services and
have relatively low levels of unemployment. The
highest levels of unemployment are in rural regions,
especially Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and in single-
indutry regions where factories have been closed
- 
for example, Erzgebirge (textiles and mechanical
engineering), the Northern region of Thiiringen
(mining, textiles and light industry), the Southern
region of Sachsen-Anhalt and parts of the
Oberlausitz (Sachsen)(Map 24).The situation is es-
pecially difficult in the Eastern parts of
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Sachsen (bordering
P_oland) as well as in some central areas of East
Germany where the opporhrnities of commuting to
the West, to Western parts of Berlin or to the capital
cities of the new Liinderare non-existent, These areas
also registered high rates of outward migration.
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Infrastructure
As noted in the Fourth Periodic Reporg the problems
of an inadequate and decaying infrastructure in the
former GDR are acute. Recent estimates suggest that
to bring the East Gennan infrastructure up to Western
standards will cost :
o for residential accommodation, 225-300 bil-
lion ECU;
r for cleaning up the environment, 100-250 bil-
Iion ECU;
o for transport infrastructure, 100-250 bil-
Iion ECU;
o for telecommunications, 30-50 billion ECU.
These figures, however, apply to average
Community standards which vary widely between
countries and regions. The state of East German
infrastructure is no worse in many respects to that in
some of the Community's weaker regions. The main
exception is telecommunications which because of
years of neglect are far inferior to anywhere in the
Community. Here, improvements have already been
made. In 1991, the numberof connections per inhabi-
tantwere athird of the numberin the rest of Germany
as against a fifth in 1 98 9. By 1995, the plan is for this
difference to be eliminated completely. Neverthe-
less, the general catching-up period for infrastructure
in other areas will vary from l0 to 20 years in most
cases.
Prospects
The new German Liinder face the basic challenge of
finding their niche in a more competitive European
market. Because of trade liberalisation, they have to
compete not only with the more advanced regions in
the West but also with the less developed regions in
Central and Eastern Europe. The former have par-
ticular advantages, beffer infrastructure and higher
productivity in particular, though they also have high
wages and high land prices. The latter have much
lower labour costs, though other conditions of pro-
duction, such as labour force skills, organisational
structure or the low qualig of infrastructure, which
are a legacy of central planning systems, are similar
to East Germany. The CzechRepublic, in particular,
seems to have been successfully adapting its econ-
ofly, exploiting its specific advantages and attracting
foreign investment.
For East Germany to adapt to Westem standards in
the face of wages and labour costs increasing ahead
of productivity and a declining industrial base is
proving to be extremely difficult. An urgent task
remains, therefore, to dirninish the deficiencies of
infrastructure, labour productivity, capital stock and
technology. Particular attention needs to be given to
small and medium-sized enterprises and to producer
services which are likely to be the main sources of
job creation. These sectors also hold the key to re-
ducing the concentration of production in certain
regions in single sectors of activity which are not
competitive.
At the same time, the restructuring of regional econ-
omies needs to be based more on specific endow-
ments, indi genous potenti al and the experience of the
local workforce. Advantages include skilled labour,
the high proportion of qualified penonnel in research
and development, experience of Eastern European
markets, the central Europeanlocation andcities rich
in cultural history and tradition. They also include
lss
land space in urban areas, mineral resources for the
building industry, an agricultural sector which is
potentially productive and a high level of social
infrastructure. Exploiting these advantages depends
on striking a balance between higher labour produc-
tivity and increased wages and standards of living.
This needs to be supported by extensive modifica-
tions to the regulatory framewort in line with local
conditions.
The convergence to Western levels of labour produc-
tivity and infrastnrcture will inevitably be a long-
term process. As in certain other regions of the
Communiry, the risk is that nominal wages and la-
bour costs will converge more rapidly than prodrrc-
tivity. This will tend to slow down the process of real
convergence by previnting the desirable growilr of
employment and giving rise to high unemployment
despite massive support measures. The absence of
self-sustaining growth based on indigenous potential
could give rise to a sihration of pumanently high
hansfers of resources only to maintain disappoint-
ingly low levels of oconomic activity. This has been
the case in Italy for a long time. As a result, financial
difficulties have multiplied and the growth of the
national economy has been held back.
fn sum, to arrest the process of deindustrialisation
and to reconstruct the economy requires improving
the competitiveness of existing enterprises, support
for the creation of new firms and better use of the
skills of the labour force. To this end, the high level
of pttblic and private transfers, in general, ffid invest-
ment, in particular, must be efficiently usedto ensure
that the economy becomes more productive as the
only sustainable basis for the creation of new jobs
and the promotion of economic convergence and
successful integration into the national and
Community framework.
I F. Abratwm and P. Van Rompuy, Thc regional potiq implimtions of Emwmic and Monctary {)nion, sudyfirwrrced by
DG )UI of tlu European Commission 1993
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Chapter 12 Regional structures
and problems in
neighbouring countries
The countries belongittg to the European Free Trade
Area (EFTA) have formally concluded new arrange-
ments with the Community in the form of the forma-
tion of the European Economic Area (EEA).
Switzerland, however, has decided against joining
the EEA. This chapter examines the socio.economic
situation in the regions of the 4 EITA countries
which have completed negotiations leading to full
membership of the Community 
- 
Austria, Finland,
Norway and Sweden.
For the former centrally-planned countries of Central
and Eastern Europe, the Europe Agreements con-
cluded with the Community provide for closer co-
operation on a wide range of matters (including trade
liberalisation in their favour and consultation on re-
gional policy issues, as described below). These
Agreements tend to be seen as a step towards full
membership of the Community, especially in the four
countries 
- 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech and
Slovak Republics 
- 
examined later in the chapter.
The EFTA countries
For purposes of analysis, the three Scandinavian
countries 
- 
Sweden, Finland and Norway 
- 
can be
grouped together, while Austria is somewhat differ-
ent geographically and economically.
Demography
The population of the EFTA countries totals 25 mil-
lion or just cver 7Vo of the present Community. In
general, the demographic situation and prospects for
the four EITA countries are similar to many parts of
the Community. The differences are largely a matter
of timing and the Nordic countries, in particular,
experienced falling fertility and a consequent ageing
of the population somewhat in advance of most of the
Community. There is therefore an older age structure
of population in the four EFTA countries, especially
in Sweden and Norway. There are signs, however, of
a recovery in fertility rates in these countries and,
combined with recent trends towards increasing mi-
gration, population growth could begin to accelerate
gently.
The recovery in fertility rates will only impact on the
population of working age and the labour force at the
beginning of the next century. With the exception of
Austria, activity rates, especially for women, are
already close to those of Denmark 
- 
the highest in
the Community 
- 
and further significant increases
are therefore improbable. Consequently, numbers in
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thc labour force in the EFTA countries 
- 
some
l2.t million 
- 
ane unlikely to change mrrch during
the rpt of this ccntury but canld risc in ttrc next.
The three Nordic countries together cover an area of
over 1.1 million square kilometres and have a total
population of 18 million, equivalent to half the area
of the Community but with only 5% of the population
(Table 26).
The very low average population density 
- 
16 people
per square kilometre as against 145 in the EC 
-
conceals wide differences (Map 0). South of a hori-
zontal line north of the cities of Bergen and Oslo in
Norway), Uppsala in Sweden and Tampere in
Finland, there is 25Vo of the land-mass and 70% of
the population. \onh of the line, there is a vast area
of small seslements typically dependent on basic
economic activities.20Vo of the land-mass lies North
of the Arctic circle. Climatic extremes are a particular
feature with long winters and low temperatures.
Austia, one-fifth of the size of Sweden, has a similar
population and is the most densely populated of the
EFTA countries, though sparsely populated by
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Map 25 GDP per head (PPS) In the EFTA countrles, 1991
Community standards. Like Norway and Sweden,
strbstantial parts are mountainous.
The Nordic countries cover large areas and tend to
be a long distance from the major Etrropean markets-
For example, in Norway the distance from Oslo to
the North Cape is 1,700 km, which is more than the
distance from Oslo to Rome. Austria is both smaller
and considerably closer to the major European mar-
kets.
Economy
Narural resources are a key aspect of the Nordic
economies whereas Austrian prosperity is based on
trade in manufactures and tourism. Forests cover a
large part of Sweden and Finland while Nonvay has
large reserves of offshore oil and gas. Other re-
sources include metals, large stocks of fish off the
coast in the case of Norway and access to hydroelec-
tric power.
Until recently, the four countries had stightly higher
levels of income per head than the present
Map 26 Regional unemployment Inthe
EFTA countrlec, 19{13
Community despite their distance from the main
centres of economic activity in Western Europe
(Map 25). With the exception of Austria there has
been a relatively sharp fall in GDP per head since the
mid-1980s and Sweden and Finland are now below
the Community average.
In the 1980s, the Austrian economy grew slightly
faster than the Cornmunity, but the Scandinavian
countries have all experienced a decline in GDP per
head relative to the Community. In the case of
Finland, the economy has been severely affected by
the collapse of trade with the former Soviet Union
and its GDP per head fell to 86Vo of the Community
average in 1993.
As in the Community, GDP per head in the
four EFTA countries is highest in the capital cities
and surrounding areas. In the Nordic countries there
is a general North-South divide between poor and
rich regions, though the gap is relatively nalrow
despite the harsh climatic conditions of the North,
partty because of the scale of public secto.r employ-
ment and transfers. In Austria, there is no simple
t5s
geographical div is ion, the lVestcrn regions w hic h are
al the other end of the_curnty from Vienna being
As in the Community, many border areas in thc ;
E[:TA countries experience disadvantages, ertpe
cirlly the Eastern regions of Finland which bodor
Rnsda and Ausriaregions which border Hungfllr,
Sbvcnia, the Czech R.epublic and Slovakia.
Simil$ to the Community, over 60% of employment
in thc I.Ior* ccrEb is in rcrvi:cr. fuiicultural
activtry is hid hAcly duc to the clhnrtc end
terrain" The grwing reason at tb latinrde of Oslo,
Stockholm and Turku is on avrrrge gt}40 dalns shor-
ter than in Denmark and at fte latinde of Oulu and
Narvik ffi-70 days shorter. Yields per hectare are
significantly lower than in the non-Mediterranean
parts of the Community 
- 
for barley, rye, oats and
potatoes 2U30% lower, for sugar ll%lower and for
wheat 49% lower. Other primary activities, forestry
and fishing in Norway in particular, are important
and provide a major source of income and employ-
ment in some of the trxxro isolated areas.
Corpred to ftc hrdty, drc glere of employ-
ment in industry is small in Nonpay and largc in
Austia and about the same in Finland and Swadcn.
In the Nordic countries;'industry is concentratod in
the processing of nanrral resources, though Sweden
hrs a more diverdfu nra{ririn3 basc than thc
otlpn.
Longer-term rtrrrchral deralopmcnts have been
similar to those in the Community, with a gencral
shift of employment out of, agririlurc and indrsny
into services.
So frr rS tbc spetid dirur'hrbn of economic activity
is comcnrcd, in thc hbrdic countries, primary acti-
vitics ere inportant for the Northern and Central
reglo.ns in&stry for the South and scrvices both for
capital rcgions and the most peripheral parts of tn"
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North- in the latter, largely public sector services.
In Austria, the Alpine areas in the West are major
centres of tourisrn and modern industry, while more
traditional industry is concentrated in the North and
East.
Unemployment
In all four EFTA countries, unemployment has been
much lower historically than in the Community. In
1990, average unemployment rates were onty around
a third of the average for the Community, varying
from 5Vo in Norway to just I.SVo in Sweden, this
despite rates of labour force participation being sig-
nificantly higher than the average for the
Community.
Since 1990, however, Nordic countries have experi-
enced substantial increases in unemployment. In Fin-
land, recession has been particularly severe becausc
of its dependence on trade with the former Soviet
Union. In 1993, unemployment reached 7.7Vo in
Sweden, 6.9Vo in Nonvay,17 .6Vo in Finland while in
Ausria it was lower at 4.5Vo.
Urremployment traditionally has been higher- about
three times higher- in the Northern regions of Nordic
than in the South (Map 26). In the cenrral areas,
unemployment rates have been somewhat lower but
still double those in the South. In Austria, unemploy-
ment is linked to the decline of traditional industries
affecting many urban centres including Vienna
(Graph 44).
The incidence of unemployment in the Nordic coun-
tries has changed during the present recession, the
prosperous industrial parts of the South being more
severely affected than the North.
Unemployment in the EFTA countries is no longer
that much lower than in the Community. Indeed in
Finlan4 rates are similar to those in the Communitys
worst-affected regions. It remains to be seen, how-
ever, to what extent recent developments are structu-
ral as opposed to cyclical in nature.
. The Nordic counties have a tluee-tier administrative
syst"* consisting of central governmen! counties
and municipalities. As in sonrc Community countries
(eg Ireland and Denmark), Scandinavian counties
have limied autonomy from central government, the
head of'administration being appointed by cental
' 
govemment. There are etected regio"A County Coun-
: cils, which arc responsible within the framework of
i1 national poliqy for areas such as education (secondary
,, schools), social services, health care, land nranage-
fil€nt, business promotion and, in some cases, even
regional planning.
; Austria, as a Federal State, has a different administra-
ritive structure which is very similar to that of
,, Germany, with 9 Ldnder created after tlre Fint World
I War, each with, its own Parliament and government.
, 
The powers of the I;dnder are, ho'wever, not so exteo-
: sive as those in Germany. They account for only 21Vo
, of government expenditure. For administrative pur-
, 
poses the country is divided into 84 Landbezirke plus
, 15 urban autborities while at the local level there are
',2350 municipalities. The Federal, Liinder and local
I governrnents are all involved in regional policy, their
;activities being coordinated by the Austrian Con-
' ference on Regional Planning (OnOrc).
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Regional policy
Thlrt rrcocrtrinfficemr in rqirnd polieyir &c
ltudbrr*bf rlomFndfitbQ6r*Y'
Policy is focussed to a lesser extent on reftcing
dirparities by promoting the growth of outpl md
coployment in the weaker regions. Given thc difii-
cnl natual living and working conditions, tb low
poprlation dcnsitie.s and long distances in natrn
Ft of these countries, the emphasis has bern on
uhtaining population, employment and incors in
nnte areas. This has resulted in a system of lorry-
Er transfers to these areas- Since transport and
cOmunication networks are already relatively woll
&vctoped, regional policy is mainly orientatod to
urrds business support and public services, nthcr
then infrastnrcture. Thb main measures in operetion
rrc, investment and development grants, loans rrd
glserrtees and employmen! *d tmnsport subsklics
- 
in many cases regionally differentiated to covcr
prrt of the cost of conveying goods into and out of
lcrs fevoured regions.
Regional policy objectives in Austriaare varied
than in the Nordic countries and have tended to
shaqge as the economy has developed and the inter-
nstional context has altered. They included a land-
usc rnd spatial ptanning dimeruion. The presentaims
8fe:
a rystial plaming and protctim of thc environ-
ment, mainly in the A$ine regions;
Eansfrontier cooperation in border regions, esP€-
cially thoae where agriculture and declining in-
drstries are important;
o reorientation of international transport networks,
especially rail, towards Central and Eastern
European counfries.
The Visegrad countries
Economic Trends
Since 1989, the four 'Visegrad' countries - Poland,
Hungary, the Czenh Republic and Slovakia - have
undergone drarnatic economic transformation- The
abandonment of central planning and the progressive
re-orientation of production was initially accompa-
nied by massive falls in outpuf though these were
mrch smaller in size in 1992 and there were clear
signs of improvement in 1993. Inflation rates, which
rose slrarply 
- 
to over ffi% in Poland in 1990 
- 
have
also fallen to more manageable levels.
As a result of privatisation programmes, virtuaUy
complete for small fi rms, the private sector is making
a growing contribution to both outpts and employ-
ment 
- 
in Poland, for 45% of the former and over
fi% of the latter at the end of 1992. Ormulative
foreign direct invesfinent in the regton has grown
ftom less than US$500 milliqr in 1989 to more tttan
US$ll billion by the end of L992, US$4 billion of
this in Hungary, where the number of joint Y€nhlres
grew from 1,300 to over 9,000 betrpeen 1989 and
1991. New financial institutions ard other business
scrvices have been established, providing important
support for the privatisation and resfrrcturi4g pro-
grarnmes.
The adverse consequences are most apparent in
rapidly rising unemployment, from negligible levels
in 1989 to between 12% and 14% n the frst half of
1993 in Polan4 Hungary and Slovakia. Prices have
risen, while real wages have fallen, and access to
hcusing, health and education has become more un-
equal between social groups.
Regional Disparities
The regional impact of the restructuring processes
varies greatly across the region. [n the frst place,
there is a pronounced difference between the 'core'
areas 
- 
the capital cities of Warsaw, Prague,
Bratislava, Budapest and the other major cities
(Poznan, Wroclaw, Krakow, Gdansh Veszprem,
Kosice, Brno) 
- 
and other parts. The position of such
t'''r'.-.
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centres as the predominant concentrations of econ-
omic, social, cultural, political, administrative and
intellectual activity and was furthered by the cenfial-
ist policies under Communist regimes but is likely to
continue under market conditions. This is reflected
in the patterns of inter-regional migration, privatisa-
tion and foreign investmenl
Secondly, there is agrowingdisparity benveen West-
ern and Eastern regions, wittr higher levels of econ-
omic development and growth in the former. Gener-
ally, economic conditions tend to deteriorate 
- 
in
terms of unemploymen! high dependence on agri-
culture, number of private firms, foreign invesEnen!
the quality and density of infrastructure 
- 
with dis-
tance from Western Europe.
Demography
Population growth in the region has slowed down in
recent years. Between 1989 and 1992, the total popu-
lation of the fourcountries increased by only 0.l%o a
year, compared with an average of 0.4Vo a year over
the period 1980 to 1989 (Table 27).
According to official figures, migration amounted to
under lVoin Poland and SlovakiA for example. How-
ever, umeported, illegal migration seems to have
been important, especially from the former
Yugoslavia and Romania and from African and
Asian countries using the Visegrad countries as a
transit route to Western Europe.
At the regional level, there are major differences in
demographic trends :
o natural increases in population are still signifi-
cant in rural and underdeveloped areas (eg North-
East Poland, Eastern Slovakia), which have a
higher proportion of young people and larger
minority groups;
o birth rates tend to be constant or falling in capital
cities and other urban and industrial areas,
though these are partly offset by inward migra-
tion.
Employment
and unemployment
Employment in the Visegrad countries in 1992
totalled 26.2ilnllion. The scale of the fall in employ-
ment over the period 1989-1992 has diverged be-
tween the four countries, ranging from 9% in the
Czech Republic to 16% in Hungary. In all the
Visegrad countries, labour markets are being restmc-
tured as economic reforms are implemented. The
most important features are :
o a widespread decline in employment, which has
been particulady severe in regions where pro-
duction is concentated in a single activity;
o a significant ieduction in employment in energy,
mining, heavy industry and deferrce (eg Upp"r
Silesia and Slovakia) (Map 28);
o a major fall in agriculnrral employment in re-
gions around capital cities and other major urban
areas. There has been little change in traditional
rual are{N (eg Eastern Poland), but this masks
significant underemployment, with a lot of
young people staying on farms as they have no
other choice (Map 29);
r growth of employment in services, which has
occurred in all regions, notably in capital cities
and other urban centres (Map 30);
o a shift in employment from the public to the
private sector, particularly in urban areas and in
sectors such as constnrction and distribution, re-
flecting privatisation and the growth in self-
employment, on the one hand, and the closure or
rationalisation of state enterprises, on the other.
The effects are reflected in unemployment. rates
ranging, in the tirst half of 1993, from 4Vo in the
Czech Republic to I4Vo in Poland. Average rates of
unemployment conceal extremely wide regional
variations rangrng from 24Vo in Norttr-West Poland
(Koszalinkie) to 0.3% in Prague. The major concen-
trations of unemployment (of 16%o or more) are in
the North and East of Hungary (Nograd, Borsod-
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Abauj-Zemplen, Szatbolcs-Szatmar-Bereg) and
North Poland (Koszalin, Olsztyn, Slupsk and
Suwalki)(Map 27). The main features of regional
unemployment are :
o rates tend to be lower in the West, in areas
bordering West European countries than in the
East, though this is less so in poland than in the
other three countries;
o capital cities and other major urban centres also
tend to have low unemployment reflecting their
economic stnrcture and infrastructure and con-
cenEations of private business and foreign in-
vestment;
o agricultural regions have in many cases been
more affected by economic restructuring labour
shedding and tend to have higher unemployment
because of the greater problems of job creation
in these areas.
o unemployment is set to increase in many indus-
trial regions since privatisation and restructuring
of large industrial enterprises are still to take
place raising the prospect of large-scale job
losses in areas such as Upper Silesia in poland
and North-Central Slovakia.
Economy
At present no official data exist for GDp per head at
the regional level in any of the Visegrad countries.
Unofficial estimares indicate that virtually allregions
experienced a significant decline in GDP over the
period 1989 tc L992 resulting from the collapse of
state enterprises in all major economic sectors,
though less so in the capital cities, larger urban areas
and regions close to Western Europe. Per capita
income levels are highest in cities such as Budapest,
Prague, Warsaw, Lodz, Wroclaw, Katowice and
Gdansk and lowest in the Eastern parts of all coun-
tries.
As noted earlier, the small enterprise privatisation
process 
- 
covering small retail shops, restaurants,
workshops and so on 
- 
is virtually complete in the
four countries. The large privatisation programmes,
by contrasL are still in their early stages, in some
cases delayed by administrative problems, disputes
over property rights and shortages of domestic capi-
tal. This is not always the case, however; in poland,
for example, Parliament has accepted the General
Privatisation Plan (and created National Investment
Funds, to be managed by firms on a tender basis).
There is a clear correlation between the rate of new
firm creation and the economic base of regions, tle
former being much higher in the capital cities; under
both the small-scale and large-scale privatisation
programmes the large urban areas have dispropor-
tionate concentrations of new enterprises and entre-
preneurs in relation to population. These areas have
the benefit of well-developed infrastructure, a rela-
tively diversified industrial structure, good interna-
tional links, access to financial and intellectual skills
and support services. By contrast, Eastern regions
tend to suffer from under-development.
Foreign investment has been rising in all four
Visegrad countries, although data on the number and
capital value of joint ventures are often contradic-
tory. By mid-1993, Hungary had been rhe recipient
of foreign investment worth around $5.3 billion,
while the former Czechoslovakia received $2.2 bil-
lion between 1990 and 1992, half in I99Z alone. In
Poland. foreign investment at the end of l99Z
amounted to over $ 1.3 biUion, wirh a funher $5,2 bil-
Iion planned in respect of activities already estab-
lished.
The main recipient sectors of foreign investment are
automobiles and transport, finance and insurance,
and import-export services. The main source of in-
vestment are Germany, Austria and Italy, though
France, the UK and the USA are also important.
As with privatisation, the regional distribution of
foreign investment is related to the level of economic
developmen! the capital cities b"ing the major loca-
tions.
At the end of 1991, Prague accounted for 497o of all
firms with foreign capital participation in
Czechoslovakia and Budapest for 56Vo in Hungary.
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In Poland, where there are other major cities in
addition to the capital, Warsaw accounted for 37Vo
of such firms, other favoured.centres being Lodz,
Katowice, Wroclaw and Foznan.
Regions close to the border wift Western Europe,
which are also ustrally more developd, tend to have a
greater concentration of foreign companies than others.
In Hungary, foreign investment is concenhated, as well
as in Budapest, in the Lake Balaton are4 the Western
border with Austria and along the Danube, whereas
there is relatively little in the North-Eastern regions (eg
B orsod-Abauj -Zemplen and Szatbolcs-Szatmar-
Bereg). In the Czech Republic, the Sotrth Moravian
region on the Ausnian border has the highest nurnber
ofjoint ventures after Prague, while in Slovaki4 most
investrnent is in Bratislava and the Western regions
bordering Austria and in Poland inthe regions borde-
ring Germany (eg Zielora Gora).
Regional problems
All regions in the four csuntries have been affected
by economic restnrcturing, the impactbeing positive
and balanced in 'innovative' and 'adaptive' regions
but negative in 'crisis' regions where mechanisms of
resfiucturing are either absent or poorly furrctioning.
Those regions which are highly urbanised and indus-
trialised, especially those with adiversified industrial
structure and well-developed infrastnrcture, appear
less vulnerable to the costs and difficulties of econ-
omic transformation. Privatisation has proceeded
more rapidly, new enterprises established more ein-
ily and foreign invesfrnent attracted more readily.
The adaptation of regions to new economic condi-
tions appears to depend critically on :
o economic structure, including the skills of the
worKorce, the quality of fixed assets and the
degree of divenification;
o the level of development, including the number
and types of employment opportunities and such
factors as the extent of 'entrepreneurship';
o geographic peripherality and infrastructure, in-
cluding proximity to larger urban centres, trans-
port networks such as international airports and
sources of capital and innovation.
The 'crisis' and problem regions suffer from a num-
ber of overlapping difficulties :
r declining heavy industry, such as coal and iron
ore mining, steel production and armaments, giv-
ing rise to high unemployment and limited op-
portunities for diversification (eg Kladno,
Ostrava, Pribram and Vsetin in the Czech
Republic, Katowice, Lodz and Walbrzych in
Poland, Baranya and Northern Nograd in
Hungary and most regions in Slovakia);
o agricultural underdevelopment (eg Szabolcs-
Szatmar-Bereg, Borsod- trbauj-7-emplen in
Hungary and Suwalki, Ciechanow and Ostroleka
in Poland);
o underdeveloped infrastructure' (eg Szabolcs-
Szatmar-Bereg in Hungary, North-East Poland
and Eastern Slovakia);
peripherality and an Eastern location
(eg Zamosc, Przemysl and Krosno in Poland,
Eastern Slovakia and Hadju-Bihar and Szabolcs-
Szatmar-Bereg in Hungary);
environmental degradation (eg the coal basin of
Norttr-West Bohemia in the Czu,hRepublic and
Upper Silesia and the Legnica copper mining
area in Poland);
demographic pressures, such as an ageing popu-
lation (eg Suwalki in Poland and Borsod-Abauj-
Tnmplen in Hungary), or the presence of mi-
nority ethnic groups (eg gypsies and Slovaks in
Hungary and the Czech Republic and
Hungarians in Slovakia);
o lack of a major urban centre which could act as
a growth pole (eg South-East Hungary).
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Direct investment in, and
trade with, Central and
Eastern Europe2
In 1990-91, in the immediate aftermath of the col-
lapse of Communism and the initiation of economic
and political reform programmes in Central Europe,
some observers expressed the expectation that
Hungary, Poland and Cze*hoslovakia would attract
large volumes of foreign direct investmenl More-
over, assuming that Bulgaria, Romania and the (then
still integrat) USSR and Yugoslavia were able to
embark on successful reform programmes, they
would on this view also be attractive to foreign
investors 
- 
in particular, the USSR with its large-
scale oil and gas reserves and other natural resources.
Indeed, there was discussion at the time that these
countries could be sufficiently attractive to large
corporate investors to divert substantial amounts of
foieign direct investment (FDI) flows from other
countries. This is not very surprising if one compares
the population of all of WesternEurope (380 million)
with that of Eastern Europe plus the successor states
to the former USSR (410 million).
Three years after the initiation of the reforms, the
expectation of large FDI flows into the eastern coun-
tries bas not up to now been fulfilled. Due to the
serious difficulties that these countries have en-
countered in establishing a reasonably well function-
ing market economy by introducing a new commer-
cial and legal infrastructure, obstacles to Western
companies doing business in Central and Eastern
Europe have been much more numerous than ex-
pected: The sharp declines in output, and thedifficul-
ties in (re-)creating macro-economic stability and
growth (let alone undertaking large scale privatisa-
tion programmes), suggest that the costs and the
economic and political risks associated with invest-
ing in the Central and Eastern Europe are much
higher than was initially perceived.
It does not seem likely that the financing needs of the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union will within the next dec'ade be
a drain on world savings. Ultimately, the very sub-
stantial investments needed to consolidate economic
and social reform in Eastern Europe will have to be
financed by increased savings in both East and WesL
In geographical terms, it does not appear likely that
the Eastern countries are competitors for FDI inflows
with countries on Europes Western periphery like
Ireland, Spain and Portugal, assuming that much of
the FDI is to build up capacity to serve local or
proximate markets. Other lagging regions like
Greece and southern Italy are geographically closer
at least to the Balkan countries but the prospects for
foreign investment in Bulgari4 Rumania and the
former Yugoslavia are even worse than those in
Central Europe.
In the 1980s, the main investing countries in the
Communirys lagging regions were the UK, France
and the Netherlands together with the US and Japan,
whereas a recent survey of 144 from the top 500
companies in the world identified firms from
Germany and EFTA nations, i.e. countries which are
geographically closest to Eastern Europe, as well as
Benelux as major investors in the East. The corpor-
ations based in the US and Japan have so far shown
relatively linle interest in investing in the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe (including the former
Soviet Union).
Thetotal foreign direct invesfrnentflowing into these
countries (almost $10 billion up to October 1991) is
considerably less than that received by Spain in 1990
alone ($ t+ biltion). One explanation is the very small
size of individual projects : the average capital com-
mitted to jointvenhrres (the primary method of direct
investment in the region) is $330,000. Until 1991,
Hungary was the only country'in Central Europe that
had attracted foreign investment on any noticeable
scale. Of the $2 billion cumulative inflow, over one
half was commitied in 1991. The largest capital
commitments were in telecommunications and
chemicals.
There seems to be littte reason to fear that develop-
ments in Eastern Europe will lead to lower invest-
ment inflows to the economically less developed
regions of the Community. Only I5Vo of the firms
surveyed said that commitments to Eastern Europe
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were diverting investment from other areas, while
most companies would invest in both regions. This
suggests that FDI encouraged by the continuation of
econornic and political reform in Eastern Europe
would act in the first place as a boost to world growth
and not lead to a displacement of economic activity
from regions like the Mediterranean or the Atlantic
coast.
In the longer term, there is likely to be an expansion
of FDI in Central and Eastern Europe, provided that
the reforms undertaken lead to the establishment of
a satisfactory commercial and legal framework
w ithi n w hich nati onal and foreign investors feel com-
fortable to operate.
Such an outcome would in fact benefit the
Community as a whole : investrnent and economic
growth in the East would stimulate exports and sales
by EC enterprises. A recent Commission study aims
to assess these benefits with the help of two alterna-
tive scenarios for prospective economic develop
ments in the countries of Centraland Eastern Europe,
which broadly represent the range of plausible out-
comes.
In the optimistic scenario, Eastern Europe would
experience rapid growth from the mid-1990s on-
wards, wittr the achievement of macroeconomic sta-
bility and economic reforms leading to improved
supply and the successful transformation of existing
productive capacity, in an international environment
characterised by a general absence of trading restric-
tions. The pessimistic scenario is one in which the
reforms fail.
The 'successful reform' case generates a very sub-
stantial increase in trade with the Community. In
1991, trade flows (exports and imports) between the
EC and the countries of Cencral and Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union accounted for 67 bil-
lion ECU or 7Vo of EC trade (excluding trade flows
between Community Member States). Within a time-
frame of twenty years, these countries could expect
a six-fold increase in their trade flows with the
Community and at least a doubling of their share in
EC trade. This would imply that by the year 2010
imports and exports each would reach values of
around 200 billion ECU per year (at 1991 prices).
In the absence of any restrictions on trade, there
would be a very substantial positive EC balance on
manufactured goods with these countries, perhaps as
high as 70 billion ECU by 2010. Nevertheless, EC
market penetration by manufacturers from the East-
ern European countries should be expected to in-
crease : the shareof their exports in EC manufactured
imports would almost triple to more than 15% in
2010. The counterpart to the Community swplus in
manufactured products would be substantial deficits
in energy trade (with the former Soviet Union) and,
more significantly in policy terms, in agricultural
trade.
The pessimistic scenario generates little in the way
of direct economic impact through trade, which-
could be expected to increase by less than 5O%
between l99l and 2010 (i.e.less than ZVo awtnlly).
Exports of Central and Eastern Europe would remain
heavily concentrated in a few 'sensitive' industries :
clothing, metal manufacuring, chernicals, timbet
and furniture.
The 'zuccessful reform' case should lead to a new
international division of labour characterised by a
progressive diversification of Eastern Europes ex-
ports to the EC. New trade patterns should tend to
mrtigate problems for particular Community regions
or sectors in adjusting to irrcreased imports from
across the Communitys eastern borders.
In this scenario there is clearly scope for considerable
growth in intra-industry as well as inter-industry
trade. The studys projections for the year 2010 in-
clude large EC trade surpluses in motor vehicles and
other transpor! in mechanical and electrical engin-
eering, chemicals and textiles. A number of case
studies in the Communitys lagging regions con-
firmed that a prosperous Central and Eastern Europe
could provide a strong market for lagging regions
exports of clothing and textiles as well as of machine
tools, automobiles etc. Conversely, the threat of low
price competition and dumping is much greater in the
pessimistic scenario.
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The projected changes in trade in the various indus-
trial sectors were allocated to the EC regions with the
help of a gravity model of interregional trade. The
reduction of tariffand non-tarifftradebarriers as well
as the removal of a number of other economic and
political impediments to trade was modelled by a
substantial reduction in the 'distance' separating the
Community regions from their trading partners in
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union.
The expected impact on the Communitys lagging
regions differs quite substantially from one country
to another. The case studies confirmed the good
economic prospects for Greece if reform in Central
and Eastern Europe succeeds; the small positive net
effects on Spanish and Portuguese industry; and the
minimal effects on keland and Northern lreland. The
evidence on Southern Italy was inconclusive, where
the modelling results presented a much more optim-
istic picture than the case study.
The regional policy response to the potential changes
in the economies of Central and Eastern Europe
should therefore start from the perspective that these
changes are not creating new problems for the re-
gions, They are in a few cases exacerbating existing
problems but, in most cases, not by nearly as much
as the advent of the Single European Market nor by
as much as the challenge from the Japanese and other
Asian economies. The main exta problem possibly
arising from Eastern exports seems to be in the steel
industry and perhaps other metal manufactues or
chemicals. [n the longer term, the main problem is
likely to be over agricultural hade, if the countries of
Eastern Europe manage to develop and successfully
exploit their potential in ttris sector.
restrict exports from the Fast over the next few years
would contribute to such failure.) There could then
be potentially serious implications for the financial
burden on the EC public sector of aid programmes
benefiting the Eastern countries, which, in turn,
might well reduce the public funds available for
Community structural policies. Threats to the level
of funue EC regional assistance flows was a much
greater concern for the lagging regions than any
East-West hade effect.
Both the modelling analysis and the case studies
show sizeable potential benefits to the EC lagging
regions from successful econornic reform in Central
and Eastern Europe. The main danger is a failure of
the reform process. (EC trade restrictions on ,sensi-
tive' products and the use of anti-dumping actions to
' EPRC (Igg3), Regbnal Socio'economic Development in Polan4 Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia Study
financed by DG WI of the Eur opean Commissian.)
' NERa (1992), Trade and Foreign Investment in the Community's regiotu : the impact of economic reform in Central
and fustern Europe. Regional Development Studies NY. Studyfnanced by DG WI of the European Commissbrt.
169
Map 27 Regional unenployrnent ln the
Visegrad countries, 1993
Figures are for the end of Jurp 1993
Map 28 Agrbultural employment Inthe
' Viseg'rad countries,l99l
1990 dala used lor Hungery.
Map 3O Servlce emPloyment In the
Vicegrad countrldr, I 991
ll+ 29 Indurtrlal employment In the
Vlsegrad countrles, 1 991
I t"", I
I cnUovnont I
| "'?u I
I I zs-es I
I I.t-ot Il.'* [
t90O data usid lor Hungnry.
annex
A.1 Correspondence between NUTS levels and national administrative divisions in the Community
A.2 Area and population ofthe regions cf the Community
A.3 GDP per person employed in the Member States (PPS), 1984-1993
A.4 Disparities in GDP per head (PPS) in EUR12, 1980-1990
A.5 GDP per head in the Member States and the EFTA countries, 1980- 1991
A.6 Unemployment rates in EUR12, 1983-1993
A-7 Employment in the automobile industry
A.8 Employment in the aerospace industry
A.9 Employment in textiles and clothing
A.10 Defence-dependent NUTS 2 regions
A.I I Road transport infrastructure
A.l2 Gross investment in road transport infrastructure
A.13 Rail ransport infrastructure, 1990
A.14 Gross investment in rail transport infrastructure
A. 15 Telecon'munication infrastructure, 1992
A. 16 Investment in telecommunication infrastructure
A.L1 Borders of EFTA countries , 1993
A.18 Employment in Objective I regions, 1990
A.l9 Unemployment rates in Objective I regions, 198G1993
A.20 GDP per head (PPS) in Objective I regions, 198G 1991
A.zL Employment change and productivity, 198G 1991
A.22 Community initiatives, 1994-1999
A.23 Ncw German Linder: demographic and economic indicators
A.24 Sectoral changes in the new Gerrnan Liinder
4.25 Regions, GDP ranking
A.26 Regions, Unemployrhent ranking
A.27 Regions, socio.eronomic indicators
Statistical
171
Definition, level and size of regions
1' The Nomenciature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) was established by the Statistical Office of theEuropean Communities in cooperation with the Commission's other departmentr, ,o as to provide a single,
uniform breakdown of territorial units for the production of Community regional staListics.
2. various systems of tenitorial division are possible:
(i) normative regions (administrative boundaries).(ii) analytical regiorn :
- (a) functional
(aggregations of complementary zones).
- (b) homogeneous
(aggregatiorn of zones with similar characteristics).
For practical reasons to do wittr data availabilig and the implernentation of regional policies, the NLJTS
nomenclature is based primarily on the instinrtional divisione curr"ntly in force in the Member States.
The NUTS lists of regional limits is of a general character: it thus e:rcludes tenitorial units serving specific
Purposes' It employs a three-level hierarchical classification of regircns for each Member State NtffS r -N{.ITS 2 
- 
NUTS 3). 
,
The NUTS nomenclature suMivides each Member State into a whole number of level I regions, each of
which is in hfn subdivided into a whole number of level 2 regions, 'which are themselves sugivided into a
whole number of level 3 regions.
3' The present NUTS nomenclature suMivides the territory of the Buropean Commurity into 7l regions atlevel l, 183 at level z and l044at revel3 (see Table Al).
Despite the aim of ensuring that regions of comparable size all apperlr at the same NUTS level, each level
still contains regions which differ greatly in terms of area, popul"ion, cconomic weight or aclministrativepowers.
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Lisboa e vale do Tejo
Abntfr
Algarve
Acores
Madeira
Portugal
?3r 611 s24 l3t5
236 196 2.34 ffi6
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3t 20 63 tr4
20 18 38 76
25 32 4 tOl
.8-00 1,274 l,g2l 3,996
19,9 43,1 37,0
35,5 29,4 35,1
l0A 27,2 62,5
39,8 l7,g 42,4
27,3 17,5 55,2
25,7 23,9 50,4
25,1 31,3 43,6
20,5 32,7 6,7
Northern lreland
United Kingdom
5,6
2,2
33
577
r76
8,599
392
17 filo
602
26,596
29,3
32,3
65,2
65,5
EURl 2
Oblective 1
9,016 $ 5AZ 93,256 135,934
4tlg2 6,346 13,142 23,669
6,6 32,1 61,3
17,7 26,9 55,5
l.: 1 ::::',,':,f:::.,:::.:;' 
U h Cffi p|6Jment ffies
Region 11986 1987
Ef fada l 7.4 7.4
roo? Change Ghangervvv 19g6-91 1986-93
7.0 7.7 0.3 0.4
Galicia
Asturias
Castilla-Le6n
Castilla-La Mancha
Extremadura
Comunidad Valenciana
Andalucia
Murcia
Ceuta y Melilla
Canarias
Espafia
r2.4 16.0
16.1 17.4
14.5 17.0
13.6 15.0
2,+.2 25.9
15.9 r84
2,+.7 265
115.5 19.0
29.7 25.1
2,+.4 24.4
16.0 17.6
13.9 r3.4 13.2
18.8 r9.7 20.2
18.1 r7.6 17.8
r54 15.1 16.6
28.3 25.9 27.r
r9.7 20.r 18.3
30.3 3l.t 29.2
184 2r.4 r7.6
28.7 29.8 35.4
26.5 25.5 22.5
2r4 20.8 20.r
12.4 I 1.9
17 4 17.4
I7 4 15.5
14.8 13.3
26.8 25.4
15.3 l4.r
27.2 25.9
t6.2 15.8
31.6 29.7
22.5 23.r
t7 4 16.3
r7.0
r9.6
19.2
18.6
28.9
22.8
30.8
23.4
2r.9
26.7
2r.3
-1.6
-2.6
-3.6
-1.8
4.0
-3.7
-5.6
-1.9
1.0
-2.1
-5.4
3.1
0.9
1.0
3.2
0.7
3.1
0.5
4.9
-6.8
0.1
-0.1
Corse
France
rr.7 l1.9 10.6
10.0 r0.3 9.6
9.4 9.7 1t1.9 104
9.3 8.7 !).0 9.7
r r.0
10.3
-0.8
-1.0
-0.7
0.4
lreland 18.1 18.1 17.5 16.1 14.2 15.8 17.6 18.4 -2.3 0.2
Campania
Abruzzt
Molise
Puglia
Basilicata
Calabria
Sicilia
Sardegna
Italia
20.4 20.1
9.4 11.0
14.7 13.8
1:t.1 13.8
19.6 205
2T.3 T7 A
ut.4 20.5
1{t.1 r7 5
10.0 9.9
16.6 21.5 23.0
rr.7 8.6 9.3
7.1 12.2 12.4
r4.3 r3.2 15.7
2r.0 15.9 2r.5
15A 17.8 22.6
15.1 16.0 18.6
20.2 16.2 18.4
105 10.2 11.0
22.3 18.6
10.3 9.6
13.1 11.3
14.8 13.6
20.5 20.r
25.1 21.2
21.6 20.4
18.9 17.8
10.9 9.5
22.8
12.4
15.6
r5.6
23.0
r9.6
23.r
19.8
tt.2
3.7
-2.4
7.6
0.8
-1.4
5.9
6.3
-2.1
{.6
6.2
0.7
8.5
1.3
2.O
4.2
8.0
-0.5
0.6
Norte
Centro
Lisboa e vale do Tejo
Alentejo
Algarve
Acores
Madeira
Portuqal
6.7 4.9
5.6 5.5
11.3 9.7
r4.9 I1.9
8.8 7.2
5.0 3,7
6.3 4.5
8.6 7.0
3.6 3.0
3.7 3.0
8.8 6.9
14.6 11.5
5.5 3.1
2.2 2.5
4.8 5.5
6.0 4.8
2.6 it.1
2.1 ?..4
5.8 tl.s
9.7 t).0
3.8 3.9
3.1 3i.8
5.0 3i.l
4.r 3.6
3.1 4.2
2.2 3.4
4.7 6.0
7.0 8.1
2.6 4.8
3.1 4.6
3.0 3.4
3.7 4.9
4.0
-3.3
4.9
-5.9
4.9
-1,.2
-3.2
-5.0
-2.5
-2.2
-5.3
-6.8
-4.0
-0.4
-2.9
-3.8
Northern lreland
Unlted Kinqdom
17.7 18.6 t1.l
1 1.5 1 1.0 8.9
17.3
7.3
1(;.3 15.6 15.0
E.8 9.9 10.3
L7.r
7.0
-1.4
-2.7
-2.7
-t.z
EURl2
Average Obiective 1
10.7 10.5 9.9
15.4 15.5 15.8
9.0 8.2 E.5
r5.2 13.9 14.3
9.3 10.4
14.8 16.7
-2.2
-1.0
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Region
Ellada
1 986
5l
1987
49
1988
49
1 989
49
19gr
47
1 991
47
Galicia
Asturias
Oastilla- Le6n
Castilla- La Mancha
Exfemadura
Comunidad Valenciana
Andalucia
Murcia
Ceuta Y Melilla
Canarias
56
7l
66
55
45
72
53
68
&
70
7t
56
69
67
58
47
73
55
69
65
72
72
57
7l
67
60
49
73
55
67
65
74
73
58
72
66
62
48
74
56
69
63
74
74
57
70
6
63
50
76
58
7l
&
73
75
59
73
67
&
51
78
60
74
&
77
78
Corse
France
82
111
81
li0
80
110
79
lll
80
lt1
80
110
lreland 60 61 62 65 69 70
Campania
Abruzzi
Molise
Puglia
Basilicata
Calabria
Sicilia
Sardegna
Italia
69
89
78
73
65
60
70
75
103
69
90
78
74
66
61
7T
75
r03
69
89
80
75
66
58
68
75
103
70
90
79
75
&
61
67
74
103
70
90
79
74
65
57
68
74
102
70
91
79
74
65
57
68
74
105
Norte
Centro
Lisboa e vale do Tejo
Alentdib
Algarve
Acores
Madeira
Portugal
46
38
70
34
39
45
39
75
34
40
47
39
72
34
47
49
39
74
34
46
50
39
76
33
48
52
41
80
35
50
52 54 54 55 56 59
Northem lreland
United Kinqdom
79
102
78
104
78
105
77
103
76
101
72
95
EURl2
Averaqe Obiective 1
100
61
100
62
100
62
100
63
Region
Eliada
:{ ;a ttr.i :i ..r i: .i i.iili :iiiii.i:+:iii :ii i. .i . }: :ir: i. .., .
GDP/employed
(EURI2 
= 
100)
Galicia
Asturias
Castilla 
- 
Le6n
Castilla 
- 
La Mancha
Extremadura
Comunidad Valenciana
Andalucia
Murcia
Ceuta Y Melilla
Canarias
Espafia
5.5
4.5
11.8
8.7
12.9
19.8
zt.l
26.5
27.2
17.1
16.3
&
89
85
76
72
95
89
96
tt4
105
95
65
90
82
88
79
91
90
89
92
108
94
Corse
France
75
3.6
l0l
l14
95
tt7
lreland 4.1 81 94
Campania
Abruzzi
Molise
Puglia
Basilicata
Calabria
Sicilia
Sardegna
Italla
2.9
6.3
3.1
2.5
4.9
-2.2
2.0
8.5
2.9
83
90
82
87
76
74
89
90
r0r
88
92
86
92
76
76
90
87
105
Portugal 3A :53 6l
Northern lreland
United Kingdom
5.2
5.6
t36
94
79
88
EUR12
Average ObJective 1
6.4
6.4
r00
't5
100
78



t
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1t
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
n,
29
24
25
26
27
28
a
30
31
9.
E}
34
3!t
36
37
38
3!t&
41
42
43q
45jt6
47
tt8
49
50
51
52
sil
54
55
55gl
58
59
60
61
Th0ringen
Mec lde nbu rg - Vo rp o rrn ern
Sachsen
Alentejo
(D)
(D)
(D)
(P)
(D)
(GR)
(D)
(GR)
Sachsen - Anhalt
Voreio Aigaio
Brandenburg
lpeiros
Guadeloupe
Centro
DytlklEllada
Anatolikl Make, Thraki
lonia Nisla
Thessalia
Rdunion
Kriti
Kentrlki Makedonia
Peloponnisos
Algarve
Ertarnadura
Dytiki Makedonia
Norte
Notio Algalo
Attikl
Martinique
Guyane
Andalucia
Calabrla
Sterea Ellada
Galicia
Castllla - La Mancha
Ceuta Y Melllh
Baslllcata
Castllh - le6n
Sicilia
lreland
Campanla
Murch
Asturlas
Puglh
Sardegna
Cantabria
Canarlas
(R
(P)
(GR}
(GR)
(GR) 
.
(GR)
(R
(GR)
(GR)
(Gn)
(P)
(E)
(GR)
(P)
(GR}
(GR)
(R
(R
(E)
(l)
(cR)
(E)
(E)
(E)
0)
(E)
(t)
(rRL)
(t)
(E)
(E)
(t)
(t)
(E)
(E)
Northern lreland (Ulq
Comunldad Valenclana (E)
Llsboa e vale do Tefo (P)Merseyside (URHighlands,lslands (UK)
South Yorkshire
Hainaut
Flevoland
(UK)
(B)
(NL)Molbe (l)Corse (R
Gornwall, Devon (UR
Northumberland, Tyne, Wear (UK)
Clwyd, Dyfed, Gurynedd, Pourys (UK)
L0neburg
Namur
Uncolnshlre
Friesland (NL)
Cleveland, Durham (UK)
(D)
(B)(uR
192


,Reqions of t1:a:-l _ Y 
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t
I
I
Rank i
l
0.6
6.9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
I
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
I
!
I
:
l
,
1
l
i
I
I
i
:
!
i
i
i
:
t
t
I
I
:
I
1
!
i
I
i
j
i
I
I
I
J
i
i
i
tI
t
1
I
I
!
I
i
I{
I
!
t
,
I
i
I
I
I
I
i
I
I
I
It
i
i
1
I
I
I
i
!
i
I
I
t
t
t
I
I
I
i
I
I
!
I
I
I
I
l
I
I
I
,
I
I
i
I
:
I
l
Region
R6union
Andalucia
Extremdura
Ceuta Y Melilla
Canarlas
Guadeloupe
Martinique
Guyane
Sicilia
Campania
Basilicata
Pafs Vasco
Murcia
Calabria
Comunidad Valenciana
Sardegna
Asturias
lreland
Castilla - Le6n
Cantabrla
Castilla - La Mancha
Northern lreland
Galicia
Mecldenburg-Vorpommern
Puglia
Molise
Merseyslde
Catalufra
Sachsen - Anhalt
Madrid
Hainaut
[-a ng ue doc- R o us si | | o n
Th0ringen
West Midlands (County)
Provence-Alpes-C6te d'Azur
Nord - Pas{e-Calals
Greater London
Brandenburg
Northumberland, Tyne, Wear
Sachsen
Rioja
Arag6n
Dumfries-Gall,, Strathclyde
Haute-Normandie
South Yorkshire
Cleveland, Durham
Baleares
Poitou-Charentes
Humberside
Aquitaine
Navarra
Li6ge
Abruzd
Corse
Highlands, lslands
Attiki
Groningen
9st for Storebalt
lpeiros
Greater Manchester
(F)
(E)
(E)
(E)
(E)
(F)
(F)
(F)
(0
(t)
(t)
(E)
(E)
(l)
(E)
(t)
(E)
(rRL)
(E)
(E)
(E)
(UK)
(E)
(D)
o
(t)
(UK)(q
(D)
(E)
(B)
(F)
(D)
(UR
(F)
(F)
(UK)
(D)
(UK)
(D)
(E)
(E)
(UK)
(F)
(UK)
(UK)
(E)
(F)
(UR
(F)
(E)
(B)
(!)
(F)
(UK)
(GR)
(NL)
(Dlq
(GR)
(utq
37.0
21.4
26.3
25.6
25.1
24.0
24.0
t6.0
2t.7
2t.l
2t.o
20.0
9.7
9.4
9.0
8.5
7.7
7.3
6.9
6.9
5;l
5.6
5.1
4.9
4.8
4.7
4.4
4.7
t3.7
3.5
5.5
3.3
3.1
2.6
2.6
2.5
2.3
2.2
304.2
DO.5
279.9
27t.7
267.O
250.5
239.9
23t.3
230.4
224.0
273.5
2t2.5
208.8
246.4
202.2
196.2
88.4
83.3
79.6
79.3
67.2
65.8
60.3
58.8
157.5
r56.5
r52.5
50.8
45.3
43.6
4t.8
41.6
39.3
33.6
r33.6
32.4
31.2
29.4
26.7
25.9
25.8
75.4
25.O
24.8
24.5
24.5
23.3
2r.0
20.5
20.3
r 18.0
n6.2
rr6.l
1t4.7
I 14.1
rr2.6
1r2.6
l n.7
il t.l
r09.9
45.0
57.8
49.5
63.6
74.5
39.0
53.0
54.0
67.5
70.2
&.5
89. r
71.3
57.9
76.0
74.2
71.5
68.0
6.7
74.4
63. l
75.1
58.3
33.0
74.1
78.8
76.7
92.7
35.0
94.4
77.6
85.1
30.0
95.0
101.5
89.8
l5 l-2
36.0
80.4
33.0
u.6
84.8
88.4
t08.4
'17.5
83.8
98.3
90.5
95.4
t03.3
95.9
95.8
90.2
79.8
76.9
52.3
127.4
90.0
36.2
91.7
l.l
0.t
1.5
0.4
0.3
0.1
5.2
5.8
0.6
z.l
t.0
2.2
3.8
t.7
l.l
3.5
L6
0.5
1.7
1.6
2.8
r.9
4.1
0.3
1.4
6.0
2.9
4.9
t.3
2.1
2.6
2.6
4.3
4.0
6.8
2.6
1.4
4.8
0.3
t.2
2.5
r.7
t.3
1.2
0.7
1.6
0.9
2.8
o.5
1.0
1.3
0.3
0.3
3.5
0.6
0.6
0.3
2.6
o.2
?.2
L5
L5
3.0
3.1
3.2
3-2
4-7
64
6.6
7-2
7.5
8.t
9.2
9.7
10.0
l1.0
I1.8
r t.9
t2.4
2.9
3.7
4.3
5.4
5.5
6.0
7.7
8.5
l1.9
I1.9
l1.8
l t.8
I1.8
tt.7
n.7
tt.7
I r.6
I t.4
I t.3
I 1.3
ll.t
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.5
0.3
?n.o
20.3
20.9
2t.7
22.5
23.7
24.8
26.8
27.6
28.0
29.4
8.4
29.8
30.5
3r.0
31.4
31.7
31.9
32.4
32,.6
33.4
33.6
33.9
34.2
34.3
34.4
35.4
35.6
35.'l
35.8
36.6
Region
Rate
Population 1991
i;t"i i 
"ururiiir"(in millions) ishare (in %)
62
63
64
66
65
67
68
69
70
72
71
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
t0
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Namur
Picardie
(B)
(F)
(UK)
(UK)
(DK)
(F)
(NL}
(F)
(GR)
(F)
(F)
(UK)
(F)
(F)
(GR)
(UK)
(utq
(F)
(D
0)(DK)
(F)(utq
(NL)
(F)
(F)
(GR)
(D)
(UK)
(uK)
(F)
(UK)
(UR
(F)
(D)
(UK)
(UK)
(P)
(B)
(UK)
(F)
(UK)
(t)
(UK)
(NL}
(UK)
(t)
(UK)
(UK)
(GR)
(uK)
(GR)
(NL)
(NL)
(UK)
(D
(NL)
(NL)
(NL)
(NL)
10.1
l0.l
10.0
t0.0
10.0
9.9
9.9
9.7
9.5
9.5
9.5
9.4
9.4
9.3
9.3
9.3
9.1
9.0
8.9
8.9
8.8
8.8
8.7
8.7
8.6
8.5
8.5
8.5
8.4
8.4
8.3
8.3
8.2
8.1
8.1
E.1
8.1
8.0
8.0
8.0
7.9
7.8
7.8
7.7
7.7
7.7
7.6
7.5
7.5
7.5
7.4
7.4
7.4
7.3
7.2
7.2
7.2
7.r
7.1
7.1
107.5
107. I
106.0
105.7
r05.7
105.6
105.5
to3.2
100.8
100.6
100.6
99.t'
99.5
98.9
98.8
98.6
96.:l
95.6
94.5)
94.1'
93.9
93.c)
92.1',
92.r
91.1
90;1
90.5
90.1
89.3
89.0
88.4
88.2
87.2
86.3
85.8
85.7
85.7
85.1
84.8
84.6
E4.3
83.1
82.8
82.3
81.4
8 r.3
80.7
80.0
79.7
79.5
78.9
78.6
78.3
77.2
76.7
76.4
76.1
75.8
75.r
75.r
82.6
95.2
84.5
80.2
99.4
9t.7
83.6
97.6
35.2
98.9
l10.7
92.2
tog.7
t03.0
40.8
90.3
94.3
93. l
l15.8
98.9
126.7
9t.4
81.1
8E.5
95.3
95.2
50.2
I163
90.2
86.8
86.8
9l.l
92.5
r66.8
149.7
106.6
83.1
33.9
103.3
t04.0
t0/..z
91.9
r29.6
84.8
l13.8
r03.3
109.4
87.5
104.6
58.0
99.8
43.7
78.1
89.7
t02.6
I19.6
94.8
88.9
106.3
108.7
o.4
1.8
1.8
1.5
2.8
1.3
0.6
3.t
0.2
1.6
1.3
2.1
5.4
2.4
o.7
2.O
1.9
2.3
t;l
o.8
1.7
2.8
1.1
o.4
2.4
1.4
0.3
3.4
1.5
1.5
o.7
1.4
l.l
10.7
o.7
2.O
0.6
0.5
o.7
1.0
1.1
1.7
0.1
1.4
2.4
0.5
3.6
1.2
1.5
0.6
2.1
o.7
o.2
1.0
1.5
4.4
l.l
1.8
3.2
0.4
38.2
38.7
39.2
40.5
40.1
40.9
41.0
4t.9
42.O
42.8
42.4
43.4
45.0
45;l
45.9
46.4
41.O
41.7
48.7
48.4
48.9
49.7
50.0
50.2
50.9
51.3
51.3
52.3
52.8
53.2
53.4
53.8
54.2
57.2
57.4
58.0
58.2
5E.4
58.6
58.9
59.2
59.7
59.7
60.1
60.8
60.9
62.O
62.3
62,7
62.9
63.5
63.7
63.8
&.1
&.5
65.8
65. l
66.6
67.6
67.7
i Gnpnt, Mid Glamorgan
i Cornwall, Devon
Auvergne
Friesland
Pays de la Loire
Voreio Aigaio
Bourgogne
West Yorkshire
RhOneAlpes
Centre
: DytikiEllada
: Ilerbyshire, Nottingham
i Bord-Centr-Fife-Lothian-Tay
i Lorraine
i Uguria
i Umbrla
i Hovedstadsregionen
i Berlin
: Kent
i essex
i Umousini Lancastrire
i Franche4omtd
i Hampshire,lsle of Wight
i Valb d'Aosta
: Salop, Staffordshire
i Noord-Holland
i Cumbrla
i Toscana
i fbreford, Worcs, Warwick
: L-eicester, Northampton
i Sterea Ellada
i East Anglia
; Thessatia
i Flevoland
i Overiissel
i Bedford, Hertfordshire
r Piemonte
: Umburg
: Gelderland
i Zuid-Holland
i Zeeland
, llaari-E
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